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Abstract 
The thesis extends the conceptual boundaries of authoritarianism to include 
dominant party systems that meet the procedural definition of democracy but 
exhibit low degrees of government contestability due to the extensive application of 
clientelism.  
The first part re-introduces Robert Dahl’s notion of ‘inclusive hegemony’ which 
encapsulates the stance of political pluralism on dominant party systems. The thesis 
develops two arguments in support of a Dahlian approach to dominant party 
systems. The normative argument discusses the associations between power, 
incentives, collective action and party organisation to indicate that, in the absence of 
physical coercion and intimidation, inclusive hegemony is a paradoxical outcome 
that can only be sustained by the application of a political strategy producing an 
effect on political behaviour similar to that of coercion. The discussion illustrates 
the practice of clientelism as the most pertinent explanatory variable. The second 
part develops a series of analytical arguments which update Dahl’s approach in 
order to meet the criterion set up by the contemporary literature for distinguishing 
between authoritarian and democratic dominant party systems, according to which 
the strategies and tactics associated with the establishment of a dominant party 
system determine the character of the regime. The set of argument addresses two 
questions: a) how clientelism can be causally associated with the rise and 
consolidation of an inclusive hegemony and b) whether clientelism is compatible 
with typical properties of democracy. The causal model presented indicates how 
clientelism affects political behaviour and overall competition. By incorporating 
agential and structural parameters it explains the consolidation of inclusive 
hegemonies. The same model provides the grounds for the formulation of two 
arguments on the democratic credentials of clientelism which allows the analysis to 
pass judgment on the character of inclusive hegemonies.  
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Chapter 1 
Dominant party systems: conceptualisation, causality and assumptions 
 
1.1 Inclusive hegemony: problems of conceptualisation  
Dominant party systems cut across the boundaries between typical democracy and 
authoritarianism. The growing literatures on dominant party systems and semi-
authoritarianism seek to address two fundamental questions: to classify dominant 
party systems along the typical conceptions of democracy and authoritarianism and 
to identify explanatory variables that can be associated with the rise and 
consolidation of dominant party systems. These two questions are interrelated. The 
nature of one-party dominance can only be assessed in full after the explanatory 
variables associated with the rise of party dominance are identified. Likewise, 
making hypotheses about possible explanatory paths cannot refrain from passing 
judgment on the character of the regime they produce.   
It is on this basis that the literature on dominant party systems has drawn a 
distinction between authoritarian and democratic dominant party systems.  
Following a Schumpeterian-procedural approach to democracy, it has been 
effortlessly concluded that dominant parties are authoritarian when tools such as 
physical violence, fraud and intimidation, are employed to distort the genuine 
representation of voters’ preferences, posing restrictions to public liberties that 
interfere in the way voters’ preferences are formed and represented in politics. 
However, the literature has remained inconclusive about dominant parties facing 
low degrees of political competition, which do not, however, pose any of these 
direct hindrances to political participation. In this type of party system the exposure 
of the dominant party to contestation is limited yet political dominance is achieved 
and maintained through practices that do not directly block political participation. 
This form of party dominance can be associated with Robert Dahl’s notion of 
‘inclusive hegemony’ – a party system facing low degrees of contestability (1971:8, 
34), based on his conception of democracy as polyarchy, which includes two 
dimensions, participation and contestation (Dahl, 1971:1-9). Low contestability 
refers to a state of affairs in which, despite the presence of elections open to all 
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parties, a party stays in power over a long period of time facing no serious challenge 
by other political force with no foreseeable prospect of losing power.  
The notion of inclusive hegemony substantially broadens the conceptual boundaries 
of dominant authoritarian party systems to include regimes that offer political 
forces an open structure of participation but in which no other political forces exist 
that is truly antagonistic to the government party (c.f. Sartori, 1987:196). A number 
of contributions in the literature on semi-authoritarianism inspired by the concept of 
inclusive hegemony built regime categories with reference to actual political 
systems with limited government contestability, to name a few, ‘electoral 
authoritarianism’, ‘hegemonic regimes’, ‘guided democracies’ and ‘managed 
democracies’ (Schedler 2006; Diamond, 2002; Colton and McFaul, 2003; McFaul, 
2005, Wegren and Konitzer, 2007). The analytical strategy there was to build 
regime categories on the basis of observations from case-studies of characteristics 
thought to deviate from typical democracies. The authors refer to numerous 
practices employed by the regimes to thwart the development of a challenging 
opposition: a combination of authoritarian controls, the banning of candidates, the 
use of secret police and, finally, corruption and clientelism, all presented as 
empirical evidence illustrating case-specific developments. 
Nevertheless, this form of regime categorisation is contingent on the authors’ own 
normative standards of how democracy should operate, often reflecting idealistic 
and debatable standards of what democracy should be. In addition, it is unclear how 
each of the practices mentioned as constitutive of the regime type has a causal 
relevance to the cases independently as well as which causal mechanism each of 
these practices unleashes does indeed lead to a particular political outcome. This 
reveals fundamental problems in conceptualising regime types on the basis of 
empirical observations alone, which usually involves a basket of explanatory factors 
consisting of tactics obviously authoritarian in nature as well as other manipulative 
practices common in democratic countries too.  
In this light, the application of a Dahlian approach in the context of dominant party 
systems needs to justify why inter-party contestability is an inherent characteristic 
of democracy against minimalist and purely procedural definitions of democracy 
according to which inclusive hegemonies should be seen as democracies given that 
there are free elections open to participation allowing the preferences of voters to be 
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genuinely mirrored in electoral results (c.f. chapter one). From this minimalist 
perspective, in the absence of coercion or threat of coercion, the dominant party 
simply enjoys high levels of popularity in the polls and, consequently, its limited 
exposure to contestability should be seen as the outcome of free vote. In that view, 
while Dahl’s pluralist approach to democracy is an important contribution to 
typological conceptualisation, the type of dominant party system defined by Dahl as 
an inclusive hegemony cannot be equated with an authoritarian regime. As an 
axiomatic definition of democracy Dahl’s normative standard of polyarchy cannot 
elicit uncritical support and provides an inadequate defence of the position that 
inclusive hegemonies should be seen as non-democracies simply because they lack 
a high degree of inter-party competitiveness.  
It follows from this objection that the position of inclusive hegemonies along the 
lines of democracy and authoritarianism remains contingent on alternative 
normative conceptions of democracy and that classification on the basis of 
particular normative interpretations of democracy is vulnerable to objections raised 
by different ideological viewpoints (Suttner 2006:277).  As a result, regime types 
based on a Dahlian approach to democracy remain debatable against more 
minimalist and procedural understandings of democracy. Contestability is a 
controversial benchmark for assessing the democratic credentials of dominant party 
systems. Consequently, dominant party systems with low levels of contestability 
that meet the procedural benchmark of open participation unhindered by typical 
authoritarian practices continue to be a grey area lurking somewhere between the 
typical boundaries of democracy and authoritarianism. The above notes expose the 
limitations of adopting a normative conception of democracy that does not justify 
why the main methods or strategies by which a regime is primarily sustained are 
incompatible with agreed democratic standards (as the criterion in the literature on 
dominant party system requires).  
This problem has both theoretical and real-world implications. It can still be argued 
that a party system where a single party stays in power without recourse to typical 
authoritarian restrictions and retains a high level of popularity over a large period of 
time is democratic as long as it still provides a free electoral process. Long-standing 
incumbency achieved after a series of electoral victories by a huge margin can be 
seen as a rare but genuine and legitimate outcome of democratic politics reflecting 
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high popularity scores. But as Huntington observed ‘the sustained failure of the 
major opposition political party to win office necessarily raises questions 
concerning the degree of competition permitted by the system’ (Huntington, 
1991:7). Hence, lack of conceptual clarity regarding the boundaries between 
authoritarian and democratic dominant party systems brings forth the need for a 
clear criterion on the basis of which to make a defensible distinction.  
One plausible way to address this problem is to provide a convincing normative 
argument in support of Dahl’s thesis, which would offer a sophisticated line of 
reasoning as to why contestability is an inherent characteristic of democracy by 
inevitably relating to alternative viewpoints, either by means of a defence of the 
pluralist thesis against opposing views or through a synthesis towards a common 
denominator that could confirm that contestability should remain one of the criteria 
for distinguishing between democratic and authoritarian dominant party systems. 
A complementary approach would be to update the Dahlian approach to dominance 
to meet the standards set up by the contemporary literature on dominant party 
systems for distinguishing between democratic and authoritarian party systems 
(process qualifies outcome: c.f. Bogaards, 2004: 178). The pressing question ‘to 
specify the standing of the regime types they built in relation to the traditional 
concepts of democracy and authoritarianism’ (Munck, 2006:28) requires evaluating 
the processes and strategies associated with the establishment of particular regime 
(in Schumpeter’s words, the method) against basic and uncontroversial elements of 
democracy. Although there is no doubt about the authoritarian nature of regimes 
that resort to methods of coercion, intimidation and electoral fraud and pose 
restrictions to political participation, the picture is still blurred when it comes to 
dominant party systems that rely on softer tactics for manipulating preferences and 
behaviour, for instance, the extensive application of clientelism.
1
 Any attempt to 
clarify the status of these tactics is expected to perform two important tasks: a) 
establishing a causal path between the manipulative strategies such as clientelism 
and the establishment of an inclusive hegemony, and b) evaluating the 
incompatibility of the strategy against an uncontroversial standard of democracy. 
                                                             
1
 Broadly defined as ‘the use or distribution of state resources on a nonmeritocratic basis for political 
gain’ (Mainwaring: 1999:177) and in use here interchangeably with the term ‘patronage’. 
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In relating explanatory variables to political outcomes, establishing causality and 
aggregate effect is particularly problematic. The problem is daunting for empirical 
studies that often assume causality and take as given the aggregate effect of 
examined variables on political developments (such as clientelism, the use of secret 
police and other state resources, electoral-law restrictions, elite settlements etc.) 
without assistance by a theoretical model that could illustrate when, how and to 
what extent each of these variables can produce an aggregate political effect. This 
becomes more perplexing when references to clientelism are made in the context of 
dominant party systems given that the practice has been widely studied as a form of 
political mobilisation in competitive political systems and modern democracies too, 
and knowing that it is often seen as a phenomenon induced by high levels of 
competition.  
An empirical inquiry into the association between clientelism and political outcome 
in general also confronts the difficulty of controlling all other interfering variables 
involved in producing case-specific political developments. A number of factors 
have been said to contribute to one-party dominance: a centrist/median-voter 
political position (Riker, 1976; Sartori, 1976; Cox 1997; Groseclose, 2001), 
electoral law arrangements (Greene 2007), socio-economic coalitions (Pempel, 
1990) a catch-all strategy and various sources of incumbency advantage (Levitsky 
and Way: 2010). We are still missing a causal path by which to establish whether or 
when a given political tactic is theoretically close to being a sufficient condition for 
the establishment of one-party dominance regardless of the presence of other factors 
observed by case-studies.  
A second challenge stemming from the standard which the literature on dominant 
party systems is to distinguish between authoritarian and democratic dominant party 
systems according to which the processes and tactics causally associated with the 
establishment of a dominant party system shall determine the nature of the regime 
itself (process qualifies outcome). Once a causal path is identified, we are interested 
in discerning whether the hypothesised practice unleashing this causal path 
contravenes accepted standards of democratic process in order to pass judgment on 
the nature of the regime it generates. This is, however, particularly problematic 
when it comes to ‘softer’ forms of electoral mobilisation such as clientelism, which 
are associated with dominant party systems but are also found in competitive multi-
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party systems. So far, this remains the main reason why the status of inclusive 
hegemonies remains unclear. It is debatable whether any of the softer party 
strategies assumed to be the possible explanatory variables of the phenomenon 
could be seen as incompatible with democratic politics.  
Hence, a defence of the Dahlian thesis on hegemony requires the prior identification 
of strategy that can lead to this outcome in the absence of violence, intimidation and 
fraud, as well as the development of an argument about the democratic credentials 
of the strategy itself, which is what shall place the party system on the side of either 
authoritarian or democratic regimes. The two analytical challenges together lead to 
formulation of a higher benchmark with regard to the status of inclusive hegemony 
can be framed as follows: 
A dominant party system is authoritarian if it meets two requirements: a) 
there is low government contestability in various arenas of political 
contestation and b) the means employed to achieve this state of affairs are 
essentially non-democratic 
This standard raises the threshold an inclusive hegemony should pass to be 
classified as authoritarian. Defined by low degrees of government contestability, an 
inclusive hegemony apparently meets the first criterion. But given that all parties 
have been given an equal opportunity to stand for election and all voters freely cast 
a vote, more should be said about the nature of the strategies employed to limit the 
dominant party’s exposure to contestation.   
1.2 Clientelism: conceptual and analytical problems 
Clientelism has been identified as a potential explanatory variable in a number of 
empirical and analytical works on dominant party systems (most notably, Greene, 
2007, 2010a and 2010b; Levitsky and Way 2010). In light of the above-mentioned 
remarks, a contribution to the debate would be to clarify a set of assumptions and 
causal claims that have hitherto remained implicit in theoretical and empirical 
works: a) a claim that clientelism is an abuse of state power that is incompatible 
with democracy, and b) an assumed causal link between clientelism and political 
mobilisation.  
The main problem with the first association is that clientelism is ubiquitous in 
democratic systems (c.f. Clapham, 1982; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; Roniger 
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and Günes Ayata, 1994; Piattoni, 2001). A pragmatic view of clientelism 
understands it as a form of political involvement in the distribution of resources 
associated with rational behaviour in the context of competitive politics. The very 
notion of distributive politics suggests that government distributed resources are 
excludable and rivalrous, and that multiple actors and groups are in competition for 
access to political power. As chapter four explains, particularistic politics by 
definition generates inbuilt incentives for clientelism on the side of both politicians 
and economic actors. Like any form of particularistic politics, clientelist exchange 
serves clients to get access to resources and politicians to incentivise political 
support and form active groups of supporters. The re-marketisation of government-
distributed resources is the result of these two parallel competitive processes. 
Hence, clientelism can be seen as another instance of particularistic politics that 
highlights the interplay between the government’s capacity to distribute economic 
resources and the political incentives that emerge from the manner in which this 
distribution is performed via politics. The question remains where to draw the line 
between legitimate and illegitimate particularistic politics regardless of whether 
there are any reproachable intentions behind clientelist exchange. For inclusive 
hegemonies to be regarded as authoritarian, the requirement here is for a convincing 
argument to explain why clientelism – or at least the type of clientelism associated 
with limited contestability in an inclusive hegemony – is essentially a non-
democratic instrument of political manipulation.  
The second problem concerns the assumption of causality ascribed to observed 
patterns of clientelism in empirical studies and reveals the need to trace the causal 
mechanisms that remain thus far implicit behind claims on causal effect. References 
to clientelism as an abuse of state power that by virtue of its scale generates an 
authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Way, 2010; also in Greene, 2007; 2010a and 
2010b) are still too generic to exclude democracies where clientelism has an intense 
and widespread presence in political competition. The problem was stressed by 
Bennet and George (1997) as an important analytical issue for research that seeks to 
make inferences either by statistical association alone or merely in historical 
narratives. For Bennett and George explanatory variables produce causal effects 
through processes and intervening variables that should be identified either 
inductively or deductively through ‘process-tracing’ (Bennett and George, 2005; 
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also Sayer, 1992: 104-105). In this method of theory development, empirical works 
should trace a causal process in analytical steps and couch it in an explicit 
theoretical form (George and Bennet, 2005:211). However, empirical studies need 
to address the issues of causal variation, equifinality and spuriousness (George, 
1997).
2
  
An alternative approach is to follow a deductive strategy that generates with logical 
argumentation a testable hypothesis in the form of a causal mechanism showing 
how the hypothesised cause generates the outcome in a number of steps (George 
and Bennet, and Sayer’s introduction, 1992: 106-107). A hypothetico-deductive 
approach to analysis moves beyond making references to a set of empirical 
observations assumed to generate a causal effect, into building testable 
hypotheses/models associated with ideal-type regime types, which could serve as 
reference points for empirical testing by process-tracing and could enable 
‘structured iterations’ between theory and cases (George and Bennett, 2005: 233, 
234). Theory derived from a deductive approach can also be used for the building of 
more robust case-study explanations in the form of analytic narratives (Bates, 
1998).  
Establishing, however, a clear path of causality – here between clientelism and 
hegemony – still confronts two significant analytical problems. The first problem is 
to trace causal effect in micro-level interactions. The analysis of causality in the 
thesis is based on a rational choice assumption of utility maximisation behaviour, 
meaning that ‘any rational actor in a given context will choose precisely the same 
(optimal) source of action’ (Hay 2004:52). The extension of rational choice from 
economics to the area of political study relies upon the assumption that the same 
individuals act in both relationships (Buchanan, 1972:12). Rational choice allows 
the analysis to accommodate the impact of agential and structural factors on 
individual behaviour by determining the options and pay-offs individuals can 
choose from. It also explains cases where agency seeks to change the structural 
context with a view to constraining future behaviour. This makes rational choice a 
                                                             
2  For instance, in dominant party systems, legal and institutional barriers act  as de jure or de facto 
restrictions on the freedom of new parties to organise as well as ‘outright bans of the entry of new 
parties’ (Haggard and Kaufman, 267; also Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006). 
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powerful heuristic analytical strategy to explore collective behaviour by associating 
aggregates of rational calculations in response to given sets of structural incentives. 
The thesis’ treatment of clientelism at the micro-level moves beyond the limited 
view of clientelism associated with voting behaviour to examine the interface of the 
practice with other parameters of political action that could jointly produce a 
multiplying effect on political behaviour, and ultimately, on electoral mobilisation.  
Positive theory establishes a causal path between clientelism and limited 
contestability in the form of two linkages: tracing the causal effects of clientelism 
on the micro-level on the basis of rational choice analysis and hypothesising the 
impact of these effects on the macro-level based on a structure and agency approach 
that incorporates aggregate sets of incentives impinging on rational choice to 
ascertain aggregate impact. In addition, the model is sensitive to the various other 
parameters that influence political competition, such as social divisions and 
cleavages, policy failures, policy-related grievances, ideological differences, party 
factions. This is particularly helpful in allowing empirical research to make robust 
claims to causality on the basis of observed patterns in their case-studies.  
More analytically, clientelism is seen to act as a particular solution for political 
parties to the collective action problem they confront concerning the building of 
party infrastructure and campaign organisation, which is vital for electoral 
mobilisation. It is also seen as a mode of interest accommodation that bypasses 
heterogeneous and often irreconcilable social demands by allowing political parties 
to address demands through bilateral exchanges. By imposing a mode of policy 
supply that accommodates individual demands, the clientelist party is able to 
permeate pressures from social groups that can hardly be contained over a long 
period through general policy-making alone. In similar way, it manages to offset 
centrifugal tendencies that threaten to break its support basis. It is argued that it is 
mainly through the two processes that clientelism helps the party skew voters’ 
preference formation.  
The thesis then tackles a second issue: tracing aggregate causal effect by moving 
from the micro-level to the macro-level. Of interest here is a type of clientelism that 
serves as a unique method of party organisation and as an effective and inclusive 
form of interest accommodation offering a distinctive way of tackling divisions and 
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grievances stemming from diverse, conflicting and often irreconcilable interests. 
Both of these functions must give the dominant party an unparalleled capacity in 
electoral mobilisation. Because clientelism is a practice common in most 
democratic countries and is associated with high degrees of political 
competitiveness, at issue here is to identify a type of clientelism that can act as 
successful substitute for coercion, constraining political behaviour to such an extent 
that it produces one-party hegemony in a multi-party system open to the 
participation of other political forces. This type should entail a configuration of 
structural and agential variables which allows a single party to contain centrifugal 
forces that tend to erode power monopolies and usually lead to defections and, 
ultimately, to electoral defeat. As a solution to this problem, the analysis here is 
based on the assumption that on aggregate level the sum of individual risk 
assessments affected by the set of clientelist incentives and disincentives 
approximates the number of actors who are engaged in the sector of the economy 
where clientelist exchange takes place. The structural parameter that determines the 
scale and intensity of clientelism is the size of the economy that remains subject to 
clientelist incentives.  
1.3 Contents of the thesis: analytical steps to theory development 
The thesis offers a normative defence of the pluralist position upon which the 
concept of inclusive hegemony is founded (chapter two and three). It then updates 
Robert Dahl’s approach to meet the standard set by the literature on dominant party 
systems, according to which the strategies, processes and methods by which a 
dominant party is established and sustained determines whether it should be 
classified as democratic or authoritarian, by building positive theory linking a 
particular type of clientelism with the establishment and resilience of an inclusive 
hegemony (chapters four and five). This analysis feeds back into the normative 
question of evaluating the nature of hegemony (chapter six).  
More analytically, chapter two develops a normative argument that explains why 
limited contestability, though derived from Dahl’s pluralist viewpoint, runs counter 
to a basic, commonly shared and less controversial interpretation of democracy. The 
line of defence here gives additional support to the claim that inclusive hegemonies 
– dominant party systems exhibiting low degrees of contestability – are not 
democracies against the objections raised by other normative conceptualisations of 
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democracy according to which dominant parties simply reflect the true preferences 
of the majority expressed through an open and free electoral process. 
Chapter three adds empirical support to the pluralist thesis by revisiting historical 
narratives of democratisation to discuss the associations in political competition 
between power, incentives, collective action and party organisation. It concludes 
that in the absence of physical coercion and intimidation acting as hindrances to 
political behaviour in typical authoritarian regimes, inclusive hegemonies can only 
avoid the centrifugal pressures from social divisions and internal confrontations by 
making use of forms of power other than coercion to produce an effect comparable 
to that generated by coercion in authoritarian regimes. As well as supporting the 
pluralist expectation of social diversity producing high degrees of political 
competition, chapter three serves as a bridge to the analytical argument developed 
in the following chapters. The historical narratives point to an explanatory path: 
given the fact that social diversity offers real opportunities for different and 
autonomous political forces to emerge and engage in competition with one another, 
limited contestability can only be seen as the result of a significant power disparity 
between the dominant party and all other political forces.  In the absence of 
coercion this power asymmetry should be attributed to an unequal distribution of 
other resources besides coercion, economic and intellectual resources. This requires 
an understanding of how these sources of power impinge on political organisation 
and mobilisation. The analysis points to the practice of clientelism as the most 
pertinent explanatory variable.  
Chapter four explains why clientelism in party competition goes beyond vote-
buying portrayed in the typical conception of the phenomenon as ‘the direct 
exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to 
employment, goods, and services (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007:2). Rather, the 
chapter describes an alternative causal path between incentives, party organisation, 
interest accommodation and electoral mobilisation. First, it emphasises the role of 
campaign resources for persuasion and for activating social divisions into electoral 
support, which has been particularly highlighted by empirical works in the study of 
nascent political systems.  Campaign resources play a key role in enabling political 
parties to project strong and convincing political messages to appeal to the 
electorate.  Thus the link between party campaign and electoral results is narrowed 
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down to a link between party organisation in the form of recruitment and 
coordination of campaign resources and the conditions in which voters form their 
preferences. In this context, clientelism is seen to have an effect on electoral 
mobilisation not primarily through direct vote-buying, the typical conception of 
clientelism, but by affecting the recruitment of campaign resources without which a 
political party is unable to activate policy issues and cleavages into electoral support 
and become an effective contestant taking advantage of the open structure of 
participation. 
With clientelism seen as both a mode of interest accommodation and an incentive 
structure for political mobilisation, chapter five develops a model associating 
clientelism with the establishment and resilience of an inclusive hegemony. To 
assess how clientelism could serve the purpose of maintaining a power monopoly as 
effectively as coercion in typical authoritarian regimes,  the chapter looks for the 
aggregate effect of clientelism on political organisation and preference formation. 
For this purpose it incorporates the causal model of the previous chapter into a 
typology of clientelism that includes structural parameters to explain differentiation 
of impact on political competitiveness on the basis of different configurations of 
clientelist incentives and structural conditions. The notion of the ‘political sector of 
the economy’ is introduced, describing the range of state intervention in economic 
activity subject to high degrees of politicisation. Its size is associated with a low 
degree of political competitiveness manifested in the organisational weakness of the 
opposition forces, lack of autonomy of civil society and the containment of party 
factions by the dominant party.  
A discussion ensues in chapter six about the compatibility of clientelism with 
democracy in order to pass judgment on the character of inclusive hegemonies. This 
is a challenging task since the practice of clientelism is observed in typical 
democracies too. Convincing arguments should be stripped of debatable normative 
ideas and guidelines of how ideal democratic politics should operate. This is a 
requirement for the analysis to be consistent with the criterion set up by the 
literature according to which a regime is authoritarian only when it emerges and 
becomes consolidated by non-democratic means (process qualifies outcome). To 
defend the view that inclusive hegemonies are authoritarian party systems, the 
argument to be made is that clientelism has certain in-built properties that run 
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counter to core principles of democracy or, alternatively, that it performs functions 
under certain conditions that act in the same way the exercise of violence and 
physical intimidation restricts free political behaviour in typical authoritarian 
regimes. Two arguments are presented. The first explains why clientelism is an 
essentially non-democratic practice regardless of whether its exercise generates 
limited contestation. The second argument identifies the analogy between the use of 
state coercion in typical authoritarian regimes and the particular type of clientelism 
associated with inclusive hegemony in the way they both limit ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ 
from a sphere of domination, thereby depriving citizens of their freedom to choose 
their desired path of political behaviour. This sequence of arguments supports the 
thesis’ main argument that: 
 Inclusive hegemonies produced by extensive application of clientelism are 
authoritarian regimes, because both the outcome – limited contestability –  
and the causal process – clientelism – are antithetical to basic democratic 
properties.  
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Chapter 2 
Understanding one-party dominance: A deontological defence of the pluralist 
framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a critical overview of the literatures on dominant party systems and 
semi-authoritarianism with a focus on the normative concept of ‘inclusive 
hegemony’ put forward by Dahl. The purpose is to illustrate the problems inherent 
in distinguishing between democracy and authoritarianism either by placing 
emphasis on the existence of formal political liberties or, alternatively, by adopting  
Robert Dahl’s approach to democracy according to which party systems with an 
open structure of participation but low degrees of exposure to contestation are non-
democracies.  
The chapter argues that regime classifications based on Dahl’s normative principles 
are vulnerable to objections raised by a procedural approach to democracy that does 
not share the normative principles underlying the pluralist view of democracy as 
‘polyarchy’. While a number of empirical studies relate to Dahl’s approach and 
comfortably name regimes as ‘semi-authoritarian’ regimes, ‘electoral authoritarian’ 
regimes and ‘flawed’, ‘managed’ or ‘guided’ democracies (Diamond, 2002; Colton 
and McFaul, 2003; McFaul, 2005, Schedler 2006; Wegren and Konitzer, 2007), 
their benchmark of what constitutes democracy and authoritarianism could be 
criticised for reflecting subjective, deontological and highly debatable normative 
conceptions or at best for referring to a scale of political pathologies also found in 
modern democracies. Alternative conceptions of democracy could consider 
inclusive hegemony as the result of successful party strategies, effective party 
organisation, better mobilisation strategies, popular ideological programmes and a 
populist rhetoric whose democratic credentials, however, are not disputed. In that 
view, to claim that inclusive hegemonies are a subcategory of authoritarianism 
cannot be taken at face value and requires a defence of the pluralist thesis on 
contestability as an essential dimension of a genuine democracy.  
In response, the chapter develops an argument in defence of the pluralist view by 
reconstructing a basic etymological interpretation of democracy that serves as the 
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lowest common denominator of existing normative conceptions of democracy. If at 
the very basic core of the notion of democracy lies the command that democracy 
enables the demos, the body of citizens, to exert an important degree of influence on 
the exercise of state power (kratos) by virtue of their political liberties, Dahl’s’ 
concept of polyarchy should be read as a thesis on how this ideal standard of 
democracy can be approximated in the real context of inter-group antagonisms 
through party formation and other non-violent forms of political activity, which 
inevitably generate arenas of political contestation.   
2.2 Two bodies of literature 
The literatures on dominant-party systems and semi-authoritarianism have yet to 
engage fully in a systematic dialogue on the common challenges they face 
concerning the robust conceptualisation of distinctive regime types. Among the 
most critical questions is to specify the standing of the regime types they built in 
relation to the traditional concepts of democracy and authoritarianism (Munck, 
2006:28). The literature usually points to flaws in the formal electoral process, 
namely elections tainted with fraud, the banning of parties and the intimidation of 
political activists and voters.  
‘Authoritarian manipulation may come under many guises, all serving the 
purpose of containing the troubling uncertainty of electoral outcomes. Rules 
may devise discriminatory electoral rules, exclude opposition parties and 
candidates from entering the electoral arena, infringe upon their political 
rights and civil liberties, restrict their access to mass media and campaign 
finance, impose formal or informal suffrage restrictions on their supporters, 
coerce or corrupt them into deserting the opposition camp, or simply 
redistribute votes and seats through electoral fraud’ (Schedler, 2006:3).  
The state of the literature, however, remains inconclusive with regard to more subtle 
mechanisms of voters’ manipulation, even though it does make references to softer 
tactics and tools such as clientelism, the use of state funding and resources in 
political campaign and in pork-barrel politics. This demarcation problem arises 
from the absence of a prior agreement on what the basic standard of democracy is. 
The problem, as Suttner put it, is that any attempt to propound a particular concept 
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of democracy needs to address ‘the question of meanings of democracy in the 
plural’ (Suttner, 2006:286).  
The concept of a dominant party-system has a broader coverage of cases in which a 
political party has won several election victories often by a huge margin and over a 
long period of time. Electoral defeat seems a very unlikely event in the foreseeable 
future (Pempel, 1990; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999). Inspired by Maurice 
Duverger’s reference to a dominant party as one whose ‘influence exceeds all others 
for a generation or more’, and a party whose ‘doctrines, ideas, methods, its style, so 
to speak, coincide with those of the epoch’ and whose influence is such that ‘even 
enemies of the dominant party, even citizens who refuse to give it their vote, 
acknowledge its superior status and its influence’ (Duverger, 1954:308-9), the 
literature on dominant party systems has studied the characteristics of such systems 
and the causal processes associated with the emergence and consolidation of 
dominant parties. One-party dominance was observed across a much wider range of 
cases including post-war Japan and Italy, Sweden between 1932 and 1976, West 
Germany until 1966, Botswana, Israel until 1977, India under the Congress Party, 
Taiwan under the rule of the Kuomintang (KMT), post-apartheid South Africa, and 
a number of African states: 
‘In these countries, despite free electoral competition, relatively open 
information systems, respect for civil liberties, and the right of free political 
association, a single party has managed to govern alone or as the primary 
and ongoing partner in coalitions, without interruption, for substantial 
periods of time, often for three to five decades, and to dominate the 
formation of as many as ten, twelve, or more successive governments.’ 
(Pempel, T.J., 1990: 1-2) 
The literature sought to define observable and measurable traits to distinguish 
between dominant party systems and typical democracies, which included 
indicators such as legislative dominance, duration in office, minority party size and 
the number of legislative parties (Boucek and Bogaards, 2010: 219-229). The 
variables mostly in use are the size of parliamentary majorities and the length of 
incumbency (Bogaards and Boucek, 2010:6). Exact quantitative standards for 
parliamentary majority vary: some definitions require a plurality of votes and/or 
seats, while others raise the benchmark to an absolute majority (Bogaards 2004). 
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The seminal work of Pempel extended the notion of party dominance to four sets of 
observations: a) the number of legislative seats and offices held with at least a 
plurality needed for a party to qualify as dominant; b) a strong bargaining position 
vis-à-vis other parties – in cases where a party does not enjoy a parliamentary 
majority alone, it must be highly unlikely for any government to be formed without 
its inclusion; c) a substantial amount of time in power; and d) a strong impact of its 
government policies and projects that give a particular shape to the national political 
agenda (Pempel, T.J., 1990:3-4).  
Opinions vary in terms to how many elected seats a party should have in the 
parliament and how much time in power it should spend to qualify as dominant. A 
specific standard of measurement for dominant party systems was put forward by 
McDonald in the case of Latin American politics, demanding that a single political 
party should control a minimum of 60 percent of the seats (McDonald, 1971: 220). 
For Pempel, one-party dominance means permanent or semi-permanent governance 
(1990: 15), while for Doorenspleet, dominance can be achieved even after a single 
re-election (2003). For Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, the period of 
dominance should exceed at least two elections (2000: 27), while for Cox it ranges 
from 30 to 50 years (1997: 238). Alternatively, a more qualitative criterion for 
identifying dominance points to the ability of the party in power to determine social 
choice through policy and legislation, which is seen as an indication of increased 
party effectiveness in political competition (Dunleavy 2010). 
The notion of ‘meaningful elections’ has been a much-cited criterion for discerning 
a dominant party system (Przeworski et al., 2000). It entails the following 
requirements: 1) the chief executive and the legislative are elected in regular 
popular elections; 2) more than one party exists as all opposition forces are allowed 
to form independent parties and compete in elections; and 3) the incumbent does 
not engage in outcome-changing electoral fraud without which dominant-party rule 
would have ended. It also includes an alternation rule, which outside the US context 
can be interpreted as the incumbent losing elections after a reasonable number of 
electoral rounds. Dominant party systems are those that fail to meet the alternation 
rule.  
The alternation rule, however, was criticised for not distinguishing adequately 
between dominant parties that maintain their rule through democratic means and 
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those who do not (Bogaards and Boucek, 2010: 9). Using alternation as a single 
criterion would mean that Japan’s LDP, Britain’s Conservatives, Mugabe’s 
ZANU/PF and China’s Communist Party can be clustered together in the same 
category. Instead, in dominant authoritarian party systems, the parties in 
government are in control of not just the government but effectively of the entire 
political system, and can only be removed from power once genuinely free, fair and 
competitive elections have taken place (Bogaards, 2004, Bogaards and Boucek, 
2010:2). 
The proliferation of one-party dominance in a number of post-communist countries 
in the 1990s and 2000s has renewed scholarly interest in understanding and 
explaining this expanding phenomenon through further classification. The literature 
on dominant party-systems moved beyond its focus on observable characteristics of 
dominance to make a distinction between democratic and authoritarian cases on the 
basis of the means employed by the dominant party to achieve this state of affairs. 
The scholarship has hitherto adopted a democracy/non-democracy dichotomy, 
following Huntington’s approach (1991:11) in contrast with the literature on semi-
authoritarianism that has treated democracy as a continuous variable.
3
  The way to 
address the problem of demarcation between dominant parties and authoritarian 
dominant parties is to show that dominance is generated by the use of extra-
democratic means by the party in power (c.f. Bogaards, 2004: 178).  
The criterion mostly used for drawing a dichotomy between authoritarianism and 
democracy in the context of dominant party system has been a 
minimalist/procedural definition of democracy that requires electoral competition 
and inclusive participation to be unhindered by openly restrictive practices 
involving the use of coercion, intimidation and electoral fraud. Levitsky and Way 
(2002) proposed a set of criteria according to which a political system is a 
democracy when a) executives and legislatures are chosen through open, free and 
fair elections; and b) virtually all adults having the right to vote; c) political rights 
and civil liberties are widely protected, including freedom of the press, freedom of 
                                                             
3 A different view Storm (2008) built a continuum with a focus not ‘on the elements of democracy 
missing or weakened, but on the elements of democracy present’ (2008:223), which is quite useful 
for tracing progress in democratisation. On the other hand, Huntington’s approach that ‘it is either a 
democracy or not’ can be taken to imply that the same continuum should refer to a space of 
‘nondemocracy’ with differentiations on the basis of tougher or milder restrictions to political 
participation, and a subsequent range of regime types from traditional monarchies to one-party states 
that hold elections and multi-party systems with various forms of restrictions to political liberties.  
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association, and freedom to criticise the government without reprisal; d) the elected 
authorities possess real authority to govern and are not subject to the tutelary 
control of military or clerical leaders (Levitsky and Way, 2002:53).  
An important charge that can be levied against this approach is that it refrains from 
asking the question whether dominant party systems can be seen as authoritarian on 
the basis of deficiencies in the dimension of government contestability, despite the 
fact that the electoral process is open to public participation. If the traditional 
threshold separating democracies from non-democracies is placed on the existence 
of a multi-party system that allows free entry to, and participation in the electoral 
contest, soft manipulative practices that shape the interactions between rulers and 
the ruled will be left out. Hence, by adopting a dichotomous position on democracy 
and authoritarianism instead of projecting a continuum, and by reducing democracy 
to a system of representation defined solely by the availability of political rights to 
voters, the literature risks stretching the concept of democracy too far to include 
regime types that employ milder forms of authoritative controls while formally 
allowing a considerable scope for public participation.  
Following this ‘mandate’ approach to democracy (c.f. Sartori, 1967:126), one may 
conclude that dominance is the result of electoral choice when diverse and often 
conflicting preferences are channelled to central politics predominantly through the 
hierarchical system of decision-making in that single party. It may simply be the 
case that successive electoral victories by one party and quite often by a huge voting 
margin reflect a long-standing majority of voters’ preferences. Various reasons can 
be invoked: the incumbent was consistently successful in delivering policies 
approved by the majority, while the opposition constantly failed to put forward an 
alternative policy agenda equally appealing to voters. The opposition may be 
portrayed as simply out of touch with public sentiment and very poor at political 
communication. Given that each political force has been previously given the 
opportunity to form a political party and appeal to the electorate, one-party 
dominance may then be seen as a fully legitimate outcome under these 
circumstances; a peculiar yet genuine product of free political competition 
developing in a democratic system (Arian and Barnes, 1974). At first glance, 
election results and opinion polls from dominant party systems in post-communist 
countries could be seen to support that view. They indicate that the opposition 
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parties have been indeed weak in public opinion polls and that, for that reason, they 
have remained unable to pose a serious electoral challenge to the incumbent (tables 
1 and 2).  
Table 1: Election results of presidential elections by candidate in four post-communist 
countries: the incumbent versus the leader of the opposition  
Belarus 
2006, 2001, 1994 
Russia 
2008, 2004, 2000 
Kazakhstan 
2005, 1999 
Azerbaijan 
2003, 1998 
Alexander Lukashenka 
82.6% 
Alexander Milinkievic 
6.0% 
Dmitry Medvedev 
71.25%* 
Gennady Zyuganov 
17.96% 
Nursultan Nazarbayev 
91.15% 
Zharmakhan, Tuyakbay 
6.61% 
Ilham Aliyev* 
76.8% 
Isa Gambar 
14.0% 
Alexander Lukashenka 
75.6% 
Vladimir Goncharik 
15.4% 
Vladimir Putin 
71.31% 
Nikolay Kharitonov, 
13.69% 
Nursultan Nazarbayev 
81% 
Serikbolsyn Abdilin 
11.9% 
Heydar Aliyev 
77.6% 
Ehtibarc Mamedov               
11.3% 
Alexander Lukashenka 
80.1% 
Vyacheslau Kebich 
19.9% 
Vladimir Putin* 
52.94% 
Gennady Zyuganov, 
29.21% 
 
 
 
 
* Presidential candidate supported by the previous President. Sources:, http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, 
http://www.idea.int, Embassy of Kazakhstan in London, Центральная Избирательная Комиссия Российской 
Федерации.  
 
In these political systems it may be the case that the dominant party and the 
presidential candidate enjoy durable high levels of popularity that allows them to 
claim that their rule is legitimate. Any electoral irregularities observed in the 
elections were not too small to skew voting preferences and popularity scores and 
the dominant parties and candidates did indeed enjoy widespread support by the 
vast majority of voters. With the formal structure of democracy in place, the power 
monopoly of the incumbent appears to be justified as a reflection of majority 
preferences. Apologists of actual dominant party systems could come as far as to 
invoke the imagery of the dominant party encapsulating the common will of the 
nation and representing national unity at the level of government. If the threshold 
for dominant party systems to qualify as democracies is placed on the existence of 
an open structure of participation, the presence of some irregularities in the 
electorate system could classify most of these regimes at the very least as troubled 
democracies.  
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Table 2: Popularity of the incumbent in four post-communist regimes 
Putin (Russia) 
Re-elected 
2004 
More achievements as President, 60% in March 2001, 61% in March 2002, 
49% in March 2003, 58% in October 2004 (The Public Opinion 
Foundation Database, 11.10.2004) 
Trust in political figures (2004): Putin: 58%, Minister Sergei Shoigu: 25%, 
Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov, 12%, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 12%, 
Gennady Zyuganov, 8%,: All-Russian Public Surveys Center (VTsIOM), 
and gateway2russia.com 
Trust in the President: 58%, (Yuri Levada Analytical Center quoted by the 
Interfax news agency, December 2003) 
Trust in the President: 39% (Yuri Levada Analytical Center quoted by the 
Interfax news agency, December 2004) 
Trust in the President by Nation-wide: 47%, in 2003; 46%, in 2004; 52% , 
in 2006;, 49% , in 2006 (home interviews by The Public Opinion 
Foundation Database) 
Approval of President Putin: 85% (ROMIR Monitoring survey and  
newsfromrussia.com, 2.2.2004) 
Nazarbayev 
(Kazakhstan) 
Re-elected 
2005 
Support for Nazarbayev:77.65% (Xinhua News Agency, December, 4, 
2005) 
70% (Central Asia Monitor, September 9, 2005 and Jamestown 
Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 2. no. 170, September 14, 2005) 
70% (Eurasia Insight at Eurasianet.org, December, 1, 2005) 
76% (KazRating Agency, and Eurasia Insight at Eurasianet.org, 
November, 11, 2005) 
Aliyev, 
(Azerbaijan) 
Elected 2008 
Support for Ilham Aliyev: (78.3%, Azerbaijani ELS Independent 
Investigation Centre) 
(Belarus) 
Lukashenka 
‘Did you want him to be a President’: 48% ‘yes’ answers (IISEPS- 
Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research, 2001),  
40% -50% (BBC reporting for Belarus, September 8, 2001) 
60% support for Lukashenka, 11% for Milinkevich, 5% for Kozulin (All-
Russian Public Opinion Research Center and Angus Reid Global Monitor : 
Election Tracker 2006) 
 
Faced with these challenging objections, the literature on semi-authoritarianism has 
sought to discern in-between regime types distinct from typical democracies and 
traditional authoritarian regimes. Terms such as ‘semi-authoritarianism’, ‘hybrid 
regimes’, ‘sultanistic regimes’, ‘demagogical democracies’, ‘competitive 
authoritarianism’, and ‘illiberal democracies’ (c.f. Linz and Stepan, 1996:38-54; 
Eke and Kuzio, 2000; Mc Faul, 2005; Gill, 2002:4-5; Croissant, 2004; Merkel, 
2004) are amidst the colourful labels illustrating the particular deficiencies of the 
political systems to which they are attached. Efforts to build a more systematic 
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analysis have generated typologies of mutually-exclusive regime types on the basis 
of the properties of the political systems under consideration. For instance Gill 
(2002:4-5) made a regime typology of ‘façade democracies’ that includes  ethnic 
democracies, describing regimes in which an ethnic group is excluded from 
participation in the democratic process; plebiscitary democracies, in which the 
electorate has given the president a strong mandate, ‘a carte blanche’ that enables 
him to increase his powers and significantly limit the powers of the legislative and 
the judiciary; sultanism, where the president obtains unrestrained power and uses 
the state as his own property, reducing elections to a process that simply legitimises 
the president’s rule; and oligarchy, where power-sharing is limited to members of a 
closed elite.
4
   
In similar vein, Linz and Stepan created their own typology of non-democratic 
regimes: authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, and sultanistic regimes 
(1996, 38-54). In authoritarian regimes, power is exercised on the basis of ill-
defined but still predictable rules without an elaborate ideology. In totalitarian 
systems, political, economic and social pluralism has been eliminated by the 
unrestricted exercise of power in conditions of great unpredictability with ‘a 
holistic, guiding and utopian ideology’ that helps achieve mass mobilisation (Linz 
and Stepan, 1996, 40). Post-totalitarian regimes are either a form of degenerated 
totalitarianism or the early stage towards totalitarianism where social and economic 
diversity is limited, there is weak commitment to the guiding ideology and the 
members of the political elite exhibit some degree of political opportunism. Finally, 
sultanism refers to regimes dominated by a dynastic personality whose rule is not 
bound by institutional constrains.
5
 These descriptive categories, though building 
mutually-exclusive categories, lack a set of generally applicable criteria on the basis 
                                                             
4 Gill admitted that following a variation in the gravity, the frequency of incidents of political 
violence and the degrees of political pluralism, there may often be an overlap between these 
categories, and that some regimes will approach democracy while others will tilt towards 
authoritarianism. 
5 In a sultanistic regime, compliance with the leadership is secured by the instillation of fear among 
its subjects and on the granting of personal rewards to its allies. The leader is glorified; he 
occasionally mobilises people by a combination of coercive and patronage but often uses para-state 
groups to attack dissenters when necessary. ‘Sultanism’ entered the political vocabulary by Max 
Weber. In his book, ‘The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation’ and ‘Essays in Sociology’, 
Weber talked of sultanates where the sultan’s rule remains unrestricted by law and relies on a 
patrimonial bureaucracy to control the social basis. In modern use, the use of ‘sultanism’ was 
attributed to the former Soviet republics in Central Asia (Beichelt, 2004:116) and to post– Soviet 
Belarus (Eke and Kuzio, 2000). 
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of which the universe of political systems can be classified into distinctive 
categories.   
Nevertheless, one of the most important contributions by the literature on semi-
authoritarianism has been to move beyond the observation of flaws of the formal 
structure of participation to include deficiencies in the dimension of contestation. In 
that way, regime types such as ‘hegemonic regimes’ (Diamond, 2004) ‘electoral 
authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2006) and ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky and 
Way 2010; Linz and Stepan, 1996, 2010) enrich the literature on dominant party 
systems by pointing to the presence of dominant authoritarian party systems. Larry 
Diamond’s definition of hegemonic regimes describes systems where, despite 
regular, competitive multiparty elections, ‘the existence of formally democratic 
political institutions, such as multi-party electoral competition, masks the reality of 
authoritarian domination’ (Diamond, 2002, 24). In that view, dominant party 
systems of that type are electoral hegemonies, since the victory of the opposition 
party is an improbable event, requiring a level of ‘opposition mobilization, unity, 
skill, and heroism far beyond what would normally be required for victory in a 
democracy’ (Diamond, 2002:24).6. In similar vein, Schedler (2006:3) has used the 
term ‘electoral authoritarianism’ for regimes in which political offices are filled 
through multiparty elections, yet the electoral playing field is severely skewed in 
favour of the ruling party (c.f. Levitsky and Way 2010). Other authors have talked 
of ‘managed democracy’ or ‘guided democracy’ (Colton and McFaul, 2003; 
McFaul, 2005, Wegren and Konitzer, 2007). Ware has given a definition of a 
dominant party system in a more dramatic tone as one in which a single party never 
loses an election since the other parties are ‘without hope of being in government’ 
(Ware, 1996: 159 and 165).  
These qualitative definitions are quite distinct from the ones seeking to capture a 
dominant-party system on the basis of measurable indicators. On closer 
examination, they tackle the classification problem with an elaboration on the 
distinction between ‘predominant’ party systems and ‘hegemonic’ party systems by 
Sartori (Sartori 1976 and 1990; Von Beyme 1985; Ware 1996). According to 
Sartori, a predominant party system is a system in which the major party is 
                                                             
6 Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset made a similar observation in Politics in Developing 
Countries, xviii.  
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consistently supported by a winning majority of the voters, when other parties are 
not only permitted to exist, but do exist as legal and legitimate – if not necessarily 
effective – competitors of the predominant party. The other parties exist as ‘truly 
independent antagonists of the predominant party’ (1976/2005:173). Under a 
predominant party system, ‘it simply happens that the same party manages to win, 
over time, an absolute majority of seats (not necessarily votes) in parliament’ 
(1976/2005:173), and a predominant party can cease at any moment to be 
predominant. By contrast, Sartori’s definition of hegemonic party system was of a 
regime in which other parties are permitted to exist but actual competition is 
effectively thwarted. In Sartori’s terms, hegemonic systems are regimes that offer a 
structure of competition but face limited competitiveness (Sartori 1976/2005:194).   
The variety of labels for political systems reflects the wide range of authors’ views 
of how the regime in question diverges from their own conceptualisations of 
democracy. Subjective evaluations are manifested in the fact that the same set of 
observations has been described on the one side as illiberal democracies (Zakaria 
1997), demagogical democracies (Korosteleva, 2003), managed democracies or 
semi-democracies (Case 1996) and, on the other, as electoral authoritarianism 
(Schedler 2002) and competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2002 and 
2010). A particular problem with any attempt to avoid overstretching the concept of 
democracy by referring to diminished subtypes of democracy is that it may simply 
mask rather than solve the problem of conceptual stretching (Storm, 2008:217). The 
problem is more acute for the literature on dominant party system which does not 
use the term ‘semi-authoritarianism’ as a way to bypass clear-cut categorisations 
and, therefore, needs to take a clear position about to how to distinguish between 
democratic and authoritarian dominant party systems.  
In response to this analytical problem, Boucek and Bogaards put forward a broader 
set of criteria for the distinction between authoritarian and democratic dominant 
party systems that moves beyond a purely procedural standard. A dominant party 
system is democratic, when a) there are legal provisions guaranteeing de jure 
political rights of equality understood as ‘one person, one vote’, freedom of speech 
and opinion, freedom to form and join political parties that are allowed to contest 
elections, and equal eligibility for public office, b) multi-party elections are held 
under these rules, c) for emerging electoral democracies the country has been given 
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a rating of 4 or better on Freedom House’s scale of political rights, and d) recent 
elections have been considered ‘substantially’ free and fair, meaning that 
irregularities in the electoral process must have not affected the outcome. Based on 
those criteria, the authors classified party systems in Africa in three categories: 
democratic non-dominant; democratic dominant; and authoritarian dominant 
(Boucek and Bogaards, 2010: 203, 208).  
The inclusion of an assessment of the fairness of the electoral process moves 
beyond a narrow approach to democracy to reflect Huntington’s definition of a 
democratic political system as one in which ‘its most powerful collective decision 
makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates 
freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to 
vote’. (Huntington, 1991:7, emphasis added). What constitutes, however, free, 
competitive and fair elections still remains open to debate. The concept of 
authoritarian dominant party systems could then be extended as far as to include all 
dominant party systems on the presumption that regular alternation of parties in 
government is an inherent feature of democracy (c.f. Giliomee and Simkins, 1999) 
and that ‘true protection for the citizens of a liberal democracy lies less in the 
separation of powers or a Bill of Rights than in the actual use of elections to change 
bad and corrupt governments’ (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999: xviii and 2).  
A systematic effort  by Greene to distinguish between what he has labelled as 
‘competitive authoritarian’ single parties from ‘predominant parties’ that emerge in 
conditions of ‘more regular democratic turnover’ as well as from fully closed 
authoritarian regimes involved three tests (Greene, 2010b:810): to be classified as a 
dominant party system, a party system should meet a power threshold (1) and a 
longevity threshold (2); if it passes these tests, it will be classified either as 
authoritarian or democratic on the basis of how meaningful the electoral 
competition is (3). The power threshold in presidential systems requires that the 
incumbent controls the executive, the absolute majority of legislative seats and in 
federal systems, the majority of statehouses. For parliamentary and mixed systems, 
the party holding the premiership controls at least a plurality of legislative seats, 
which makes it impossible for any other party to form a government without the 
participation of the dominant party. The longevity threshold requires the completion 
of a four-election or 20-year threshold; party systems that have not yet reached the 
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longevity threshold are named proto-dominant party systems (Greene, 2010b:810). 
Once these thresholds are passed, a dominant party system is authoritarian when 
elections are not meaningful in the sense used by Przeworski et al. (2000) and, 
moreover, when the costs imposed on opposition actors in the form of intimidation 
and physical repression and any other forms of authoritarian controls are pervasive 
and fundamentally important in altering participation decisions of prospective 
activists (also see Greene, 2010a:156 and 158). The gain from Greene’s criteria is 
that what constitutes ‘authoritarian means to achieving dominance’ can now be 
extended to include any practices other than coercion that eventually produce a 
similar effect on the terms of political competition. 
Nevertheless, identifying what is responsible for imposing a cost on opposition 
actors, as Greene means it, is again open to interpretation of whether it constitutes a 
practice compatible with democracy, given that a wide range of practices create an 
incumbency advantage and raise the cost for the opposition in democracies too. If 
we agree that a dominant party system can be dubbed as authoritarian on the basis 
of the means by which dominance is achieved, we are still falling short of 
discerning which of the practices raising the cost in Greene’s sense must be 
regarded as incompatible with basic properties of democracy. In a nutshell the 
demarcation problem (drawing the boundaries between authoritarian and 
democratic party systems on the basis of the democratic credentials of the strategies 
used to achieve dominance) is still contingent on addressing the conceptualisation 
problem (defining an acceptable standard of democracy). 
The threshold for a practice to pass in order to qualify as compatible with 
democracy is raised by Robert Dahl’s conceptualisation of democracy as 
participation and public contestation (Dahl, 1971: 4, 8, 34). The relevance of this 
standard is that it can be used either as a direct benchmark of democracy against 
which dominant party systems can be assessed, or as a criterion for passing 
judgment on the democratic credentials of the practices associated with the rise and 
consolidation of a dominant party system.  
In the first case, a dominant party system can be seen as a subset of authoritarianism 
when it exhibits sizeable deviations in the dimension of contestation. For Dahl, an 
‘inclusive hegemony’ (Dahl, 1971:8, 34) is a regime-type that provides formal 
structures of participation, namely elections and the right to form political parties, 
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but faces low degrees of contestability. In other words, there is limited 
competitiveness despite the existence of a formal structure for competition (Sartori, 
1976). This runs counter to the expectation that the formal opportunities to vote, get 
elected and establish political organisations will inevitably give rise to a 
competitive political arena composed by autonomous parties and other independent 
social organisations that will strongly and vociferously articulate opposing political 
agendas in public debate, mobilise broader campaign support, and freely 
disseminate information and propaganda.  
In the second case, any practice that limits government’s exposure to contestation to 
the extent that it produces limited contestability (an inclusive hegemony) could be 
said to meet the criteria set up by the literature on dominant party systems for 
discerning a dominant authoritarian party system. More broadly, any serious 
hindrance to both dimensions other than the complete blocking of political 
participation – a characteristic of authoritarian regimes – would allow the analysis 
to construct distinctive regime categories. 
Nevertheless, while the definition of democracy as contestation open to 
participation is indeed a solid benchmark on which to distinguish between 
democracies and non-democracies and between democratic and non-democratic 
party strategies, claims based on this conception may not be convincing enough for 
those holding a different view of democracy. The idea that contestability is an 
inherent property of democracy is vulnerable to counter-arguments stemming from 
the ‘mandate approach to democracy’ according to which the absence of a high 
degree of multi-party competition can be plausibly regarded as the genuine result of 
electoral choice provided that the electoral process is open to all and that no 
application of fraud, intimidation or violence has skewed voters’ choice and 
political behaviour. On this interpretation, it merely happens that one party wins the 
popular vote by a huge margin, and popular claims, expectations and worries must 
be duly and fully represented into politics through the ranks of a single dominant 
party. This counter-argument can hardly be tackled by an axiomatic view of 
democracy. As a normative claim Dahl’s pluralist thesis on democracy needs to 
justify the position that contestation is a necessary precondition for democracy. In 
particular, the argument required to support the pluralist thesis on contestability is 
expected to defend the view that political competitiveness is both a necessary and 
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an inevitable property of democracy against alternatives approaches that regard 
inter-party contestability as a possible but not inevitable product of an open political 
system. The following section distils a common denominator from alternative 
definitions of democracy to support the claim that, if the basic command is to be 
met that democracy should give its citizens the opportunity structure required to 
defend themselves against state power, contestability stemming from autonomous 
collective organisation is a necessary condition. 
2.3 A defence of the pluralist approach to dominance  
The very fact that Robert Dahl’s polyarchy is one out of the numerous definitions 
given to democracy is an indication of how controversial and elusive the meaning 
of democracy is. This pluralist conception of democracy as ‘contestation open to 
participation’ and the concept of ‘inclusive hegemony’ (1971:8, 34) are premised 
upon an essentially normative claim that a high degree of between-party 
competition is an inherent characteristic of democracy. It follows for pluralism that 
a dominant party system situated in a multi-party electoral system should be seen as 
authoritarian if the dominant party is not exposed to a substantial degree of 
contestability effectuated by strong, autonomous and competing parties.  
Although most modern democracies fall short of the ideals espoused by this 
deontological definition and many others, definitions are important in that they 
create epistemological and practical yardsticks against which existing political 
systems are assessed. As Giovanni Sartori acknowledged, ideals and reality interact, 
and normative definitions of democracy exert deontological pressures on what 
democracy develops into: ‘what democracy is cannot be separated from what 
democracy should be’ (Sartori, 1962:4). The descriptive definition of what 
democracy is relies upon the normative view of what democracy ought to be. 
Deontological standards, however, vary depending on numerous alternative 
normative standpoints. Thus a better defence of the view that contestability is an 
inherent characteristic of democracy should relate to the common denominator 
found in various normative interpretations of democracy.  
The basic concept of democracy is captured by the etymology of the Greek word 
‘democracy’ as a combination of the words ‘demos’, the citizenry, and ‘kratos’, 
power. Brought together in a dialectical relation, democracy essentially means 
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‘power in the hands of the citizens’, or more broadly ‘rule by the people’. This 
commands a synthesis between two notions which have been historically standing 
in an antithetical relation. In essence, the very etymology of democracy sets up a 
dual, prescriptive and descriptive standard. On a normative level, this synthesis of 
the antithesis requires the subjugation of political authority to those upon which it is 
exercised. In actual democracies, it requires that the actual system of governance 
whereby political decisions are taken by central authoritative institutions come close 
to the ideal form of governance in which power is exercised by the people and for 
the people. It is important to specify how (or, if at all) this ideal can be 
approximated in modern systems of governance.  
Various approaches have pondered on how this deontological synthesis is to be 
achieved. A classical and rather uncontroversial definition of democracy places 
emphasis on the existence of a structure of political participation open to ‘all adult 
citizens not excluded by some generally agreed upon and reasonable disqualifying 
factor’ (Pennock, 1979:9). Democracy as  ‘rule by the people’ means that public 
policies are ‘determined either directly by vote of the electorate or indirectly by 
officials freely elected at reasonably frequent intervals and by a process in which 
each voter who chooses to vote counts equally’ (Pennock, 1979:9). This definition 
resonates with Schumpeter’s democratic ‘method’ as an ‘institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individual acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (1976:269).  
In similar tone, Seymour Martin Lipset saw democracy, ‘as a political system which 
supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, 
and a social mechanism that permits the largest possible part of the population to 
influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office’ 
(Lipset, 1960:45). This suggests that, thanks to a set of fundamental political rights 
equally distributed among its constituents, the citizens are expected to exercise 
some control over the structure of collective decision-making. In this view, the 
political system that approximates the ideal of ‘popular sovereignty’ involves a 
process by which citizens give a mandate to chosen candidates and parties in 
periodical elections.  
A more minimalist view perceives citizens’ control over power as the capacity to 
overthrow peacefully their rulers without recourse to a violent revolution – a 
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possibility that in all other regime types requires the use of force. Karl Popper’s 
minimalist definition of democracy is based on how the rulers come to lose power:  
‘The first type consists of governments of which we can get rid without 
bloodshed; that is to say, the social institutions provide the means by which 
the rulers may be dismissed by the ruled, and the social traditions ensure 
that these institutions will not easily be destroyed by those who are in 
power. The second type consists of governments which the ruled cannot get 
rid of except by way of successful revolution – that is to say, in most cases, 
not at all. I suggest the term “democracy” as a short-hand label for a 
government of the first type, and the term “tyranny” or “dictatorship” for 
the second’ (Popper, 2002, 132). 
Taken at face value, both the procedural and the minimalist view of democracy 
suggest that inclusive hegemonies should be regarded as democratic regimes 
provided they offer an open structure for participation for voters and political actors 
in which they participate without fear of suppression and intimidation and where 
they register their preferences without fraud contaminating the weight of their votes. 
At first glance, this procedural view of democracy requires only part of what the 
pluralist view demands to regard a political system as being a democracy.  
Participation, however, cannot be detached from contestability. The political system 
of the procedural definition of democracy is such that ‘citizens are free to criticize 
their rulers and to come together to make demands on them and to win support for 
their policies they favour and the beliefs they hold’ (Plamenatz, 1978, pp.184-188). 
The right to vote is accompanied by political freedoms such as the freedom to 
organise collective action and make use of resources other than violence in order to 
exert pressure and bargain for policy outcomes. Seen through this lens, democracy 
is: ‘...government by the people, where liberty, equality and fraternity are secured to 
the greatest possible degree and in which human capacities are developed to the 
utmost, by means including free and full discussion of common problems and 
interests’ (Pennock, 1979, p.7, emphasis added). While for the pluralists 
contestation is an integral element of the democratic process, for the procedural 
view of democracy contestation is the indispensable and inevitable outcome of an 
open structure of participation, where different viewpoints, interests and proposals 
are channelled to politics. 
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The combined reading of the two approaches suggests that the political 
empowerment of citizens in democracy involves more than their small share in the 
general vote. Instead, citizens’ empowerment is extended to include the actual 
capacity of citizens to express views and take an active part in politics. Thus 
fundamental political rights equally distributed among its constituent citizens are 
valuable mostly because they generate a free arena for collective decision-making, 
which gives rise to a competitive political system. In this regard, it is through 
collective organisation that in a democracy each individual citizen makes an 
appearance from the notion of the ‘demos’ and by pooling resources with others 
gets a better bargaining position to defend their claims and interests against state 
power. In a nutshell, collective action empowers individuals in their political 
claims. Taken further, the assertion here is that, while the principle of political 
equality gives each citizen a share of political power of equal weight with any other 
citizen in the form of political rights, this entitlement is of no use without free 
collective action. 
From the perspective of a procedural definition of democracy, the pluralist thesis 
can be seen as highlighting the distance that an actual political system should travel 
to approximate the ideal of ‘rule of the demos’. It marks a subtle but significant 
refinement of which state of affairs comes close to offering individuals a strong say 
in authoritative state decision-making. The ideal synthesis between the ‘ruled’ and 
the ‘rulers’ can be redefined as group associations and organisations freely 
competing to define political outcomes. This is what the term polyarchy essentially 
captures, as it offers its own redefinition of the synthesis between ‘kratos’ and the 
‘demos’, as multiple agents, the ‘polloi’, participating in the decision-making 
structures in the form of groups in competition for access to decision-making to 
promote their preferences through the formal institutional channels, thereby creating 
various arenas of political contestation. Underlying this view is an assumption 
according to which each political force represents a point of view in society and 
promotes it to become state policy (Sartori, 1967:83). The concept of polyarchy, 
epitomises the bridging of the distance between the ideal of democracy and the 
actual political system not solely through the formal structure of participation in 
politics but, instead, through the pluralist organisation of society, whereby groups, 
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emerging from a social and economic context, compete for political outcomes and 
contest political decisions with the resources at their disposal.  
Democracy recaptured by ‘polyarchy’ as a form of governance constituted by the 
open and active participation of individuals through the groups they form is by 
definition an inherently competitive political system ‘in which competing leaders 
and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the 
public can participate in the decision-making process’ (Schattschneider 1960:141). 
It is: 
 ‘...a set of institutions and rules that allow competition and participation 
for all citizens considered as equals. Such a political arrangement is 
characterized by free, fair, and recurring elections; male and female 
universal suffrage; multiple organizations of interests; different and 
alternative sources of information; and elections to fill the most relevant 
offices’ (Morlino, 1986:54).  
Hence, by acknowledging the reality of the numerous affiliations and multiple 
preferences and identities of democracy’s citizens, the pluralist thesis gives a 
refined meaning to the notion of demos, now broken down into its constituent parts, 
the polloi, and redefined as a plurality of interest groups with conflicting, often 
irreconcilable preferences. Democracy is about active democratic minorities, where 
a minority becomes a majority, or, inversely, the majority is thrown into a minority 
(Sartori 1967: 116). It is a polyarchy of elected elites, ‘a selective system of 
competing elected minorities’ in which the unorganised majority of the politically 
inactive becomes the arbiter in the contest among the organised minorities of the 
politically active (Sartori, 1987: 167-9). In this view, the ‘demos’ cannot and should 
not be seen as one single collectivity with a ‘general will’ which democratic politics 
is supposed to identify –  a vision found in the monistic ideal of democracy of the 
early idealistic theories –  but, rather, as a community with a plurality of competing 
social and political organisations. In any open structure of participation in place, a 
competitive multi-party system is bound to emerge from a context of social 
diversity.  
A second contribution of the pluralist view on collective action is that it gives a 
specific meaning to the position of the individual against domination by the state. If 
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the etymology of democracy suggests that the individual’s autonomy from –  as 
well as defence against –  the rulers is to be secured by an institutional framework 
whereby the ‘demos’ could exercise control over the ‘kratos’, the pluralist thesis 
stipulates that this synthesis is impossible through the political activity of individual 
citizens alone. Political rights equally distributed among citizens give each citizen a 
modicum of influence over political decision-making. Political equality in the form 
of equal political rights under democracy does not suffice to prevent domination. 
This view portrays single individuals as more or less powerless against the means of 
coercion and the economic resources which the state has at its disposal.  
Instead, pluralism points to collective organisation as the means by which the 
individual may get in the position to exert some control over outcomes: it is by 
pooling resources that individuals obtain the capacity to check and influence state 
authority. Collective organisation may enable individuals to overcome and reshuffle 
existing power asymmetries that would have hindered their effective political 
participation and would have eventually endangered the very foundations of modern 
democracies as both representative and liberal. The pluralist approach is that of 
‘power from collective organisation’ that can help individuals overcome structural 
disadvantages: 
‘Dominated and deprived individuals are likely to be disorganized as well 
as impoverished, whereas poor people with strong families, churches, 
unions, political parties and ethnic alliances are not likely to be dominated 
or deprived for long’ (Walzer, 1995:19). 
We have clarified so far that the fundamental difference between the procedural 
view of democracy and the pluralist approach is the position of contestability either 
as an inherent part of the definition or as an inevitable and desirable outcome from 
an open process of public participation in politics. The relevance of pluralism to 
other approaches to democracy is that it contends that the approximation of the core 
ideal of democracy is secured through group organisation in a system of mutual 
controls. But unlike the procedural view, the pluralist definition draws more 
attention to the possibility of one-group dominance from inter-group dynamics. The 
challenging issue raised by the pluralist approach to democracy is that the concept 
of democracy is recast as a question of both vertical power relations between 
individuals and state power and horizontal power relations among citizens and their 
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groups. If power in politics is primarily sourced on power from organisation, 
asymmetries in power between groups may skew relative influence on political 
outcomes. The analytical implications are clear. While political rights open up 
opportunities for individuals to form alliances and take an active part in politics, 
like a knife that cuts both ways collective organisation may help groups either 
realise or destroy democracy. While it can only be through collective organisation 
that democracy is secured against possible attempts by some groups to acquire a 
dominant position, it may also be through collective organisation that the goal of 
democracy now modestly understood as contestation open to participation can be 
lost if a group obtains asymmetrical power resources in relation to all others.  
A further elaboration of this claim could be that by allowing collective action 
democracy simply offers groups the potential for a defence against state power and 
for some influence on state power. One-group domination can only be limited 
through the countervailing powers which other groups possess. The crucial role 
collective organisation plays is that it can evolve into a system of mutual controls 
providing checks on central government power. This system of mutual controls 
generates mutual accommodation or ‘détente’ among the major organised interests 
(Dahl, 1982: 36, 43). For pluralists, what secures democracy is a delicate balance of 
power in which no group has the power to impose outcomes on all others. This 
system of mutual controls is established when the cost of domination by one group 
is raised by the collective organisation of others pooling their resources. In that 
case: 
‘Wherever the costs of control exceeded the benefits, it would be rational for 
these rulers to reduce costs by leaving some action beyond their control, 
leaving some matters outside their control, or accepting a higher’ (Dahl, 
1982: 34). 
Consequently, political power can only be tamed and become subject to a system of 
mutual controls as long as the collective organisation of individuals allows 
individuals in possession of necessary resources to ally to fend off attempts for one-
group domination.  
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2.4 Final remarks 
This chapter has developed a first line of defence for Dahl’s approach to inclusive 
hegemony as a pertinent contribution to the literature on dominant party system by 
associating the pluralist thesis on democracy upon which the concept relies with 
more basic standards of what democracy is. It has argued that the pluralist 
conception is an elaboration on two fundamental questions for democracy 
concerning inter-group competition and domination by the state.  
By deconstructing the demos into its constituents, individuals, and by re-
constructing them into groups, pluralism conceives political competition as a 
struggle for power among groups whose outcome is primarily determined by the 
dynamics of collective action. In this view, collective action seen by other 
approaches as derivative of a free structure of participation is elevated by pluralism 
into an element constitutive of democracy. Political rights unlock real opportunities 
for participation in politics by allowing citizens to contest political proposals and 
outcomes principally through collective action. In essence, ‘the demos’ consists of 
citizens articulating competing claims in politics through their organisation in 
multiple groups, and the democratic political community is defined by the political 
expression of social diversity in the form of various and autonomous collective 
associations. It is collective action that allows individuals to exert some influence 
on decision-making, to place limits to the exercise of political power and to thwart 
the prospect of one-group domination. Hence, a typical democratic system is 
conceived of not as one that merely satisfies the criterion of equality in voting rights 
but as one that meets the standard of effective competition among political forces 
autonomous from one other. 
On the analytical level, the same perspective expects a competitive political arena to 
be the inevitable outcome of a genuinely open political process insofar as collective 
action is not suppressed by coercive power.  A competitive political system will be 
the standard outcome of different political forces formed to represent distinct social 
interests that envisage becoming state policy (c.f. Sartori, 1967:83). The concept of 
inclusive hegemony can now be seen as an indication of an anomaly related to inter-
group dynamics. If autonomous collective organisation is expected to spring up 
from an open process of participation, the question that unavoidably arises here is 
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how this state of affairs is established. Hegemony appears to be an antithesis 
between process and outcome.  
The analysis above indicates an explanatory path. Collective organisation opens up 
the possibility of one-group domination when asymmetrical power is concentrated 
in the hands of one group. In the pluralist view of democracy, insofar as collective 
action generates a balance of power between opposing groups, collective action 
may prevent one group from obtaining a dominant position. More broadly, the 
notion of ‘mutual controls’ refers to a balance of power between antagonistic 
groups in possession of power resources.  
In the next chapter, theory on democracy and historical narratives of 
democratisation and regime change add empirical support to the pluralist thesis by 
indicating that a) an open structure for political participation inevitably generates a 
substantial degree of political competition in the form of at least two parties having 
more or less similar influence on politics, and  b) that one group dominance can 
only be achieved by the effective exercise of coercive power suppressing political 
expression of diverse social interests or, alternatively, through a strategy that 
produces an effect similar to that of coercion through the use of other sources of 
power and mechanisms that skew the distribution of power resources.  
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Chapter 3 
The paradox of one-party dominance: social diversity, power resources and the 
state 
 
3.1 Introduction 
While the previous analysis provides a normative defence of the pluralist position 
that a high degree of political competitiveness is an inherent characteristic of 
democracy, those adhering to a ‘mandate’ approach to democracy (c.f. Sartori, 
1967:126) may still contend that a dominant party system can emerge through an 
open process of participation in exceptional cases in which a majority freely 
chooses one single party to be the main addressee of their claims for a period of 
time. This choice may be attributed to fragmentation and organisational weakness 
of the opposition to capitalise on substantial political opportunities stemming from a 
diverse social context and to the poor political skills of its leaders who are unable to 
activate social cleavages and policy divisions into electoral support for their parties 
(c.f. Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Riker, 1983; Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Cox 1997; 
Bartolini, 2000; Adams et al. 2005; Magaloni, 2006; Greene 2007).  
This chapter explains why this ‘natural selection’ view of political organisation in 
competitive conditions is ill-suited to explain the resilience of one-party hegemony. 
It adds more strength to its defence of the pluralist thesis that political contestability 
is a necessary element of democracy by revisiting the theory on democracy and 
democratisation to confirm that social diversity tends to generate multiple forms of 
collective action, which act as centrifugal forces destabilising the political arena. 
Political contestability is the inevitable outcome of social and political diversity. 
Consequently, where coercion is absent and political organisation is free, various 
and competing forms of political organisation will emerge to express and represent 
diverse and often irreconcilable interests, while mounting social and political 
divisions will eventually strengthen the position of the opposition. From the 
viewpoint of these historical narratives on regime change, one-party dominance is a 
perplexing outcome and can only be attributed to the presence of other critical 
factors affecting political behaviour and suppressing or manipulating the political 
expression of social diversity. The overall argument here can be framed as follows:  
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In the absence of coercion exercised in the forms of violence and 
intimidation, the political expression of competing interests can hardly be 
accommodated and contained within the ranks of one dominant party and 
social diversity will tend to be registered as a multi-party competitive 
political system.  
Moreover, the historical narratives presented in this chapter demonstrate that both 
political outcomes and regime change are associated with shifting patterns of power 
distribution among competing groups. A typical authoritarian regime relies on the 
exercise of coercive power that effectively suppresses collective action and enables 
a group to obtain a dominant position. Given that limited contestability in a multi-
party system by definition precludes the use of coercion as a means to obstructing 
political participation, inclusive hegemony can only be attributed to the impact of 
other forms of power. This, however, requires an unusual concentration of power 
resources in the hands of one group. The chapter turns to the discussion about the 
ways power as persuasion and incentives can produce an impact on preference 
formation and political organisation, and concludes that unusual concentrations of 
economic and knowledge resources can only be found in the hands of the state. 
3.2 Historical accounts of democracy and democratisation: from social 
diversity to political competition 
A large body of democratic theory has associated changes in the structure of the 
economy with the emergence of new social groups and the development of new 
political agendas and struggles. Under changing conditions, political forces were 
formed, came to conflict with one another, forged alliances or made critical 
compromises, at times leading to political change and in certain cases to the advent 
of democracy. For Barrington Moore, structural change gave rise to new classes, 
shaped their political preferences and determined power dynamics and class 
alliances that directed the institutional and political path of each society in diverging 
ways (Moore, 1967). Similarly, ‘capitalist development’ was associated with 
working class struggles pushing for political inclusion (Rueschemeyer, Stephens 
and Stephens 1991). For Göran Therborn (1977), working class claims were 
accommodated by a bourgeois class that was ‘internally competing and peacefully 
disunited’ and eventually had to yield to these demands after a period of resistance. 
In these narratives, political change was generated by a combination of economic 
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interests, a shifting balance of power and strategic interactions between social 
groups. The broader picture presented here is that social groups emerge under 
changing economic and social conditions, shape and revise their preferences on the 
basis of their understanding of economic interest and come to choose a political 
strategy that takes into account relative power against other groups. Seen in this 
light, political change can be explained as the combined effect of structural 
developments on group formation, group empowerment preference formation and 
strategic action.  
By the same token, different patterns of shifting political alliances take political 
change in different directions. While inter-group conflict is seen as the main driving 
force behind political change, emphasis is placed on the volatility of alliances. For 
instance, the move to liberal democracy in nineteenth century France was seen as 
the outcome of a coalition of the emerging business class against the conservative 
elites (Nord, 1995). In Argentina, fears that the inclusion of other groups would 
prevent more aggressive forms of popular mobilisation led the conservative elites to 
ally with the military to resist the demands of the popular classes despite their 
original agreement for universal suffrage (James, 1995). In Japan, top-down 
modernisation undertaken by the bureaucracy before World War II was said to 
explain the political compliance of the business elites with the authoritarian 
government (Allinson, 1995).  
More empirical works stress the interplay between structure and agency in 
producing shifting alliances, facilitating compromise and deterring clashes. The 
pattern here is of socially constructed groups, socially-defined preferences and 
inter-group alliances that reflect relative power. For instance, this is observed in 
studies of Latin American politics, where for the greatest part of the 20
th
 century 
vacillation between democracy and autocracy was a frequent occurrence. In Latin 
America, shifts in the structure of the economy brought changes in the political 
demands and strategies of the social forces involved in competition with one 
another, and at times produced radical political agendas triggering military coups in 
response. The period before World War II when most Latin American economies 
were export-driven coincided with a period of authoritarianism; the ensuing period 
of rapid industrialisation under a protective trade regime sponsored by the state saw 
the rise of populist politics (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979:15). In the period of 
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protectionist industrialisation, diversified production broadened the social basis of 
participation, which included the middle classes, the national bourgeoisie and to 
certain extent the ‘popular classes’ (Cardoso and Faletto, 99, 102, 107). When, 
however, foreign capital invested in Latin America to bypass the tariff walls, new 
social cleavages and tensions appeared. It was argued that in this late stage of 
industrialisation foreign investment sharpened social cleavages and significantly 
affected the less efficient domestic firms, marginalising economic actors who had 
had a dominant place before (Ibid, 64,165). This development gave rise to radical 
opposition movements.  
When economic policy opened up the economy to foreign trade and foreign 
investment, political turmoil was aggravated along the lines of opposing economic 
paradigms; on the one hand a defence of the existing form of capitalist relations in 
those countries and on the other an advocacy of left-wing, radical and mostly 
Marxist economic ideas. The crisis signalled the exhaustion of the populist 
nationalistic paradigm and was followed by a series of military coups as in Chile in 
the early 1970s. The crisis led to the establishment of a ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian 
state’ supported by the dominant classes in the presence of the perceived threat 
posed by radical groups, aiming at de-politicisation through repression (O’Donnell, 
1972, 1978; Linz, 1970). This regime guaranteed the move to a new type of 
capitalist development with extensive industrialisation led by foreign capital and 
state policies of public investment and fiscal discipline. Cracks within the 
temporary alliance occurred when middle class groups felt ignored and the local 
bourgeoisie threatened by the regime’s preference for international capital and 
increased competition (O’Donnell, 1978, 8, 10). In Brazil, inter-group dynamics 
were also seen to be affected by economic change: the marriage of convenience 
between the business class and the authoritarian regime ended when the business 
community demanded a stronger say in political decisions that were affecting its 
economic interests, and pushed for a ‘controlled transition’ to democracy (Cardoso, 
1991).  
Regardless of any substantive objections to the empirical claims made by these 
narratives, they provide useful insights to the analysis of group formation and 
alliances. The pattern underlying these narratives is that a) shifting socioeconomic 
conditions shape groups’ perception of interest, give rise to competition and define 
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the strategic interactions between rival groups, and b) that unintended political 
developments occur by changes in economic structure: i.e. by opening up the 
economy to foreign investment, bureaucratic authoritarianism laid the structural 
foundations of its decline. Political demands, sometimes radical and maximalist in 
extreme social conditions, are then articulated. Social tensions arise, generating 
radical reactions and authoritarian backlash from the most powerful groups 
(Kaufman, 1991). The theoretical articulation of these observations suggests that 
social diversity is a fundamental factor of systemic volatility and instability, 
constantly providing grounds for group formation, inter-group competition and 
defection from alliances. Thus the historical accounts confirm that the political 
expression of social diversity can hardly be contained by a single political force; 
politics remains an essentially contestable arena, unless an unusual degree of 
coercion is used to suppress political competition, and that in any political arena 
with diverse interests and shifting alliances, political monopolies unavoidably face 
contestation sooner or later.  
Alongside this useful empirical confirmation of the pluralist thesis, historical 
narratives of regime change bring to the pluralist framework of analysis the impact 
on structure. They present a social landscape of diverse and competing social 
groups with distinct preferences and asymmetrical power relations. Structural 
change goes as far as to produce changes to preferences. Structural parameters also 
impinge on forms of group action and on inter-group relations and alliances. They 
may tie some groups in relations of interdependency or may equally generate 
irreconcilable tensions causing conflict between groups or fractions within a single 
social group. They may lead to a revision of old strategies and the formation of new 
alliances. They may also reshuffle relative power.  
A crucial analytical point highlighted by the literature on democratisation is that 
inter-group dynamics are determined by shifts in relative power. Donald Whistler 
argued that ‘autocracies have ceased when economic, social, and coercive resources 
are widely enough distributed that no subset of the population can monopolize the 
government’ (Whistler 1993). As Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson put it, 
political elites may choose to launch a process of controlled democratisation when 
the cost of repression is too high (2005). For Tatu Vanhanen, ‘when resources 
become so widely distributed that it is not any longer possible for any group to 
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achieve or uphold political hegemony, it becomes rational and necessary to share 
power with the most important competitors’ (Vanhanen, 1990, 83). Identifying what 
raises the cost of oppression and what bestows more power to one group calls for 
attention to the structural dynamics and the impact they have on relative power, as 
highlighted above.   
The implications for the study of dominant party systems can be summarised in the 
form of three observations: 
a) Social diversity generates competing interests and rival groups whose preferences 
are formed in interaction with one other and in view of structural constraints and 
opportunities; 
b) Asymmetrical and dispersed distribution of resources available to groups helps 
prevent domination by one group; 
c) Only concentrated power resources in the hands of one group can allow the group 
to establish a dominant position in the political arena.  
These useful insights imply that the best analytical strategy to understand hegemony 
is to trace relative power with reference to both structural and agential parameters. 
This is an important refinement to the assumptions held by political pluralism that 
political competition stems from social diversity and a plurality of organisations, 
and that inter-group associations alone may enable or prevent one-group 
domination. A balance of power is far from a certain state of affairs and depends on 
the interplay between agency and the structural context where power resources are 
distributed, and from which they can be retrieved. In this view, power asymmetries 
in a given structure may be sharp enough to allow one group to exercise unequal 
influence on political processes.  
The added value of this review is to suggest that an explanation of one-party 
dominance should look at highly asymmetrical distributions of power resources 
among competing groups in unusual contexts. There must be an unusual 
concentration of power resources other than coercion in the hands of one political 
group that outweighs the sum of resources that all other groups together hold. The 
discussion now turns to examine the multiple ways in which power is exercised. 
How is it possible that power resources come to be concentrated in the hands of a 
dominant group to serve as a source of political domination?  This question is an 
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important step towards understanding the causal mechanism by which manipulative 
practices, such as clientelism, affect political behaviour. 
3.3 The concept of power: coercion, incentives and economic resources 
It is now clear that in order to seize the full potential of the pluralist emphasis on the 
‘balance of power’ and understand how one-group dominance can be achieved and 
sustained without the use of coercion, it is important to discern a) the meaning and 
different forms of power and b) different sources of power (power resources).  
The broader meaning of power conveys that actor A brings about a change in his or 
her state of affairs, in the sense that she has the power ‘to do something’. A 
narrower view of power, however, will see it as a relational concept, as ‘power 
over’, whose exercise may be needed when the capacity of actor A to bring about a 
change in her state of affairs depends on bringing a change in the state of affairs of 
others. The exercise of power may or may not be necessary. If the capacity of actor 
A to achieve the state of affairs,    , which is her preference, depends on whether B 
is moving into the state of affairs    , one way to get there is a convergence of 
preferences between actor A and actor B by which B is willingly moving to the new 
state of affairs that is equally desired by A. In that case, B prefers     to   , and this 
easily allows A to achieve her desired state of affairs, One instance, for example, in 
which such a convergence of preferences is initially present is that of a voluntary 
transaction between actor A and actor B on the basis of an exchange, whereby actor 
B moves to the state of affairs      in exchange for actor moving to    . Prior to the 
transaction, actor A wants to trade her state of affairs for the actor’s B state of 
affairs, and none of the actors need to exercise any power over the other one to 
achieve this outcome.  
Power is exercised in the event that the preferences of A and B initially diverge, 
when actor B does not hold that the state of affairs     is a more desirable position 
in relation to his current state of affairs,   . Actor A may still want to make actor B 
move to    . Exercise of power means that actor A gets actor B to do something 
which actor B would have not otherwise done. In the absence of an initial 
preference convergence, one way to do this is for actor A to coerce actor B to do 
what would enable actor A to achieve her desired state of affairs. There are, 
however, two forms of power alternative to coercive power. The first form involves 
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setting up incentives while the second involves exercising persuasion by which a 
convergence of preference is achieved and coercion is not necessary. Both 
persuasion and incentives are means by which B can be mobilised into acting in a 
way desired by A. They are included in the notion of power, because they involve 
the capacity of one actor to bring changes to the other’s preferences and behaviour; 
in short, because had they been absent, B would not have done what A asked him to 
do.  
Broadly speaking, the capacity of actor A to change B’s behaviour can be achieved 
through the exercise of power as coercion, incentives or persuasion. As a form of 
power alternative to coercion, incentives refer to the capacity of an agent to place or 
change the set of pay offs that shapes someone else’s preferences and behaviour. 
Incentives that do not involve the threat of direct coercion and punishment may 
involve economic rewards, often putting the targeted actor before dilemmas in 
choosing between alternative options with different pay-offs.  Persuasion may 
equally lead actor B to behave in certain way simply by offering selective 
information about what course of behaviour is to B’s own interests. Changes in the 
actors’ preferences can take place in our example when B comes to believe that 
doing what A asks him is beneficial to him. Persuasion may also include signals of 
what is considered as appropriate behaviour in a given context or a set of values 
determining the standards of appropriate behaviour. Both information and values 
are knowledge or intellectual resources. Following the assumption that actor’s 
rationality is bounded by the information received and other cognitive limitations 
(Simon 1985), the use of these resources may be seen as equally effective,  if not 
more effective, means of bringing changes to behaviour than coercion by virtue of 
their profound effect on shaping perceptions of interest and preferences.  
Both the role of incentives in directing behaviour and the role of persuasion in 
changing preferences merge in politics in what was described as the second and 
third image of power. The second image of power includes sets of values and the 
power of agenda setting. Agenda-setting removes certain issues from discussion 
directly, while predominant values could prevent a discussion aiming at their 
revision and the way they allow issues to be tackled. The second image of power 
appears:  
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‘...when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and 
political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the 
political process to public consideration of only those issues which are 
comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B 
is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues 
that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of 
preferences’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, 7)  
This point was taken further by Steven Lukes which argue for a ‘third face of 
power’, referring to the ways in which preferences are manipulated.  
‘To put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by getting him to 
do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by 
influencing, shaping, or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the 
supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you 
want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their 
thoughts and desires? (Lukes, 1974, 23) 
In similar vein, John Gaventa understood that the exercise of power changes ‘the 
conceptions of the necessities, possibilities, and strategies of challenge in situations 
of latent conflict through different means, which include social myths, language and 
symbols, more broadly set of norms and ideas’ (1979/1982, 15). For Gaventa too, 
power resides in the social construction of meanings and patterns that serve to get B 
to act and believe in a manner in which B otherwise might not (Gaventa, 
1979/1982, 15-16). A study of power may also involve  
‘...the study of communication and information – both of what it is 
communicated and how it is done. It may involve a focus upon the means by 
which social legitimations and developed around the dominant, and instilled 
as beliefs or roles in the dominated’ (Gaventa, 1979/1982, 15) 
Arguably, in this broader view, power is ubiquitous; it is found in all instances in 
which an actor or a group manages to alter the preferences of others by projecting 
new ideas and new arguments, by setting up information and value standards and by 
placing sets of incentives. The exercise of power in those forms is by no means 
coercive in the typical sense of the word. Power exercised in the form of persuasion 
and incentives when there is initially a divergence of preferences leads to voluntary 
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changes of behaviour and possibly mutually beneficial transactions between private 
actors in many instances. An example illustrates this; A and B engage in a process 
of negotiating with each other the price of a car, which A wants to buy and B wants 
to sell, each giving his or her own views over the value of the car, references of its 
technical condition, the price and performance of other comparable models of cars, 
the general state of the market etc. It is possible that one party will play tricky 
games by limiting the source of information available with a view to influencing the 
preferences and behaviour of the other party. In this context, the availability of 
alternative sources of information is crucial to offset the efficacy of these tactics.  
3.4. Power and power resources 
While power takes the forms of coercion, incentives and persuasion, it can only be 
exercised when resources are available (Giddens, 1984, 15). Material-economic and 
knowledge resources make persuasion and incentives-setting possible. The 
association between power and power resources is particularly useful when it comes 
to measuring relative power in real contexts, such as a political system. By looking 
at the distribution of power resources among competing social and political forces 
the analysis can come closer to understanding the distribution of power among 
them. Based on the premise that relative power matters, we may then associate 
different distributions of power resources with different political outcomes ranging 
from a more or less balanced distribution of power associated with democracies all 
the way to social contexts in which one group dominates by possessing 
disproportionately more power resources than all other groups together. For 
instance, in typical authoritarian regimes, monopoly over state coercion enables one 
group to establish an autocratic rule. In that case, the power which the ruling group 
possesses is coercive since the use of military and police force compels others to 
make involuntary adjustments in their behaviour. The regime is duly characterised 
as authoritarian because of the coercive form of power it relies upon, constraining 
the behaviour of all others by punishing voice and depriving them of exit. In similar 
vein, we may now argue that other forms of power resources, when concentrated in 
the hands of one group, may also perform this task.  
This analysis has three important implications for the study of inclusive hegemony. 
First, the balance of power, which according to pluralists prevents domination by 
one group, depends on the particular configuration of power resources among 
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competing groups. This refined picture of group competition indicates a view of 
politics as a process in which the power of each group constantly depends on the 
recruitment and gathering of power resources in a given structural context: the 
availability or not of more resources for one group in the structural context may 
strengthen or weaken the capacity of that group to impose outcomes on others. In 
addition, the unequal distribution of power resources makes democratic competition 
precariously contingent on new emerging asymmetries of power. The fact that 
organisation into group action changes the distribution of power resources means 
that it can also seriously disturb the balance of power which is necessary for a 
sustainable democracy in the pluralist framework. Power advantages may then turn 
into a self-reinforcing cycle: ‘...the more one has power, the more one can get 
scarce resources’ (Vanhanen, 1997, 23).   
Second, agency and collective action may restructure the distribution of power 
relations to some considerable extent. By pooling their resources such as societal 
support and funding and by forging alliances, groups seeking to promote their 
political preferences in the field of politics may overcome some initial 
disadvantages in power resources. The changing pattern of collective organisation 
may strategically reshuffle the distribution of power resources. Even though power 
resources are unequally distributed among individuals, the organisation of collective 
action entails the potential for restoring some symmetry in power relations and 
resist domination by others by pooling resources. In addition, just as the defence of 
an individual against domination by others is possible thanks to collective 
organisation, similarly the defence of groups against others is secured by strategic 
alliances between them. As pointed out earlier in state-society relations, this 
observation summarises the essence of the pluralist re-conception of ‘demos’ as 
primarily a collective form of political participation with the potential of subduing 
state power to democratic control, and clarifies the idea that electoral politics alone 
do not automatically prevent one-group domination. Collective action has the 
potential of breaking concentrations of power and prevents one-group domination. 
Attempts by a single group to impose a dominant political position are expected to 
trigger the coordinated reaction of all others. Hence, even when one group is 
relatively stronger than any other group, it can hardly be more powerful than all 
other groups together. 
55 
 
Third, there are limits to what collective action can achieve. Following the 
conclusions drawn in the previous section that structures entail distributions of 
resources, it is understandable that changes of the socioeconomic context shift the 
distribution of power among groups. This view of power as structurally embedded 
means that certain agents or groups are endowed with greater resources than others 
(Smith, 2009: 84) and that these asymmetries could change over time following 
structural change. The prospect of a ‘balance of power’ from collective 
organisation, though associated with agential strategies, is primarily contingent on 
the distribution of the resources available. The latter is constrained by the given 
distribution of power resources in a social and economic context. We thus gain a 
more nuanced understanding of relative power as configured but not determined by 
structure. Instead it is contingent on a particular configuration of structural and 
agential variables.  It may rely upon an unmatched asymmetrical advantage of one 
political group in possession of asymmetrical power resources other than coercion. 
This suggests that understanding one-party dominance needs to explain two 
interrelated processes: how an unequal distribution of power resources other than 
coercion can lead to one-group hegemony, and, most importantly, which 
socioeconomic context and which strategy can provide one group with an 
unparalleled and sustained power advantage to be able to offset any coordinated 
attempt by other groups to break its dominant position. 
3.5 Power and the state  
It should now be clear that one-group domination is associated with the 
concentration of power resources other than coercion in the hands of one group. 
This state of affairs, however, is highly unlikely for two reasons suggested by the 
previous analysis. First, alternative sources of power abound in a diverse 
socioeconomic context and fuel inter-group competition and, second, social 
diversity acts as a source of systemic instability generating conflicting preferences 
and centrifugal tendencies and often leading to clashes between groups and splits of 
group alliances. 
It thus appears to be paradoxical that, on the one hand, the unequal distribution of 
power resources in theory can generate one-group hegemony and, on the other 
hand, group organisation and re-alignment stemming from a context of social 
diversity promises a re-balancing of relative power sooner or later. At best, it could 
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be argued that a dominant party can hardly become in the position to sustain an 
unusual concentration of power resources in the long run to such an extent that it 
could limit its exposure to competition, unless it controls an unparalleled source of 
power advantage that remains to some extent less vulnerable to shifting inter-group 
balances of power. The state comes centre stage here as ‘... an ensemble of power 
centres that offer unequal chances to different forces within and outside the state to 
act for different political purposes’ (Jessop, 2008, 37).  
In the case of authoritarian regimes, it is the state’s mechanism of coercion that 
provides the ruling group with an unmatched concentration of coercion resources, 
which allows it to deprive political actors of political freedom. In similar vein, other 
forms of state resources and tools may give the ruling group an extraordinary power 
advantage. While coercion has been the traditional method for governments to 
motivate individuals to act in specific ways, more recently, governments have 
increasingly developed other mechanisms to assume control over agents: regulation, 
rationality, surveillance and risk assessment (Smith, 2009, 79).
 
Many of these new 
forms of state power rely on incentives and persuasion that, instead of commanding 
people to act in certain ways, change the contextual knowledge in which people 
make choices (Smith, 2009, 84).  
This view of state power is the reverse of the stance of democratic theory on state 
power in which the state is positioned as the political target of groups competing 
for power. Here, the state is the most powerful means by which the group occupying 
political power can determine the terms of competition and may achieve a dominant 
position against all others. Both the approach to democracy that emphasises popular 
participation, representation, deliberation, and the version of pluralism that discerns 
group action targeting the state can be criticised for presenting a narrow view of the 
state as a hollow locus of power for which citizens and groups compete. In this one-
dimensional portrayal of state-society interaction, power is visible in the context of 
group interactions shaping what states do and less noticeable as the state shaping 
what people do; the ways in which the state impinges on many of the political 
conflicts within society is underestimated (Smith, 2009, 19).  
It is now clear that these approaches should take into account the way state power 
has a direct involvement in inter-group dynamics.  In constructing any account of 
political power, it is important to recognise that institutional structures have biases 
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that generate important resources for some groups (Eisenberg 1995, 59). Because 
the state is an institutional framework whose rules and norms define the distribution 
of power resources in a society and whose decisions affect individual behaviour by 
means of coercion, incentives and persuasion, the state has an active involvement in 
defining the terms of inter-group competition. In this case, the power of the state in 
setting the political agenda, filtering information flows, projecting value sets and 
conditioning public discourse within its hierarchical organisation and with the 
unmatched resources it possesses is the most powerful mechanism for political, 
economic and social change. State power can equally become a tool in the hands of 
a ruling party to affect political behaviour and limit its exposure to competition. As 
a result, each group has a strong incentive to capture state power and skew the 
distribution of power in its favour and at the detriment of rival groups.  
In the case of inclusive hegemony, the use of coercion is precluded by definition. 
Other forms of state power involved to sustain the party’s dominant position may 
include the state’s economic resources and its unmatched power capacity of the 
state to incentivise behaviour through their distribution. This involves the power of 
the state to allocate economic resources and decide which groups will be included 
and which will be left outside the distribution. The government’s capacity to 
allocate economic resources can then be transformed into a powerful set of political 
incentives, depending on the manner through which distribution via politics is 
performed; whether the allocation of economic resources has been made conditional 
by the party in government on the recipients exhibiting a desired political 
behaviour. This brings forth the practice of clientelism, which engages the 
distribution of state resources in party politics to recruit political supporters while 
punishing their opponents by exclusion from the allocation. Clientelism activates a 
form of state power that entails a set of incentives which political agents may find 
very useful in guiding political behaviour in a desired political direction.  
It remains to be seen how clientelism works to skew political behaviour to a degree 
that considerable narrows the competitiveness of the political system to the point of 
sustaining one-party dominance. The previous notes suggest that if clientelism is to 
be introduced as the explanatory variable, a different take on clientelism would 
relate the practice to both party organisation in the form of campaign resources 
recruitment and interest accommodation. We need to address two questions: a) how 
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clientelism can effectively influence political behaviour and preferences on an 
individual basis and b) how it can produce an aggregate effect on political 
competition in interaction with other parameters such as social cleavages, political 
divisions, interest groups and within-party factions.  
On the micro-level of analysis, the capacity of clientelism to affect behaviour is 
illuminated by the view of power as the ability of one agent to make another one 
move to a state of affairs where he would not have moved had it not been for her 
action, which involves the capacity for persuasion and incentives. On the aggregate 
level, the application of clientelist incentives should offer the party a clear 
advantage in knowledge and material resources that gets it in a ‘position of power’ 
in political communication. If electoral mobilisation depends on the availability of 
campaign resources clientelism must play a key role in the recruitment of these 
resources, and must produce an effect other than direct vote-buying. 
These ‘functions’ of clientelism must be related to what the theory and the 
empirical studies of democratisation presented above suggested; that, on the one 
hand, any type of regime, be it democracy and autocracy, becomes consolidated 
insofar as it succeeds in providing a framework that effectively accommodates 
diverse and competing social interests, and that, on the other hand, social diversity 
acts as a source of systemic instability generating conflicting preferences, leading to 
clashes between groups and creating centrifugal tendencies that break alliances. The 
success of democracy, in particular, is attributed to the process it puts forward for 
the settlement of conflicting interests, which offers conflicting interests an 
institutionalised avenue for competition within certain limits and the chance for 
periodic revisions of previous decisions in a peaceful and orderly way. Since no 
political force can accommodate all conflicting demands, political expectations and 
loyalties are expected to be represented by two or more political parties alternating 
in power and, in addition, by factions within the parties themselves. By contrast, 
one-party hegemony actually lacks this open-ended pattern of alternation in power 
and can hardly contain the political expression of diverse interests within the 
confines of a single party. To be sustainable, a dominant party must provide an all-
embracing and extraordinarily mode of interest accommodation that successfully 
and consistently retains the political expression of social diversity within the 
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boundaries of the dominant party.  The question is whether clientelism can perform 
this task. 
We are in search of a mode of interest accommodation that helps the dominant party 
thwart centrifugal tendencies in the form of splits, divisions, factionalism and 
defections. In particular, we should examine how clientelism can become a 
powerful tool that restructures the way social claims are expressed, from demands 
articulated by social groups in open public debate and through competing political 
organisations into the constrained forms of selective and hidden deals within one 
single party between patrons and their clients. This qualitative shift in interest 
accommodation must alter the terms of political behaviour and protect the party 
both from inter-party and intra-party competition.  
3.6 Final remarks 
This chapter has provided further empirical support for the pluralist framework 
according to which inclusive hegemony is a non-democratic regime by virtue of its 
deficiencies in the dimension of contestability. Historical accounts of 
democratisation and regime change validate the pluralist assumption that social 
diversity can hardly be contained and addressed by a single political force for too 
long without the extensive use of power. In this view, the balance of power, a state 
of affairs so essential for pluralists for preventing one-group domination, refers to a 
more or less symmetrical distribution of power resources among competing groups 
and their shifting alliances. Seen from this perspective, only a huge asymmetry in 
power relations shall limit political competition. The analysis also reveals a paradox 
for the pluralist view. A notably low degree of political competitiveness is a still an 
enigmatic outcome because autonomous political organisations may at any time 
reshuffle relative power in an open system.  The narratives presented in the chapter 
indicate that it is structural factors that reduce inter-group volatility competition by 
delineating the distribution of power between groups and creating entrenched 
incentives for collective action. 
To explain one-party dominance, it is understood, we must look for a source of 
structural power that offers a single group a formidable capacity to outweigh all 
other groups and simultaneously prevent them from organise action to offset the 
influence of the dominant group. This source of power is found in the state, its 
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unmatched economic resources and its powerful instruments to shape preferences 
and behaviour. In the case of inclusive hegemony, the unavailability of state 
coercion as a tool for suppressing the political expression of social diversity means 
that other forms of state power should be at play. Our attention now turns to the 
economic and knowledge power resources which the state possesses. To understand 
why, in the absence of effective coercion, social diversity is blocked from 
generating a competitive political arena, the presence of other strategies involving 
state power must be identified and their association with voters’ choice and 
political behaviour must be understood. State power can alter the basis on which 
groups are formed in response to a shared understanding of common interest and 
with a view to promoting shared preferences through politics. Clientelism comes 
centre-stage as the most pertinent explanatory factor, which employed by the 
government deprives the opposition of the capacity to recruit campaign resources 
by which it becomes capable of taking advantage of the substantive opportunities 
for ideological and political differentiation existing in a diverse society such as 
social cleavages and policy divisions.  
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Chapter 4 
Political Mobilisation and Interest Accommodation: How Clientelism Works  
 
4.1 Introduction 
It is now clear that the terms in which inter-party competition takes place are 
contingent on inter-group relative power and the distribution of resources, and that 
the latter depends on the success or failure of the recruitment strategies of the 
groups. In politics this task is extensively performed by political parties. This 
chapter brings centre-stage clientelism as the practice directly related to party 
organisation and, consequently, as a variable affecting electoral mobilisation. 
The practice of clientelism typically refers to an exchange of benefits between 
politicians and their constituents, ‘a dyadic alliance’ for Landé (1977:xx), or an 
‘instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status 
(patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or 
both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering 
general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron’ (Scott, 
1972a:92; also Lemarchand and Legg 1972:150; Kaufman 1974, 285; and 
Mainwaring 1999; Piattoni 2001, Robinson & Verdier 2003, Roniger 2004). The 
aggregate effect of clientelism on political competition has been the object of a 
large number of empirical studies (c.f. Clapham 1982; Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson, 2007; Mavrogordatos 1983; Piattoni, 2001, Stokes 2009; Tarrow 
1977; Weingrod 1968). While theory and empirical works have already associated 
clientelism with the terms of political competition, the causal mechanism 
connecting interactions on the micro-level with macro-political developments 
remains implicit in empirical works. The linkage is generally assumed to involve a 
direct impact on client’s voting preferences (vote-buying).  
This chapter establishes an alternative causal association between clientelism and 
electoral mobilisation in a sequence of logical arguments that help illustrate in the 
next chapter the conditions under which the practice of clientelism is likely to 
produce one-party hegemony. To establish causality from the perspective of rational 
choice perspective, the chapter starts by examining the impact of clientelism on 
individual choice (micro-level) and moves to aggregate behaviour (macro-level) 
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following the logic of collective action. As shown in the previous chapter, to be 
successful contestants, political parties need to perform two important tasks: a) to 
obtain an effective political organisation by recruiting resources and mobilising an 
active support basis in order to galvanise broader electoral support by activating 
social cleavages and policy divisions and b) to accommodate demands from 
supporters and preserve loyalties to the party to prevent defections stemming from 
policy grievances, irreconcilable demands or deeper social cleavages. Based on 
assumptions by rational choice on individual and collective action this chapter 
shows how clientelism performs these two tasks in ways that strengthen the party’s 
electoral mobilisation beyond its narrow conception of vote-buying a) by inducing 
clients to make a contribution to the party’s campaign organisation in the form of 
resources or active engagement and b) through the accommodation of diverse 
interests that signals to prospective clients special gains from supporting the 
clientelist party. 
4.2. Assumptions of a causal link between clientelism and electoral 
mobilisation 
The association between clientelism and dominant party systems is part of a more 
general theoretical task of tracing the causal process linking clientelism with 
political competition. As a form of political mobilisation clientelism has been 
mostly associated with competitive political systems and modern democracies 
(Weingrod 1968, Tarrow 1977, Clapham, 1982, Mavrogordatos 1983) and it is 
widely seen as the product of high levels of competition (Lindberg and Morrison, 
2008). A smaller number of case-studies have considered the input of clientelism in 
dominant party systems too.
7
   
Despite these useful associations, assessing the impact of clientelism on political 
competition still confronts two crucial problems. First, empirical research confronts 
the difficulty of controlling all other interfering variables that affect case-specific 
                                                             
7 From a number of studies see Muramatsu and Krauss (1990: 296), Inoguchi (1990) and Christensen 
(2002) for Japan;  Zuckerman (1979: 70), Leonardi and Wertman (1989: 223– 244) and Tarrow 
(1990) for Italy; Warner (1998) for France and Italy; White (2011) for Russia; and Ames (1970), Fox 
(1994) Cornelius (2004) and Greene (2007) for Mexico.  Pork-barrel allocations of public funds to 
geographical constituencies were associated with the success of Mexico’s dominant party (Magaloni, 
2006:122-151) 
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political developments. Second, assumptions about the impact of clientelism on 
individual behaviour do not necessarily support analytical claims for its aggregate 
impact on political competition. In particular, the connection between micro-level 
and macro-level remains implicit when clientelism is brought into the analysis as an 
explanatory variable. As Kaufmann put it about clientelism, ‘it is all too easy, 
unfortunately, to assume that the organization of power and the regulation of 
activities within a given macro-unit is the same as that which occurs within the two-
person dyad’ (1974:293). Hence, we are still in search of an effective causal 
mechanism between clientelism and aggregate political behaviour. 
So far, the causal link between clientelist exchange and political competition is 
taken as given by empirical studies associating clientelism and pork-barrel politics 
with party strategy and political competition, and is mostly considered to involve a 
form of vote-buying (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002, Desposato, 2007; Dunning & 
Stokes, 2010; Hiskey 1999, Kitschelt et al.2010; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007:2; 
Schady 2000, Stokes 2005) generating network effects that influence voters’ 
behaviour (c.f. Weingrod, 1968; Powell, 1970; Scott, 1972b). Similar assumptions 
on causality have been made by works that insert the use of public resources as an 
explanatory variable in the analysis of semi-authoritarianism and dominant party 
systems (Greene, 1997, 2010a and 2010b; Colton and McFaul, 2003; McFaul, 2002 
and 2005), without, however, clarifying the causal processes they assume to be in 
operation in order to link this practice with electoral outcomes. That clientelism 
produces an aggregate impact on political behaviour remains an implicit 
assumption; consequently, that clientelism may account for the consolidation of an 
inclusive hegemony – the actual destruction of competition through a formally 
democratic process – is an even stronger claim that is currently based on a loosely 
implicit causal connection.  
Understandably, the range of clientelism can be traced by looking at the number of 
the actors potentially exposed to clientelist incentives through their involvement in 
the distribution of resources by government decision-making. However, there are 
grounds to expect that, with clientelism seen as vote-buying (as portrayed in most 
theoretical models Brusko et al., 2004; Dal Bo, 2007; Dekel et al. 2008; Dixit and 
Londregan, 1996; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Philipson and Snyder 1996; 
Robinson and Verdier, 2002; Schaffer, 2007; Weiss, 1988), its aggregate impact on 
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electoral mobilisation is uncertain because of logistical limits to the possible 
number of clientelist relations in relation to the general electorate, to the limited 
capacity to monitor reciprocity from client voters in the polls and to the presence of 
other factors of political mobilisation such as ideology, group interests and social 
divides (cleavages). It may be the case that the explanatory weight of clientelism 
must be at best marginal if not minimal compared with other parameters of political 
competition. This is a serious analytical deficiency, since understanding how 
clientelism works on the micro-level and macro-level in a typical party system is 
relevant for two reasons: to establish whether clientelism is an important if not 
sufficient condition for the resilience of one-party dominance (as part of the 
literature claims) and, if this is so, to decide on its nature in order to determine the 
character of the regime it produces. 
For clientelism to work as a powerful strategy conducive to one-party dominance, 
its range of application and its intensity must be such that clientelism could serve as 
an effective substitute for the more invasive coercive methods used by authoritarian 
regimes to limit their exposure to contestability. This suggests that the use of 
clientelism must involve more that vote-buying and vote-selling and that important 
causal associations between the practice of clientelism and electoral outcomes and 
regime change are left under-theorised.  
4.3. Empirical hints: post-communist transition and party competition 
Empirical observations from post-communist transition confirm that clientelism 
plays a broader role in shaping the terms of political competition. Post-communist 
transition has offered a good set of observations for the analysis of the formation of 
parties in nascent political systems and for assessing the input of mobilisation 
strategies such as clientelism.  
Following the collapse of communism, the ground was open for parties and 
candidates to take sides along the political and ideological spectrum. Most of the 
new parties lacked the historical roots that could have enabled them to build a 
strong support basis in a relatively short time. With the exception of the successor 
parties to the old communist parties, political loyalties had to be built from scratch 
(Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008). New parties had to devise ways for motivating support 
and accommodating social interests in conditions of extreme political volatility and 
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ideological fluidity. The shaky social and economic structure was fuelled by 
ongoing economic crisis and harsh economic reforms that continually posed 
obstacles to party strategies for political organisation and interest accommodation.  
Faced with shifting public expectations and vacillations between hope and 
disillusionment, political parties were in search for effective ways to organise 
themselves internally and present themselves before voters that were very reluctant 
to join a party (Lewis, 2000: 98, 102, 104). To overcome this weakness, a number 
of parties made an appeal to issues of ethnicity and nation-building to revive old 
and dormant animosities from troubled times (c.f. Evans and Whitefield 1993). 
Attempts to shield public support generally brought poor results. The party system 
was a shaky mosaic of political alignments. Early studies on the nascent political 
systems of Eastern Europe showed low party identification of voters, increasing 
public apathy and higher indices of electoral volatility compared with Western 
Europe, (Olson, 1998: 460). Ideological confusion coupled with unstable economic 
conditions was hindering the consolidation of a stable party system. The problem 
was more acute for parties in government whose attempt to muster political support 
confronted soaring grievances fuelled by deep-cutting reforms, as increasingly large 
numbers of voters saw themselves as losers from the policies of transition.  
By the late 1990s, post-communist scholars were invited to focus on the role of 
resources in shaping post-communist political developments (Kitschelt 1999:3). In 
similar vein, the study of Russian politics of mid 1990s demonstrated the 
importance of party organisation in mobilising communities of fate by means of 
collective incentives (Golosov 1998). The distribution of campaign-related 
resources was found to have played a more crucial role in defining the terms of 
party competition (Bartolini and Mair 1995). This in its turn redefined the capacity 
of parties for electoral mobilisation. Access to human and material campaign-
related resources determined the capacity of each political force to project strong 
messages in a political context where party loyalty was to be shaped from scratch 
(Piven and Cloward, 1992; Kitschelt, 1995:6). But since campaign resources, much 
needed for effective electoral mobilisation, were in short supply, the political forces 
were facing a more acute and urgent problem of party organisation.  
To overcome this problem, parties in the post-communist countries turned to 
government funding to finance their campaigns and transformed themselves into 
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‘cartel parties’ with strong ties to the state (Lewis, 2000: 107). Unable to make 
credible promises to citizens in those extraordinarily unpredictable economic 
conditions, a number of parties resorted to the practice of clientelism (Keefer and 
Vlaicu, 2005) making targeted transfers to selected groups of voters (Malloy and 
Mitchell, 1987, Keefer, 2005). The practice of clientelism became a central part of 
party strategy to build stable political alignments, and compensated for the 
weakness of the parties to make credible programmatic commitments. The capacity 
to organise a clientelist network depended on each party’s ability to capture the 
state apparatus. Orientation towards the state soon triggered intense competition 
among the major parties (Szczerbiak, 2001). Serious disputes erupted over access to 
state resources to be used as resources for clientelist allocation. As a result, the 
public discourse was dominated by accusations of corruption, and partisan use of 
budget funds to reward supporters (Lewis, 2000, 113-115).  
Narratives from post-communist studies call for attention to the role of clientelism 
as a powerful tool in electoral mobilisation. They imply a causal link between 
clientelism, campaign resources, party loyalty and actual electoral results. However, 
the way clientelism exactly works to affect electoral results remains unaddressed in 
theoretical terms. This causal link should be broken into smaller steps unfolding the 
impact of clientelism in a sequence of stages: voters’ preference formation being 
contingent on available information; the capacity to give information to voters 
being dependent on the availability of resources; the availability of resources being 
contingent on tactics of recruitment; and, finally, preference formation being 
contingent on interest accommodation. The next session hypothesises the impact of 
clientelism in each of these stages and makes a coherent argument about causal 
process. 
4.4 Preference formation, access to information and the recruitment of 
resources 
The idea that, in seeking to appeal to voters, party strategies make use of 
programmatic and ideological agendas or, alternatively, choose clientelism to buy 
votes by offering direct rewards conveys a false dichotomous picture of how 
political competition works. Instead, clientelism interacts with other forms of 
electoral mobilisation and with all means of political campaign and communication. 
A more comprehensive understanding of these linkages is gained if clientelism is 
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seen as an incentivising device for party organisation – the recruitment of campaign 
resources and active supporters engaged in political competition. Large ideological 
groups and any other group of individuals who share common interests and 
concerns could be seen as latent groups that can be motivated into taking an active 
role in politics by selective incentives. Clientelism, by allowing parties to offer 
selective incentives to current and prospective supporters, helps the parties 
effectively address the collective action problem facing party organisation. In its 
turn, active supporters and campaign resources recruited by the targeted application 
of clientelism strengthen the capacity of the party to mobilise electoral support.  
More analytically, resources play a key role in determining the capacity of the 
parties to project information to voters. Parties appeal to voters’ circumstances 
using programmatic pledges, ideology, direct negotiation and other processes of 
socialisation involving values and norms. The typical view of electoral choice is 
that voters are expected to choose among the political candidates on the basis of the 
information they receive about party programmes, past record and political 
credibility, whether voting is primarily ‘retrospective’ or ‘prospective’ voting (c.f. 
Morris, 1978; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Mikhailov et al., 2002). Over time, as political 
parties create a party profile by repeatedly sending ideological and political 
messages, party loyalties are built that make voters’ choice more predictable (c.f. 
Aldrich, 1995, Edelman, 1964; Cox 1997). Just like a recognisable brand name, 
party profiles identify the party with categories of social status and distinctive sets 
of political concerns, lifestyles and viewpoints, and create perceptions among voters 
that are hard to change, unless more diverse and credible information about party 
policies becomes available (Klingemann and Wattenberg 1992). 
These hypotheses on electoral choice rely on the assumption that electoral 
preferences are formed on the basis of strategic and cognitive interactions that 
develop between political actors and society, and that this process of preference 
formation is contingent on the information available. This assumption is illustrated 
by the concept of bounded rationality, developed by Herbert Simon (1985) 
according to which, rational actors make utility-based decisions based on the 
information available. Behaviour is ‘adaptive within the constraints imposed both 
by the external situation and by the capacities of the decision maker’ (Simon, 1985, 
294). The information available is combined with prior perceptions about one’s 
68 
 
personal circumstances. Whatever perception we have of the political contestants, 
and – more arguably –  the way we understand how to improve our own social and 
economic position through the medium of politics depends on the information we 
receive from various political and ideological contestants, and how successfully 
their programmes ideology are presented to be relevant to our own circumstances.  
Understood in these terms, politics take place in a context of incomplete 
information. The political arena can be paralleled to an imperfect ‘market’ with 
high costs attached to obtaining or disseminating information. Both politicians and 
citizens need to acquire information about each others’ preferences and about actual 
or proposed policies. In this context, it is political parties that bear most of the cost 
of disseminating information to voters.  
The logical implication is that for a party to succeed in providing information to 
influence political preferences, it should have at its disposal a range of mechanisms 
and techniques that shape perceptions of interest and, eventually, electoral 
preferences. It becomes obvious that the distribution of human and material 
resources among the political contestants matters for the relative capacity of parties 
to manipulate the information available to voters. As parties are expected to bear 
much of the cost of sending information to voters as well as retrieving information 
about their own general trends and circumstances, a substantial degree of party 
organisation is required. By contributing resources to the party’s campaign, active 
political members and supporters, such as party members, sponsors, journalists are 
indispensable for the strength of the capacity of each party to appeal to the wider 
public and shape electoral preferences.   
Seen in the above light, the distribution of campaign-related resources among 
parties operating in a political system open to public participation largely delineates 
the relative strength of each political party to mobilise broader electoral support. 
For a political system to be competitive, at least two parties – the government and 
the main opposition party – should be in possession of comparable organisational 
capacities. This does not necessarily require an equal amount of resources but at 
least some close proximity in the distribution of financial resources, party 
membership, campaign activists, favourable media coverage, endorsements by 
prominent public figures etc. Any sharp asymmetry in the organisational capacities 
between the government and the opposition is expected to have an impact on their 
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mobilisation capacity, their ability to appeal to the electorate by raising political 
issues and criticism on the political agenda and, eventually, building a more stable 
pattern of party loyalties.  
If it is quite clear that electoral mobilisation is very much dependent on the 
recruitment capacity of each party to gather and coordinate resources necessary for 
disseminating political messages and ideology, we now understand why a 
disproportionate share of campaign-related resources in the hands of one party 
prevents the opposition from taking advantage of social diversity and long-standing 
cleavages and policy divisions to muster considerable political as expected by 
theory (c.f. Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).  Limited contestation, the dependent variable 
in inclusive hegemonies, can now be recast as the limited capacity of the opposition 
to gather sufficient human and material resources on a par with the incumbent. 
At this point, the input of clientelism becomes relevant in the context of electoral 
mobilisation beyond the narrow confines of direct vote-buying. The role of 
campaign resources and active political supporters is linked to electoral 
mobilisation on the assumption that voters make choices on the basis of the 
information available about past policy records and future policies and upon 
exposure to party images, ideology and party ‘brand name’ that require the 
availability of resources. As the next session demonstrates, the recruitment of 
resources and active supporters depends on the party’s capacity to overcome a 
collective action problem that requires the application of selective incentives to 
motivate contributions, which is what clientelism does. 
4.5 Party organisation: clientelist incentives as a solution to the collective 
action problem  
The famous ‘logic’ of collective action explains why individuals are unlikely to be 
motivated into collective action simply by virtue of shared perceptions of common 
interest, when the anticipated collective benefit will be indiscriminately shared by 
contributors and non-contributors alike and when each member of the group expects 
to experience a small change in their personal circumstances relative to the required 
contribution (Olson, 1971). Unless there is some element of compulsion or a 
collective incentive by which individuals would be incentivised to act towards the 
shared good, and non-contributors are excluded from the benefit of its consumption, 
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or, alternatively, unless the number of individuals in a group is small so that the 
benefits will be significant anyway, rational individuals will abstain from taking 
collective action to achieve the perceived common interest (Ibid).  
The logic of collective action applies by analogy to party organisation, the 
recruitment of active supporters and campaign resources. Party organisation is 
unlikely to be successful when the political goal to be achieved has the nature of a 
‘non-excludable good’. In politics, the collective good is a political goal reflecting 
an ideological view or the pursuit of a material gain to be attained by the election of 
a party to parliament and ideally to power. The non-excludability of the good which 
is to be provided by a political party to a large group is likely to render ineffective 
any attempt to turn members of the concerned social group that expect to benefit 
from the party’s agenda from a dormant group to an organised and coordinated 
active group, insofar as the expected policy and ideological gains will be diffused 
among many and will not accumulate to each actor in some proportion to one’s 
active contribution.  
In any case, even when benefits from collective mobilisation are expected to accrue 
to a social category, its members will not be mobilised into collective action by 
programmatic or ideological drive alone insofar as the cost of taking an active part 
in political action outweighs the expected share of the benefit for each individual. 
Active participation oriented to achieving a collective goal will make sense for 
those who expect that their share of the non-excludable good will make a difference 
in their circumstances large enough to outweigh the cost of their contribution 
regardless of whether non-contributors might gain from it too. In these exceptional 
cases, it rational for a single individual to sacrifice time and money to contribute to 
the achievement of a collective good even if a share of the same good is going to be 
offered to others who have made no contribution.  
In this light, political mobilisation is better understood if large ideological groups or 
clusters of individuals that share common goals or basic concerns and aspirations 
are seen as latent groups, which will not be mobilised into political action unless 
motivated by selective incentives. The formation and organisation of a political 
party confronts the challenge of overcoming free-riding to incentivise active 
contributions to its cause. At best, parties will be capable of mobilising relatively 
71 
 
large groups only when the share of benefit  promised to each member of that group 
is going to bring a great deal of improvement in their individual circumstances. 
The collective mobilisation problem described above explains why ideology alone 
is too weak an incentive to motivate individual contributions as long as ideological 
benefits are to be shared by contributors and non-contributors alike and the 
allocated benefit for the contributors will be too small to compensate for their costly 
contribution. It is rational for a member of a latent ideological group who expects a 
benefit from a policy to prefer that the cost of promoting that policy be borne by 
others, instead of making a costly contribution oneself. It is only when a selective 
incentive, different from a general interest in the attainment of a non-excludable 
good, is offered to each member of the latent group individually, involving an 
expected benefit that far outweighs the cost of participation, that it is more likely 
that the beneficiaries will make an active contribution to the party’s campaign.  
For this reason, successful party organisation presupposes the granting of specific 
rewards to those willing to become active contributors to the party’s campaign by 
means of active membership and financial support. There may also be concrete 
punishments in place for defection and free-riding that would further discipline 
personal strategies and would induce members and groups to act in conformity with 
the normative, institutional and hierarchical confines of the party as imposed by the 
party hierarchy. Selective incentives involving reward and punishment assist parties 
in creating and preserving a loyal support basis of members and supporters and in 
maintaining cohesion against centrifugal tendencies spiralling from competing and 
often irreconcilable interests and personal strategies.  They help party leaders to 
monitor, control and coordinate party members and supporters who now have 
specific reasons to avoid gestures and actions that run counter to the party’s 
electoral strategy and would hurt the party’s image.  
These selective incentives are provided by clientelism as a solution to the free-
riding problem facing party organisation. The input of clientelism in party 
organisation demonstrates its broader role in electoral mobilisation beyond vote-
buying. To associate a party’s lead in the practice of clientelism with patterns of 
electoral mobilisation, it is important to get a clear view of how clientelism works 
on the micro-level, affecting political choices. As a tool for political organisation, 
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clientelism puts in operation a distinct pattern of collective incentives that help the 
parties gather political resources and build solid networks of loyal supporters.  
The impact of clientelism on individual behaviour is described by typical 
definitions as a bilateral agreement between the patron and the client for the 
delivery of reciprocal benefits (Piattoni 2001a, Robinson & Verdier 2003, Roniger 
2004). As Stokes (2007: 605) put it ‘the criterion of distribution that the patron uses 
is simply: did you (will you) support me?’ Seen as an exchange of benefits between 
politicians and their constituents, ‘a dyadic alliance’ for Landé (1977:xx), the 
practice of clientelism seems to create an ‘instrumental friendship in which an 
individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and 
resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status 
(client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, 
including personal services, to the patron’ (Scott, 1972a:92; also Lemarchand and 
Legg 1972:150; Kaufman 1974, 285; Landé 1977:xx; and Mainwaring 1999:177). 
The informal nature of clientelist exchange means that adherence to the terms of the 
‘agreement’ by the two parties is neither legally binding nor enforceable by courts. 
It depends on expectations of reciprocation by each party to the agreement and, 
quite often, on threats of possible retaliation in case the client fails to meet the terms 
of the agreement. From the part of the political agents involved, it relies on the 
building of trust and reputation over time, which, in the absence of formal 
sanctions, reduces the risk of breaking the agreements. 
These micro-foundations of clientelism reveal a rational process of decision-making 
that can be extended beyond vote-buying to incentives for the recruitment of active 
supporters and contributors of campaign resources. The selective distribution of 
goods to clients serves as a personal motive for them to make a visible and sizeable 
contribution to the patron’s campaign. Again, rational calculations apply. 
Prospective clients are expected to evaluate the anticipated benefit against the 
required cost of their own contribution. The expected clientelist benefit, offered or 
promised, should outweigh the cost of their participation. For prospective clients, 
any contribution to the party beyond casting a vote incurs a high cost which can 
only be covered by a highly valued benefit is offered in return. Quite often the 
anticipation is that taking part in clientelism would be more than a one-off 
exchange. From the position of an insider to the party, clients will be better 
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positioned to demand new benefits and will have a higher chance of getting them. 
Economic actors who are not part of this clientelist relationship will be at a 
disadvantage and will be probably pushed aside to areas of economic activity 
outside the reach of clientelism.  
In theoretical terms, a cost and benefit calculation takes into account the range and 
intensity of the practice of clientelism in any given context. The calculus weighs the 
scope for exit to areas of economic activity outside the reach of clientelist 
incentives. It also includes the probability of exclusion from the allocation process 
and possibly of any sanctions imposed in case they decide to refuse an offer. All 
instances in which the government rewards its allies serve at the same time as 
signals to the rest of the population of similar future benefits they could enjoy, if 
they decide to align themselves with the government support basis. The ‘signalling’ 
of previous cases of favourable treatment also offers an indication of how probable 
it is that supporting the government will grant access to the same kind of rents that 
the government has already offered to current clients. A government that has been 
previously generous in offering its supporters economic rewards signals that new 
rewards of similar value are very likely to be offered to new clients once they join 
the government’s network. From the part of the prospective clients, this is a 
probability assessment which is also dependent on the size of the economy exposed 
to government clientelist practices. The smaller the size of the business sector 
relatively autonomous from clientelism, the more attractive the option for entry to 
the government’s network becomes.  
By the same token, past incidents of the government sanctioning non-compliance 
and dissent are signalled as disincentives to prevent alignment with the opposition, 
showing the probability that the same type of sanctions would be imposed on actors 
exhibiting similar behaviour in the future. Prospective dissenters are expected to 
assess the severity and the frequency of previous cases as an indication of the 
probability that the sanction be imposed in their case. In their calculated decisions, 
individuals receive past signals and make a risk assessment that includes the 
damage anticipated, the probability of the sanction being imposed, the chances of 
avoiding the risk by moving to economic activities outside the political sector, and 
the availability of opportunities to recover the damage suffered in the future either 
by exit from the political sector of the economy or by entry to a rival clientelist 
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network. In the last case, the probability of the expected sanction imposed for 
dissent or supporting the opposition is weighed against the probability of gaining 
benefits from doing so. These notes suggest that the practice of clientelism is a very 
effective tool for the party to gather contributions to its organisation and gain, as a 
result, a strong advantage in electoral mobilisation. 
4.6 Interest accommodation and clientelist networks 
The longevity of the government party in power depends on how successfully its 
policies accommodate claims stemming from competing social and economic 
interests. The longer the government party is able to successfully provide a viable 
political platform that accommodates as many social interests as possible, the longer 
it stays in power. In a context of diverse and conflicting social interests, the capacity 
for interest accommodation faces a great challenge. Government parties are usually 
unable to address most social demands in the long run and inevitably experience 
losses in popularity as well as defections from their party basis and internal 
factionalism that sooner or later undermines the party’s cohesion.  
This tendency makes interest accommodation a more pressing problem for 
dominant parties (Boucek, 2012). Given that policy-making and implementation 
involves tough choices over who gets what, the long-term incumbency of the 
dominant party is more likely to aggravate social divisions and produce new 
tensions. To preserve their dominant position they must put in place a form of 
interest accommodation unusually successful in accommodating a sizeable majority 
of diverse and often irreconcilable social interests. It follows that understanding the 
stability of a dominant party requires tracing an extraordinary form of interest 
accommodation that is effective enough to contain claims stemming from a diverse 
social context within the party’s ranks to prevent them from undermining its 
popularity and cohesion.  
In that respect, clientelism as a very effective tool for interest accommodation 
addresses demands in an individualised way. This helps political parties to bypass 
traditional forms of policy supply to social demands that tend to generate 
antagonisms between affected groups leading to instability and losses in popularity. 
Bilateral clientelist relations between the patron and the client dilute and weaken the 
strength of the client’s membership in social groups. Clientelism, by 
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accommodating individual claims, has a more significant impact on one’s personal 
circumstances and a superior capacity to elicit loyalty and complacency than 
general policies whose benefits are dispersed and whose impact on individual 
circumstances is usually smaller. An additional advantage is that, while general 
policy-making places governments before dilemmas of selection that could harm 
and alienate certain social groups, clientelism, by contrast, entails selection among 
different individual claims that allows the party to deal with isolated clients and, 
therefore, confront a smaller scale of reactions driven by arising grievances.  
On aggregate level, by rewarding compromise, acquiescence and commitment to 
party unity and by punishing defection and actions of factionalism, clientelism is a 
powerful mechanism for interest accommodation that restructures the social sphere 
into stable and loyal clientelist networks controlled by the dominant party, which 
makes the distribution of political support more stable and predictable. Thus 
clientelism enables parties to shield themselves from collective action emerging 
from social stratification which is what typically destabilises party incumbency. 
Equally important is the effect of clientelism on the internal cohesion of the party. 
The pursue of gains through clientelist exchange within the party promises clients 
personal rewards on a permanent basis and becomes the glue that binds them into 
an organisationally coherent body under one leadership despite personal strategies 
and diverging preferences. The same practice enables the leadership to impose the 
terms that define the negotiations and compromises that take place within the party 
when conflicts between party members and groups arise.  
Political allies recruited by means of clientelist exchange are clustered into 
clientelist networks. Thanks to these networks, large and socially heterogeneous 
groups can be mobilised and coordinated into taking an active part in the patron’s 
political campaign. Relations within these networks are defined by the 
asymmetrical power of the political patrons over their clients. Clientelist networks 
may often be divided into smaller local and sectoral sub-networks where eponymity 
increases the degree of control and pressure and enables coordinated action. 
Clustered into the larger party network, the local networks may be given specific 
tasks and assignments and may operate in different social and professional contexts. 
In this way, a large supporting base for the party is mobilised and becomes centrally 
directed and coordinated.  This has a multiplying effect. As this network expands, 
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more social and economic actors may see these informal networks as an opportunity 
for liaising with other actors, which offers them more comparative advantages 
against outsiders. More clients are expected to join in as the result of ‘adaptive 
expectations’ whereby actors tend to make choices thinking that ‘they are picking 
the right horse’ (Pierson, 2004:24).  
Hence, the practice of clientelism serves as an effective barrier against the growth 
of non-clientelist parties and new entries. The latter will find it difficult to build 
their own clientelist network from scratch, which requires a significant amount of 
resources that is usually not available at the early stage of party formation when the 
playing field has been occupied by existing clientelist networks. Both prospective 
clients and aspiring politicians would find it easier to approach existing political 
parties to pursue their careers and promote their claims there. This advantage 
further increases the bargaining power of the clientelist parties vis-à-vis current and 
prospective clients. As a result, political activity is increasingly locked in among the 
clientelist parties and filtered through the hierarchical structure of the clientelist 
networks, while electoral volatility is further reduced through the process shown 
graphically in table 3.  
 
Table 3: Causal model linking clientelism with inter-party competitiveness 
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4.7 Broader implications  
It has been shown here that clientelist exchanges set up selective incentives for 
contributions to political party. By providing targeted collective incentives, 
clientelism serves as a strategic tool through which the political parties address the 
collective organisation problem facing political organisation and form wider 
networks of political allies. The impact of clientelism on party organisation affects 
the party’s capacity for electoral mobilisation through three intermediary causal 
associations: a) clientelism as a mechanism for the recruitment of resources for 
party organisation, b) party organisation affecting the terms of political competition 
under the assumption of voters’ bounded rationality, as resources strengthen the 
capacity of the clientelist party to mobilise electoral support; and c) clientelism 
providing an effective form of interest accommodation that sustains the cohesion of 
a clientelist group, secures its loyalty and prevents centrifugal tendencies stemming 
from social divisions.  
As a next step to assess the aggregate impact of clientelism on political behaviour, 
the model needs to integrate structural parameters associated with the range of the 
clientelist incentives in a given context. Clientelist networks have an impact on 
electoral preferences and levels of political competitiveness primarily because they 
generate pools of campaign resources that are strategically employed by the party to 
project strong political messages and images. In a multi-party system the relative 
size of rival networks is expected to affect the relative capacity of parties for 
electoral mobilisation.  
The size of a clientelist network depends on how many economic activities are 
subject to clientelist exchange. Clientelist relations develop in what can be named 
as the political sector in the economy, the sphere of economic activities in which 
resources, goods and services, are produced, priced, or allocated by the state 
directly or through transactions governed by private law to which either the 
government or a government-controlled entity is one party. The term covers forms 
of state intervention in the economy beyond state ownership: any form of political 
involvement in the production, pricing and allocation by government of goods and 
services as well as the allocation of economic opportunities by the state in the form 
of regulations, licences etc. 
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The reach of clientelism in the political sector of the economy presupposes 
government discrimination in the distribution of scarce resources. For instance, the 
owners and managers of private companies may be required to make a contribution 
to the party in government in return for state subsidies and other forms of 
favourable treatment. Private media may receive advertisement from government 
agencies and state-owned companies in return for their favourable political stance. 
Private business may be offered public procurement contracts, easy access to credit 
from state-controlled banks, registration with privileged tax schemes or in free 
economic zones, valuable information about oncoming state projects, a speeding up 
of the delivery of government services etc. Further government rules and 
procedures can subject private companies to government discrimination. Schemes 
of mixed ownership between the state and private actors can also provide a platform 
for rent-seeking. In general, any allocation of government-provided resources that is 
made conditional on political behaviour can be used as a strong selective incentive 
for economic actors who are dependent on government allocation or seeking to take 
a part in it to align themselves with the government party and make an active 
contribution in a variety of ways: by becoming member of the party, taking part in 
the campaigning at local level, funding the opposition party or candidate, taking 
part in the party’s rallies and petitions, expressing political views favourable for the 
party in the press, the workplace or the neighbourhood, operating a media outlet 
sympathetic to the opposition etc.  
4.8 Final remarks 
The chapter has put forward a model of the impact clientelism has on electoral 
mobilisation that goes beyond vote-buying to include incentives for the recruitment 
of active political agency and campaign resources that play an indispensable role in 
party strategies for electoral mobilisation. In particular, clientelism more than any 
other strategy helps political parties overcome successfully the problem of 
collective action facing party organisation by raising the value of rewards offered to 
active contributors, by excluding non-contributors (free-riders) and by punishing 
defectors. The application of clientelist incentive gives rise to vast networks of 
clients who are coordinated into political action in support of the party’s campaign.  
The lead in campaign resources achieved by means of clientelism gives a party an 
advantage in electoral mobilisation – the capacity to appeal to the electorate by 
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taking advantage of actual issues on the political agenda and by bringing forth 
alternative political proposals. This association is based on the assumption of 
voters’ bounded rationality according to which voter’s preference formation is 
contingent on information mostly provided to them by the parties and the media. By 
strengthening the party’s electoral mobilisation capacity, clientelism increases the 
chances of the clientelist party to skew voters’ preferences in its favour. 
Second, clientelism works as a particular form of interest accommodation that 
effectively addresses claims on an individual basis and has a more significant 
impact on individual circumstances compared with general policies. Through 
individualised interactions it offers the party a tool by which to bypass, transcend 
and mitigate demands derived from social groups. The clientelist party obtains a 
unique capacity to reconfigure the social context and shape the source of political 
demands in ways that protect it from demands articulated en bloc on the basis of 
typical social categorisations such as class, gender, ethnic background or profession 
that tend to generate group action. Clientelism can thus help the party contain 
centrifugal tendencies stemming from heterogeneous social demands from outside 
social groups, personal strategies and factions within its ranks, a function which is 
of particular interest to the study of dominant party systems. Moreover, clientelist 
relations have a multiplying effect on party organisation and electoral mobilisation. 
Members of clientelist networks are expected to reproduce the same pattern of 
incentives in their own sphere of command as part of the commitments they have 
undertaken. 
The analysis here has clear implications for the study of dominant parties. In 
political systems open to participation the distribution of campaign-related 
resources largely delineates the relative strength of each political party in 
mobilising broader electoral support. The strength of the dominant party can be 
associated with an extraordinary set of incentives and an extraordinary form of 
interest accommodation offered by clientelism that protect the party’s power 
monopoly from centrifugal tendencies resulting from social divisions and 
grievances over politics. For a dominant party to obtain an extraordinarily 
asymmetrical advantage in political organisation without recourse to the use of 
coercion in order to directly restrict political participation, clientelism should serve 
as substitute of equal effect in mobilising support, stifling dissent and suppressing 
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diverse interests on a large scale. The association between clientelism and one-party 
dominance now appears to be a matter of magnitude in the range and intensity of 
clientelism. Following the causal analysis here, there are reasons to expect that a 
combination of strategic and structural variables in the practice of clientelism may 
give the type of clientelism that accounts for the low degree of political 
competitiveness observed in an inclusive hegemony. We can now expect that, 
depending on the size of the economy exposed to its practice, clientelism in the 
hands of the government party may significantly reduce the degree of contestability, 
whereas the presence of competing clientelist networks is likely to give rise to 
different patterns of political competition. The typology that incorporates all these 
parameters in a causal model is discussed in the following chapter.    
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Chapter 5 
The link between clientelism and hegemony 
 
5.1 Introductory comments 
The knowledge that the practice of clientelism is common in many democratic 
systems and that is often associated with intense political competition suggests that 
inclusive hegemonies must involve a particular type of clientelism that significantly 
reduces the competitiveness of the political system and sustains the political 
dominance of a single party in ways as effective as the use of coercion. In light of 
the analysis presented in the previous chapters, we are in search of a particular type 
of clientelism that acts as an extraordinary blocking factor to political competition. 
This type must include: 
a) Extensive and intensive application of selective incentives for the 
recruitment of human and material resources to be used for electoral campaign, 
which offer the incumbent an unmatched resource advantage and a clear lead in 
electoral mobilisation capacity; and 
b) Extensive range of interest accommodation by which the dominant party 
manages to transcend well-entrenched social cleavages and contain centrifugal 
political tendencies within the structures of the party. 
This chapter incorporates structural parameters to associate the causal model of 
clientelism described previously with the emergence and consolidation of inclusive 
hegemony. The type associated with dominant party systems must be part of a 
typology linking different degrees of contestability on the basis of extreme values of 
the structural and agential parameters pertinent to the reach of clientelist incentives: 
a) the distribution of clientelism among political parties, b) the permissiveness of 
institutions, and c) the structure of the economy.  
The analysis must also discuss possible objections to the rational choice 
assumptions underlying the causal model. The first objection is raised against the 
very notion of self-interested political action, in that ideology and political 
conviction are equally strong factors driving political behaviour. For that reason, it 
should be expected that the impact of clientelism on party allegiance necessarily 
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interacts with ideology to have a considerable impact on the overall level of 
political support mobilisation. The second objection is derived from the view that 
contestability cannot be reduced to inter-party competition and that, in the absence 
of ‘effective’ party opposition, a degree of competitiveness in the political system 
could be restored as intra-party contestation by the activities of factions within the 
party and as non-partisan contestation by the emergence and operation of 
autonomous civil society organisations provided that factions and civil society 
organisations possess some degree of bargaining autonomy vis-à-vis the party 
leadership (c.f. Goldman 1993; Gillespie et al, 1995). 
In this broadened view, despite a low degree of inter-party contestation, a dominant 
party system can still be regarded as democratic insofar as the dominant party 
confronts a substantial degree of contestation from autonomous civil society 
organisations and party factions. This notion of contestability redefines the concept 
of inclusive hegemony as a phenomenon referring to a general deficiency in the 
way social diversity is expressed in the political arena by social and non-partisan 
organisations and by factions emerging from within the structures of dominant 
party. Seen in this light, the wide-encompassing effect of clientelism associated 
with inclusive hegemony on contestability should be traced on all arenas of political 
competition in which competing demands can be articulated, and involves the 
overall re-grouping of the social sphere’ into clientelist networks that are 
hierarchically controlled and operated by the dominant party. 
5.2 Clientelism and the party structure: monopoly control, range and areas of 
‘exit’  
A model on the impact of clientelism on the overall pattern of political competition 
needs to take notice of three parameters determining the reach and effectiveness of 
clientelism, the intensity and the scope of ‘exit’ from the reach of government’s 
clientelist incentives: 
a) Available resources for the government to distribute in a clientelist fashion: 
i.e. the size and the economic role of the state in the economy. 
b) Institutions enabling the government party to discrimination in the 
distribution of state-provided resources. 
c) The capacity of the opposition to counterbalance the impact of clientelism 
practised by the government party by its own engagement in clientelism or the 
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recruitment of supporters from areas of economic activity outside the reach of 
clientelist party. 
The capacity of the party to limit its exposure to political competition depends on 
the availability of resources to be allocated in clientelist exchange and the frequency 
of government discriminatory treatment that takes place there. The availability of 
resources determines the size and strength of the government’s clientelist network 
and it is highly contingent on structural factors. As clientelism concerns economic 
activities that take place in the political sector of the economy, the size of the 
political sector of the economy determines the number of the economic actors 
potentially exposed to clientelist incentives. In other words, the size of the political 
sector of the economy defines the structural boundaries to the practice of 
clientelism. The larger the political sector of the economy, the larger the number of 
economic actors exposed to government distribution of resources, and the wider the 
reach of clientelist incentives in the form of rewards and sanctions By the same 
token, the extent to which segments of the private sector are outside the reach of 
discriminatory treatment allows a degree of autonomy from the government’s 
clientelist incentives. In a large political sector, however, clientelist incentives and 
disincentives signalled by previous applications of clientelist exchange are likely to 
affect the majority of the economically active population. Economic actors 
understand that there is limited opportunity to avoid the reach of clientelism and 
will most probably adjust their behaviour. As the political sector of the economy 
expands, so does the scope for the exercise of clientelist exchange to new targeted 
groups. This is in itself an incentive for the government to increase the size of the 
political sector of the economy in order to increase the effectiveness of its clientelist 
strategy by reducing the scope of private sector actors for exit to areas of economic 
activities where access to resources is not decided by way of government 
distribution.  
On the other hand, the extent and the nature of practices of clientelistic exchange 
vary depending on the permeability of the institutions and the checks in place to 
government discrimination in the allocation of resources (c.f. della Porta and 
Vannucci, 1999; Heywood, 1996). In other words, institutional rules that secure a 
transparent and predictable process in the distribution and allocation process can 
significantly limit the scope of clientelism by prohibiting arbitrary treatment and the 
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abuse of government discretion. The formal rules governing government 
distribution of resources define the institutional boundaries to the practice of 
clientelism. To increase the intensity of clientelism, the government party should 
undermine the efficacy of these institutions in order to sidestep the rules of equal 
treatment of equal cases and engage in discriminatory allocations of resources 
following a clientelist logic.  
In addition, the relative strength of each party’s clientelist strategy depends on the 
presence and relative size of rival clientelist networks controlled by the opposition 
parties. If prospective clients can join rival clientelist networks and anticipate future 
compensation for the cost of exclusion from the government’s network, depending 
on the share each party has in the practice of clientelism, the availability of 
alternative networks lowers the cost of ‘voicing’ dissent. This in its turn defines the 
effectiveness of the clientelist practices of the government party in skewing the 
pattern of political organisation. With at least two parties developing comparable 
organisational capacities from clientelist networks of comparable size, the 
opposition party is in a better position to match the incumbent’s electoral 
mobilisation capacity. Consequently, a more or less symmetrical distribution of 
‘patronage’ between two or more political parties is expected to have a balancing 
effect on the distribution of political incentives for agency. In the opposite case, the 
opposition can only hope to recruit a support basis among those whose social and 
economic activities develop outside the political sector of the economy where 
clientelism is applied and who remain indifferent to clientelist incentives for that 
reason. In an economy with a large political sector, the chances of successful 
recruitment are, therefore, slim.  
A typology can be built to associate different values for each of these parameters 
with variation in the competitiveness of a bipartisan political system consisting of 
the government party and the main opposition party, depending on a) the size of the 
political sector in the economy, b) the intensity of clientelism and c) the presence 
and relative strength of competing clientelist networks. Each distinctive 
combination of the above parameters builds up a type with a different hypothesised 
effect on political competitiveness. The typology presented below covers the 
practice of clientelism under weak institutional boundaries and, therefore, does not 
include cases where state intervention in the economy is subject to rules that 
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effectively reduce the capacity of political parties to discriminate in the allocation of 
economic resources in favour of their supporters. Each type of clientelism is 
associated with the relative effectiveness of two competing political parties in the 
gathering of campaign-related resources.  
Four remaining types of clientelist exchange are defined by the size of the political 
sector – the structural boundaries determining its reach in a given economic setting 
– and the distribution of clientelist exchange among the political parties. Based on 
the analysis in chapter three on the causal link between the organisational capacity 
of political parties and electoral mobilisation capacity, each type produces a 
different impact on the parties’ relative capacity to mobilise broader electoral 
support and, consequently, on the competitiveness of the party system.  
Type 1: Both parties engaging in clientelism in a large political sector 
In a large political sector in the economy, economic actors whose economic 
activities remain mostly vulnerable to government discrimination have limited 
scope to exit from the practice of clientelism to areas of economic activities 
relatively autonomous from government discrimination. Lack of exit can be 
mitigated by the presence of competing clientelist networks of comparable size 
operated by two or more parties, which gives economic actors a limited range of 
options. The cost of exclusion from one network can be compensated by entry into 
an antagonistic network promising future rewards that may cover or exceed the 
present cost of exclusion. The range of options for each economic actor depends on 
the relative capacity of each network to accommodate demands from prospective 
clients. As long as the distribution of clientelism is more or less symmetrical among 
competing parties, economic actors are able to choose among alternative political 
forces. Hence, the overall distribution of political support is likely to reflect the 
relative size of the competing clientelist networks. When the two parties frequently 
alternate in power or share power in coalition governments, clientelist networks are 
likely to be more or less comparable in size. Conversely, clientelist promises 
strengthen the chance of a party in opposition to gain power insofar as the dominant 
party does not have a disproportionately larger share of the practice of clientelism. 
A share of clientelism gives the clientelist parties a comparative advantage against 
parties that do not engage in clientelism. While the presence of more than one 
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clientelist parties means that a degree of competitiveness in the political system 
survives, clientelist parties may found themselves capable of blocking entry to other 
political forces and controlling centrifugal tendencies within their ranks. Moreover, 
because, clientelistic networks are at the same time competing spheres of control, 
clientelist parties have at their disposal a powerful instrument to check the 
behaviour of their members. Thanks to these advantages, parties with established 
clientelist networks would prefer to maintain and increase the sum of clientelist 
exchanges by expanding the size of the political sector of the economy in an attempt 
to protect themselves from further exposure to competition. Given the possibility of 
alternation in power or power-sharing in government coalitions, clientelist parties 
have a strong incentive to refrain from imposing harsh sanctions on each other’s 
supporters to avoid rounds of retaliation. 
Type 2: Both parties engaging in clientelism in a small political sector 
Clientelism has a smaller impact on political mobilisation in an economy with a 
small political sector where the largest proportion of economic actors develops 
activities outside the reach of clientelism. Consequently, the overall degree of 
political mobilisation through clientelism is expected to be lower than the previous 
type. Economic actors enjoy more freedom in choosing the course of political 
behaviour they wish to pursue and they are more likely to remain indifferent to 
clientelist incentives. Even in the presence of political forces with networks of 
clientelistic exchange, new political entries – though still at disadvantage – may 
find it easier to gather political support. Following the previous analysis, we expect 
a higher degree of public apathy, as mobilisation into active political engagement 
shall be limited to a smaller pool of prospective clients and to those primarily 
motivated by ideology. In similar vein, strategies for interest accommodation must 
consist of other forms of particularistic policies, which unlike clientelism cannot 
command reciprocity. This pattern is common in democratic countries where the 
government has relatively limited scope to apply clientelist incentives in the 
distribution of resources. 
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Type 3: One-party monopoly over the practice of clientelism in a small 
political sector 
In the third type, the government party has a monopoly over the supply of 
clientelism in an economy with a relatively small size of the political sector. While 
the opposition cannot resort to clientelism as a way of mobilising supporters and 
finds itself still at a disadvantage compared to the government party, there is still a 
large pool of prospective supporters from the wide group of actors who develop 
economic activities outside the reach of government clientelism. The political 
system may retain a degree of contestability as long as the opposition’s appeal to 
ideology and self interest succeeds in recruiting active supporters among those 
indifferent to the government’s clientelist incentives.  
Without access to clientelist incentives, however, the opposition is still expected to 
have greater difficulty in recruiting active supporters other than the ideologically 
motivated actors. Prospective clients may tend to approach the government party 
attracted by the prospect of gaining rents through special clientelist relations. Actors 
within the private sector that currently retain their autonomy versus the state are 
likely to be swayed to support the government in return for guaranteed economic 
returns and protection from open competition. It is for that reason that the 
government party has an incentive to enlarge the political sector of the economy in 
order to extend the reach of its clientelist incentives. Faced with these 
disadvantages, there are equally strong incentives for the opposition party to 
promise clientelist rewards to current and future supporter and start building its own 
clientelist network to offset the mobilisation tactics of the incumbent. Refraining 
from making clientelist promises undermines the incentivising capacity of the 
opposition and monopoly clientelism is, therefore, a disequilibrium state of affairs.  
Type 4: One-party monopoly over the practice of clientelism in a large 
political sector 
Low degrees of contestability can be associated with the dominant party’s 
monopoly over the supply of clientelism in a large political sector of the economy. 
The large size of the political sector reduces the possibility of economic actors to 
exit to non-politicised areas of economic activity. Under these conditions, the 
opposition can only hope to garner a comparable amount of political support among 
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the few actors whose activities remain outside the political sector of the economy. 
Given the attractiveness of clientelist incentives and the added costs which actors 
may have to bear if they choose to develop economic activities relatively 
autonomous from clientelism, this group is likely to be particularly small.  Any 
calculus of available options would favour a decision of economic actors exposed to 
clientelist incentives to support the government and the decisions of non-clients to 
exhibit complacency with the government to avoid punishment.  
In this context, the opposition will find it extremely difficult to gather a comparable 
support network and match the organisational capacity of the incumbent. In 
addition, with most of economic activity subject to the government’s clientelist 
network, there is little credibility in the opposition’s promises for clientelist rewards 
to current and prospective supporters, unless it is perceived to have a considerable 
chance to gain power. This is very unlikely in a party system where there is a 
dominant party. Unless there is a deep social, ethnic or political cleavage whose 
divisive impact on preferences and loyalties cannot be mitigated by government’s 
clientelism, the opposition has a slim chance of becoming a serious challenger and 
is, instead, locked in a disadvantageous position. For the same reason, a party that 
gains power has an incentive to build and secure its monopoly in the supply of 
clientelism as soon as possible and expand the political sector of the economy as 
much as possible to ‘occupy the field’. 
The model presented here makes predictions applicable to conditions of inter-party 
competition. The same parameters strengthening the dominant position of a 
hegemonic party protects it from factions within the party and other social non-
partisan forms of collective action. It is expected that, by virtue of their size, 
dominant parties will be characterised by a higher degree of social heterogeneity 
and will face a more acute problem with factionalism, internal strives and 
defections (c.f. Boucek and Bogaards, 2010: 225; Boucek, 2012).
 
As government 
policies have an impact on the strength of the party’s socioeconomic support base 
(c.f. Pempel, T.J., 1990:2) clashes of interest are likely to emerge both from within 
the party basis and outside the party, which may destabilise an inclusive hegemony. 
While it appears perplexing how dominant parties become able to continually 
preserve their electoral strength and maintain large coalitions among broad 
socioeconomic sectors (c.f. Pempel, 1990:2), clientelism enables them to exercise  
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Table 4: Types of clientelism and effect on the competitiveness of the party system 
 
Type 1 
 
Competitive 
clientelism 
Type 2 
 
Competitive 
Clientelism 
Type 3 
 
Monopoly 
Clientelism  
Type 4 
 
Monopoly 
Clientelism 
Parties 
practising 
clientelism 
 
Two or more 
parties 
 
Two or more 
parties 
One party One party 
Size of the 
political sector 
of the economy 
 
Large 
 
Small Small Large 
Political 
mobilisation 
(effect on 
resources) 
 
Significantly 
skewed in 
favour of the 
clientelist 
parties 
 
Skewed in 
favour of the 
clientelist 
parties 
Skewed in 
favour of the 
clientelist party 
Significantly 
skewed in 
favour of the 
clientelist party 
political 
competitiveness 
 
Contestable 
among 
clientelist 
parties 
 
contestable 
Contestable 
despite resource 
advantage for 
the clientelist 
party 
Non-contestable 
 
effective hierarchical control over all forms of political organisation such as 
factions inside the party and civil society organisations. 
The same process by which clientelism reduces the degree of government exposure 
to inter-party contestability can bring about a similar effect on other arenas of 
contestability. Clientelist incentives permeate all forms of social organisation and 
have a broader impact on the political expression of socially diverse interests, 
constraining the expression of preferences in any form that could undermine the 
government party’s political dominance and internal cohesion. With regard to intra-
party contestability, clientelism helps the government party shield party unity in the 
long run and prevent splits and factionalism by punishing defection with exclusion 
from the network. With regard to power of civil society, clientelism undermines the 
autonomy of collective action in non-partisan forms by restructuring all demands as 
individual claims to the party and thereby subjecting social and political actors 
outside the party to relations of dependency within its clientelist network.  
The extension of the model’s applicability to all arenas of contestability redefines 
the very concept of limited contestability itself that chapter one has singled out as 
the distinctive element of a category of dominant party systems. The degree of 
90 
 
factionalism and competition from social organisations outside the party system is a 
more robust criterion for distinguishing between authoritarian and democratic 
dominant party systems. In this view, the term inclusive hegemony refers to an 
authoritarian party system which exhibits low degrees of contestation in all three 
arenas of contestation: the inter-party arena, b) the intra-party arena, and c) the 
civil society arena. By contrast, a dominant party system is classified as democratic 
if the dominant party confronts high degree of contestation stemming from its own 
factions and alternative forms of social organisation through which a wide range of 
competing interests finds its political expression.  
5.3 Assumptions and objections 
The model presented here relies on the rational choice assumption that political 
behaviour is driven by calculations of material costs and benefits employed by self-
interested, utility-maximising actors when making a decision about what course of 
behaviour to follow and which preferences to reveal in public. The reach and 
intensity of clientelism is expected to have an impact on the aggregate pattern of 
political alignments through the sum of individual rational calculations that follow a 
generic pattern: 
Expected cost > expected benefit→ inaction (complacency) 
Expected cost <expected benefit → action supporting the opposition) 
For a sceptical reader, however, this assumption is at best a generalisation that risks 
dismissing the fact that in the real world of politics action is also driven by 
commitment to a political cause derived from ideological beliefs and values which 
some political actors enthusiastically endorse. The premise that an individual acts 
rationally driven by self-interest may well apply to market transactions but offers an 
impoverished view of political action.  
Following this objection, it may be said that what the model has described is at best 
a logical possibility and there is still a considerable degree of uncertainty 
concerning the impact of clientelism on political action due to the contingency of 
political action on other equally important driving factors of political mobilisation. 
In particular, the effectiveness of materialistic rewards and punishments put forward 
by the government party in its clientelist activities depends on how appealing 
economic incentives are to each actor individually. It may be the case that the 
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rewards offered by clientelism do not equally entice everyone, while the sanctions, 
exclusions and punishments will fail to prevent the politically-concerned and the 
ideologically-driven from taking an active part in politics on the side of the 
opposition, making a decision that defies the high cost attached to that choice. 
Ideological commitment may lead some actors to dismiss the benefits offered to 
political alignment with the government party and to be willing to bear the cost 
attached to alignment with the opposition. This varies with social settings and 
different historical circumstances. 
The objection to a pure rational choice model can be seen as an invitation to 
acknowledge that each individual decision over engagement with politics is 
contingent on a combined assessment of material and non-material benefits and 
costs. This approach will concede that utility considerations are unique to each 
individual and that subjective perceptions of utility are not necessarily reduced to 
calculations of material rewards offered and punishment pending. Instead, the 
impact of material rewards and sanctions in each individual case is weighed 
differently against the kind of utility one expects from political activism. There is a 
degree of uncertainty here that compels us to make predictions based on material 
rewards and punishments less rigid. An estimate of the impact of clientelism on the 
aggregate pattern of political action can only be seen as a logical possibility. With 
regard to the model presented in this chapter, this means that clientelism in the 
typology consisting of clientelism in four different structural settings will not 
necessarily generate the same pattern of political behaviour, but there will probably 
be some variation across cases depending on the degree of ideological drive and 
commitment as well as many other local factors.  
While the critique above concerns the deterministic endorsement of rational choice 
analysis, the central premise of rational choice that political actors are the same 
individuals when operating in different contexts of human activity holds truth. As 
James Buchanan has pointed out: 
‘The critical important bridge between the behavior of persons who act in 
the market place and the behavior of persons who act in political process 
must be analyzed. The “theory of public choice” can be interpreted as the 
construction of such a bridge. The approach requires only the simple 
assumption that the same individuals act in both relationships.... Closure of 
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the behavioral system, as I am using the term, means only that analysis must 
be extended to the actions of persons in their several separate capacities 
(Buchanan, 1972: 12).  
This premise suggests that, although there is great difficulty in gauging the extent to 
which ideology and political values matter in relation to purely material incentives 
in every given case, a rational choice perspective can accommodate the input of 
values, ideology and material rewards into a broadened view of ‘utility’. While it is 
important to acknowledge that each individual’s cost and benefit calculation is 
shaped by different formulations of utility in different ways, this concession should 
not go as far as to dismiss the interplay between material costs and benefits on the 
one side and other driving incentives for political action on the other. Just as the 
analysis should not dismiss the impact of ideology on personal motivation, so too it 
should acknowledge that the expected impact of material rewards and punishments 
on one’s circumstances is weighed against ideological considerations. A synthesis is 
needed that should rely on a more nuanced definition of utility as perceived benefits 
minus costs from a course of action under consideration, which includes ideological 
motivations and material costs and benefits as integral parts of a rational decision 
over political action.  
In this synthesis, while benefits from clientelism may be perceived differently by 
each individual, ideological motivation is not independent from the material costs 
attached to political participation. For ideologically-driven actors, a sanction on a 
particular path of political behaviour may be quite effective in deterring action in 
that direction when the personal cost attached to a course of political action driven 
by ideology outweighs the expected personal benefit. It is plausible to expect that 
those who prioritise non-material causes cannot wholly disregard any material costs 
attached to a path of action, especially when the material cost has been raised to a 
level that clearly outweighs the non-material benefit. It then makes sense to expect 
that with the exception of a small core of ideological hardliners most other affected 
actors will prefer to stay out of politics. For instance, even in the ‘difficult’ cases of 
ideologically-driven actors, an economic sanction may be effective in changing 
one’s decision when it threatens to affect sensitive personal and family 
circumstances, posing an agonising ethical dilemma between the choice to serve a 
political cause and the welfare of one’s family.  
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To deter political mobilisation driven by ideology, the cost of political activism 
must be raised substantially high beyond a certain threshold of tolerance. The 
higher the cost, the more likely it is that most actors will choose inaction instead of 
active political engagement. Finally, an individual calculation of expected benefits 
versus anticipated costs is sensitive to group dynamics. The effect of the sanctions 
imposed in deterring others from playing an active role in politics may dishearten 
an isolated ideologically-driven actor who may have otherwise decided to defy 
these costs. As previous applications of threats and sanctions had already prevented 
others from engaging in political activism, it is reasonable for him or her to expect 
that his or her engagement will make little difference. The multiplying effect of 
deterrence is particularly relevant for the type of clientelism which by virtue of its 
magnitude and intensity is associated with an inclusive hegemony. 
5.4 Continuity and change: the role of agency 
Given the specific terms of the type of clientelism associated with limited 
contestation, it is highly unlikely for any clientelist party to abandon or reduce 
unilaterally the practice of clientelism, since this move would offer the other parties 
the chance to ‘occupy the space left’. It follows that, unless an opposition party 
develops its own clientelist network comparable in size to that of the government 
party, it will be difficult to counterbalance the government’s advantage in 
mobilising electoral support and can only hope to recruit its own support basis from 
actors situated in areas of economic activity outside the political sector of the 
economy. On the contrary, there is an inbuilt incentive for the opposition party to 
attempt to build its own clientelist network to engage in clientelism, as shown in the 
clientelist game in table 5. In this game, it is likely that the opposition will attempt 
to move to the equilibrium point a by promising future rents in the event it gains 
power to prospective supporters who have been excluded from access to 
government resources. 
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Table 5: Options and pay-offs for political parties in clientelism 
Equilibrium at a)  Party B 
Engage  Abstain  
party 
A 
Promise 
and 
engage  
a) Competitive 
clientelism (type 1 or 2) 
b) Monopoly clientelism 
by party A (Type 3 or 4) 
Abstain  c) Monopoly by party B 
(type 3 or 4) 
 
d) Competition  without 
clientelism 
 
The participation of the opposition in clientelism places the calculus of prospective 
clients in a broader perspective. It may be then rational for prospective clients of the 
opposition to bear the present cost of expressing dissent (as demonstrated by 
previous cases acting as warning signals) in anticipation for larger future benefits 
from raising a ‘voice’ in support of the opposition. They may be willing to bear the 
cost of sanctions from government retaliation now so as to be the first to establish a 
privileged relationship with the opposition in anticipation of higher returns offered 
on a ‘first come first served’ basis. Any future benefit, however, is estimated as to 
whether its value exceeds the current cost and as to whether it is likely to occur 
anytime soon. Hence, expecting benefits from the opposition is a highly uncertain 
bet. Utility-maximising actors who are promised future benefits by the opposition 
party have to assess the chances the opposition party has to gain power in the near 
future. As a result, to offset the competitive advantage of the party in government, 
the opposition’s promises have to be credible, and this largely depends on its 
current strength in polls. In view of these uncertainties, risk-averse economic actors 
are more likely to choose the more certain path of supporting the government.  
Under the conditions present in a dominant party system, the opposition is trapped 
in a disequilibrium point by a vicious circle. The appeal of its promises depends on 
its credibility which is contingent on the perceptions of prospective clients of 
whether it is likely to gain power. In a political system where the incumbent 
constantly wins a large percentage of votes and the possibility for a change in 
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government is small, this understandably discourages economic actors from 
aligning with the opposition. The opposition’s promises are seen as unrealistic as 
the likelihood that it will get in a position to fulfil them is slim. The large voting 
distance separating the incumbent from the opposition as well as the incumbent’s 
longevity in power signal to current and prospective clients that any contribution to 
the opposition in anticipation of future benefits is likely to be fruitless and counter-
productive. Those already excluded from access to the government’s privileged 
group of supporters would rather try again to establish special links with the 
government or at least show complacency to avoid material sanctions.   
Despite these adverse circumstances, victories of the opposition party in local 
elections and in trade unions may serve as a springboard for the opposition to build 
up credibility (c.f. Langfield, 2010). As the clientelist game suggests, the opposition 
can open up a turf for clientelism in local councils or trade unions that come under 
its control. They will tend to be perceived as indications of a higher probability of 
the opposition to gain control of central government and this will equally increase 
the credibility of the opposition’s clientelist promises. The opposition can now start 
offering generous rewards to supporters and compensation to those punished by the 
government for their current alignment with the opposition. Once in control of local 
and sectoral posts, the reliability of the opposition in keeping current and future 
promises can be tested and evaluated by prospective clients.  
For the dominant party, the opposition’s victories are dangerous cracks in the 
government’s monopoly over the supply of clientelism, as they open up new areas 
for the opposition to recruit its own support basis. With its own clientelist network 
growing, the opposition may become able to infiltrate and destabilise the support 
basis of its opponent, possibly overbidding in promises. It may also recruit 
displeased government clients whose claims were not properly or fully 
accommodated. The opposition has the chance to gradually erode the current 
advantage of the government party in incentivising support by means of patronage. 
This is a serious threat to the incumbent whose strong interest in preserving an 
asymmetry in organisational and motivational capacities dictates that it should be 
vigilant enough not to allow the opposition to win victories in small elections and, 
consequently, a niche in the practice of clientelism.  
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5.5 Continuity and change: structural constraints 
Clientelist networks whose mobilisation is a necessary precondition for successful 
campaign are for party leaders ‘inclusive groups’: it is in the party’s interest to 
include as many clients as possible to make a contribution to the campaign and 
increase the chances for election to office. Consequently, there is a strong incentive 
for the clientelist party to intensify the practice of clientelism. As the range of 
clientelism depends on the size of the political sector of the economy, the tendency 
is to add new areas of economic activity to those subjected to clientelist exchange. 
The propensity to increase the practice of clientelism can only be kept in check by 
institutional safeguards prohibiting or reducing the politicisation of the allocation 
process of government goods. The strength of these checks depends on legislation 
and constitutional norms. Understandably so, political parties practising clientelism 
are unlikely to be willing to impose limits to the very source of their own 
comparative advantage. In the absence of checks, the practice of clientelism can 
only be reduced when the decrease in the size of the political sector is the 
unintended outcome of exogenous shocks hitting the economy and compelling the 
government to perform reforms reducing the state’s share in the economy and 
changing the character of state intervention to allow for autonomous private 
economic activity to come to the economy’s rescue.  In the face of an economic 
downturn threatening the very sustainability of the clientelist system, the priority 
may be that part of the turf for clientelism can be temporarily lost to prevent a 
greater systemic collapse.   
An exogenous shock to a clientelist system can also be attributed to negative 
externalities produced by the extensive application of clientelism. The practice of 
clientelism involves government distribution of resources and incurs a fiscal cost of 
on public sector finances. The capacity of the government party to extract resources 
for clientelist exchange mainly through taxation and public borrowing ultimately 
depends on the health of the economy. Extensive clientelism, however, discourages 
private investment particularly when investors are uncertain about the terms of trade 
and feel unprotected from the whims of government discrimination. Low levels of 
investment and a shrinking economic activity eventually reduces the resources 
available to the government for clientelist allocation. As government revenue drops, 
the need to preserve the current level of government distribution calls for heavier 
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taxation and borrowing, fuelling higher government deficits and launching a 
downward spiral of economic downturn, fiscal derailment and public 
dissatisfaction.  Unless the government is able to find a source of revenue 
independent of taxation, e.g. by collecting rents paid by foreign actors for the 
extraction of minerals and oil as in the case of ‘rentier states’ (See: Entelis, 1976; 
Beblawi, 1987: 51; Mahdavi, 1970; Luciani, 1994; Shambayati, 1994:308-309; 
Ross, 2001) or public borrowing, it remains financially dependent on domestic 
business activity for tax revenue.  
Faced with fiscal deficits and a deteriorating economy, the government is likely to 
be compelled at some point to limit government spending and consequently to 
curtail the resources available for distribution. Depending on the severity of the 
economic situation, economic and social actors under increased financial strain may 
push in that direction as the cost of clientelism passed on each of them through 
increased taxation and a deteriorating economic situation increases. The cost borne 
may reach a point that its impact on one’s economic circumstances makes it cost-
effective to join or even organise forms of collective action to oppose the 
government’s politics of extensive clientelism.  
When a crisis dictates the launching of institutional reforms that curtail the 
expansion of the state in the economy, the erosion of the political sector of the 
economy occurs as the unintended consequence of government decisions that were 
necessary and difficult to avoid under deteriorating economic conditions. The 
combined assessment of economic and political cost considerations recommends 
this course of action when the political cost generated by clientelism itself and a 
deteriorating economic situation outweigh the political benefits from keeping the 
same pace of clientelist practices. The decision to implement a number of structural 
reforms may reduce the role of the state in the economy, limit government 
intervention and make it less discriminatory, for instance with the elimination of 
quotas and license fees for business activities and the abolition of the system of 
permits and allowances which are typically awarded to loyal supporters. These 
decisions could ultimately reduce the scope for the development of patron-client 
relations (c.f. Ades and Di Tella, 1999). To the extent that economic reforms reduce 
the size of the political sector of the economy, limiting the degree of government 
regulation and distribution, economic reforms will eventually reduce the scope for 
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clientelist exchange. This will increase the share of the private sector that enjoys 
relative economic autonomy vis-à-vis the government and possibly generate 
grievances amidst the clients left outside the new allocations of clientelist rents. 
Nevertheless, the capacity for clientelist exchange is not necessarily undermined by 
economic reforms in all cases and clientelism may adapt to the new limitations. A 
shift may take place from direct allocation of resources that incur an immediate cost 
on public finances to other forms such as a licensing system, the provision of credit, 
indirect protection, tariffs etc. In these instances, the government continues to 
exercise discrimination in the selection of winners but without the heavy cost 
attached to other forms of clientelist exchange. It may be the case, for instance, that 
tax authorities could be asked to turn a blind eye to tax evasion by supporters of the 
government while searching thoroughly for irregularities in the accountant books of 
others; or that the deregulation of capital flows may be decided at a time when 
particular beneficiaries wish to transfer capital abroad, and so on. 
Market reform is also likely to give rise to new opportunities for clientelism, 
particularly when market reform takes place in a context of intense state 
intervention in the economy prior to the inauguration of reforms, and when reforms 
reducing the state’s direct involvement in economic activities fail to actively 
develop market-enhancing institutions (McMann ,2009). The choice of reforms, the 
sequence of reforms and the selection of beneficiaries from these reforms can still 
reflect clientelist agreements between political patrons and clients. New forms of 
clientelist relations between the business community and the government will 
develop (Pearson, 1997). The process of privatisation, for instance, can increase the 
government’s leverage over the business sector competing for a share, when the 
government is at liberty to choose the winners that buy the public assets at bargain 
prices (Tangri 1999, 59). These types of clientelist exchange may involve more than 
a one-off agreement: partial privatisation of state-owned enterprises may not 
introduce a purely economic logic in their management, if the new managers are 
subject to political pressures to hire supporters and fire opponents. The practice of 
clientelism is thereby outsourced by the government party to its client private 
actors. As the government creates new business opportunities and allocates them to 
private actors on condition that they reproduce clientelist incentives in their own 
sphere of command, the political sector of the economy simply changes shape.  
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5.6 Final remarks 
Drawing on the causal process described in chapter three, which links clientelism 
and political competition on the micro and macro-level, this chapter has associated 
clientelism with one-party dominance in a typology consisting of three variables 
whose values determine the impact on clientelism on political competition: the 
number of parties engaged in clientelism, the institutional framework that allows or 
limits the scope for clientelism, and the size of the political sector of the economy 
that delineates the range of clientelist incentives. Based on the assumption of 
rational behaviour, it is argued that on the aggregate level variations in the scale and 
intensity of these variables will define the reach and effectiveness of clientelist 
incentives and disincentives and, ultimately, affect the political choices of social 
actors. In an economy with a large political sector where the scope of exit from the 
reach of clientelist incentives is small and there is no alternative clientelist network 
to compensate for material losses, the government monopoly over the practice of 
clientelism gives the dominant party the capacity to incentivise political support and 
deter the active expression of dissent. In that case, the reach of clientelist incentives 
is such that, while formal structures for participation are present, clientelism could 
distort the conditions of political competition in all spheres of political activity: 
inter-party competition, intra-party politics and civil society activism. This 
extensive form of inclusive hegemony is associated with the type of clientelism:  
monopolised by a single party in a large political sector of the economy, 
which allows it to accommodate diverse individual preferences in ways that 
limit its exposure to other forms of social organisation and prevent 
centrifugal tendencies from undermining party cohesion, as well as to 
achieve an advantage in party organisation that undermines the chances of 
other parties to mobilise considerable electoral support. 
It becomes clear under which circumstances the exercise of a form of manipulative 
power by a dominant party results in low exposure to contestation. By virtue of this 
all-encompassing effect on all forms of political expression, clientelism enables a 
dominant party to reduce its exposure to competition to a degree comparable with 
authoritarian regimes. By contrast, in all other types, a degree of political 
competitiveness survives, since there are other clientelist networks or the political 
sector of the economy is small and the reach of clientelist incentives limited.  
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The typological theorising here opens the field for more structured and focused 
analysis in empirical works in search of explanatory paths against a multitude of 
observed tactics and strategies which, albeit found to be in operation in a given 
case, may not be of direct causal relevance to the phenomenon under study. The 
model indicates why the analysis of hegemonic regimes should keep a distance 
from views that see the incumbent popularity in polls as the genuine outcome of 
voters’ choice. Limited contestability must be associated with unusual and unethical 
practices that interfere in the formation of preferences and behaviour.  
The last piece of the puzzle is to agree on the nature of the dominant party system 
produced by extensive application of clientelism. Even though limited contestation 
is now seen as the result of intensive and extensive monopoly application of 
clientelism by a single party, clientelism as a form of manipulation may still be 
regarded as compatible with competitive democratic politics. A highest threshold 
should be passed that requires explaining why, when or under which circumstances 
clientelism should be seen as an inherently authoritarian practice. 
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Chapter 6 
The authoritarian nature of inclusive hegemony: a note on clientelism  
 
6.1 Introductory comments 
Following the criterion used by the literature to classify regime types as 
authoritarian, the crucial question this chapter addresses is whether clientelism runs 
counter to essential properties of democracy. The literature is rather inconclusive as 
to the nature of clientelism that is widely regarded as part and parcel of competitive 
politics in most modern democracies despite the alleged distortions it produces. 
Although the previous chapter makes it clear why an inclusive hegemony should be 
regarded as severely flawed on the dimension of contestability, this particular 
outcome is not the product of applied violence or threat of violence on behaviour 
and preferences to allow the unproblematic judgment that inclusive hegemony is an 
authoritarian regime. Hence, albeit an extraordinary form of a party system an 
inclusive hegemony associated with extensive and intensive application of 
clientelism by a single party may still be seen as compatible with the very essence 
democratic politics.  The opposite claim must demonstrate that clientelism is 
basically a non-democratic practice either because its in-built qualities run counter 
to a basic standard of democratic process or because it affects political behaviour in 
a way similar to coercion in authoritarian regimes. The chapter here develops two 
arguments in support of this claim. 
6.2 Clientelism: legitimacy, consensus and particularistic politics.  
Clientelism is widely seen as a general pathology in the particularistic allocation of 
state resources by government in democracies and authoritarian regimes alike (c.f. 
Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; Lyrintzis, 1984; Komito 1985; Roniger and Güneş-
Ayata, 1994; Gay, 1998; Blakeley, 2001; Kristinsson, 2001). While the practice of 
clientelism exerts an indirect and subtle form of manipulative power and is widely 
perceived to be an unethical practice, the critical question is to ascertain whether it 
can be considered as a practice compatible with basic properties of democracy or 
not.   
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Arguments in support of the view that clientelism is incompatible with democracy 
can be summarised in two sets, which are discussed in detail here. The first set 
focuses on the macro-level and sees clientelism as an abuse of state power, while 
the second emphasises the asymmetrical power relations that develop between the 
patron and the client on the micro-level.  
It has been said that clientelism undermines the notion of citizenship by privileging 
short-term exchanges of votes over more general benefits from political 
representation (Escobar, 2002), that it obstructs the functioning of democratic 
institutions of representation and accountability, offering the incumbent an electoral 
advantage (Graziano 1973; Lyne 2007; Stokes 2005; Wantchekon 2003), that it 
constitutes the illegitimate manipulation of public resources to skew voters’ 
preferences (c.f. Forewaker and Landman, 1997), that it hinders the development of 
horizontal civil society organisations (Erie, 1988; Graziano, 1977; Scott, 1972a), 
and that it is a degeneration of the relationship between elected officials and the 
electorate (Volintiru, 2010). These arguments bring to the debate normative 
prescriptions that raise the standard far above the basic properties of democracy – 
the common denominator of various definitions of democracy according to which 
democracy is a form of a political system which offers an open structure of political 
representation and allows for peaceful alternation in power and the contestation of 
policy outcomes. As a result, these arguments can be criticised for involving 
unrealistic expectations of what constitutes a functioning democracy as well as 
idealised standards which actual practices by office-seeking politicians in 
democracies also fail to meet (for similar objections, c.f. Huntington, 1991:9-10 and 
Schumpeter, 1956, chapters 20-22).  
A minimalist approach to democracy accepts that government policies may be 
motivated by partisan gain and other humble driving factors (c.f. Huntington, 
1991:10). The freedom of voters to exercise this right means that they are at liberty 
to exchange their votes for whatever payoffs they think it is in their interest. If, from 
the point of view of the client, clientelism is ‘the proffering of material goods in 
return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is 
simply: did you (will you) support me’ (Stokes, 2007:604-605), at first glance 
clientelism seems to generate a win-win situation that leaves voters better off, as 
they get a higher return on their vote and experience a greater positive change in 
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their utility curves compared with other forms of policy supply. To consider this 
exchange as a violation of the notion of citizenship is to pass judgment on how 
voters should make use of their freedom to vote when confronted with different sets 
of payoffs. This claim places an idealised standard of democracy above and beyond 
voters’ freedom to choose and defines the nature of their involvement in democratic 
competition in a way that contradicts the essential property of democracy, which is 
voters’ free choice of political behaviour. Stemming from a particular view of 
citizenship’s autonomy (Lemieux, 1987) this specific take of clientelism is 
countered by the very basic idea of free choice inherent in the notion of a ‘right’. 
The idea is that clientelism constitutes a re-individualisation of the provision of 
goods and services by government. Whatever the motive, whether it fosters rent-
seeking activities and whether it changes the terms of competition for access to 
government resources should actually remain the issue of political debate in a 
democracy. Moreover., the claim that clientelism imposes costs on others (c.f. 
Epstein, 1985:987-988) dismisses the fact that all forms of government distribution 
generate negative externalities and that it is the very essence of democracy that 
relevant grievances and complaints about negative political externalities can be 
aired freely in political debate. While one is entitled to believe that certain forms of 
distribution are better than others and that some forms of voting behaviour are 
unethical, these opinions reflect subjective and ideologically debatable standards 
and, therefore, cannot be elevated to the status of a benchmark that determines what 
acceptable democratic behaviour is and what is not. 
As pointed out earlier, clientelism does not force a change in behaviour but 
incentivises adaptive responses by self-interested actors. It emerges at the interface 
of two key processes in politics, on the one hand economic actors and social groups 
competing for goods and services distributed by the government, and on the other 
hand political actors competing for political office. Utility maximisation 
considerations apply to both politicians and prospective clients. It appears that the 
two processes of selection, electoral politics and the allocation of resources by the 
government, invite groups and individuals to take part in a form exchange on a 
voluntary basis, clientelist exchange, from which both parties gain benefits. For 
politicians, clientelism offers an effective way of electoral mobilisation while for 
clients it is a shortcut to exclusive access to government-distributed goods. 
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Clientelism is thus generated by the interaction of political demand and supply: on 
the one hand, demand for preferential treatment by economic actors and, on the 
other, supply depending on the availability of resources for clientelist exchange and 
the number of patrons involved in their allocation. As Gordon Tullock argued in 
1965 in his paper ‘Entry Barriers in Politics’ the democratic process resembles an 
auction mechanism in which politicians bid for the right to a natural monopoly, the 
government. This ‘right to monopoly’ means that political power decides over the 
provision of goods and services by government decision-making in the form of  a 
monopoly that rules out competition by any other entry. But because the right to run 
the state ‘monopoly’ is decided competitively in elections, a degree of 
‘marketisation’ resurfaces when politicians distribute goods and services to voters. 
As the allocation of government-provided goods among candidate clients is made 
conditional on political support, to regard clientelism as a voluntary transaction may 
go as far as to suggest that clientelism generates a ‘political market’ for the 
allocation of economic resources. This is an informal market where mutual benefits 
are exchanged between politicians and social actors. Like any competitive process, 
this form of allocation generates an informal system of ‘prices’, for the goods and 
services provided by the government.  
A plausible objection to the portrayal of clientelism as a ‘political market’ is that 
unlike ordinary market transactions clientelist exchange involves state power. 
Clients are subjected to government power and their transactions with the 
government or with state-controlled companies form part of a hierarchical 
relationship defined by a clear power asymmetry in a sphere of authority. They may 
also face discriminatory treatment, the negative side of clientelism, whose 
consequences they can hardly neglect or avoid. A wide array of retaliatory measures 
could affect their decisions and conduct, such as strict and constant auditing of 
books, the revoking of a license, refusal to grant public advertisement, delay in the 
delivery of government services, refusal to provide credit from state-controlled 
banks etc. These measures can be imposed on defectors and members of the 
clientelist network that did not fulfil as expected the duties and commitments they 
have undertaken in return to the favour they received. 
Power asymmetry in clientelist exchange is even sharper owing to the fact that the 
number of patrons on the supply side is small while demand for clientelism involves 
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myriads of prospective clients. This disparity allows the patrons to choose their 
clients or raise the ‘price’ they could ask in return of the favour granted. This is an 
unequal bidding process, where the patrons choose those who are able to offer the 
strongest form of political support or the most resources possible. Empirical studies 
have confirmed that politicians selectively allocate rents to core constituents, 
influential interest groups and swing voters to avoid wasting resources (Lindbeck 
and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Only a small number of 
economically powerful ‘clients’ are able to negotiate the terms of the exchange. 
Moreover, refusal to take part in a clientelist exchange means that someone else can 
jump to grasp the opportunity. 
Nonetheless, even if clientelism is seen as an extreme and quite ‘dark’ form of 
particularistic politics it is still not clear why it is necessarily a non-democratic 
practice. It can be argued that all policies involving selection could be used by the 
government party for partisan gain and that all instances of government selection 
are allocations by government monopoly that unavoidably involve power 
asymmetries between the government and those claiming access to goods and 
services distributed by the government. For democratic theory, it is asymmetrical 
government power in the selection of policies that creates inter-group 
confrontations and substantiates the raison d’être of a democracy.  
This line of argument suggests that clientelism should be considered as compatible 
with the very essence of democratic politics, an actual derivative of inter-group 
competition. All politics are particularistic and involve discrimination in the 
provision of goods and services. To expect universalism in politics is ‘unrealistic, 
unattainable and possibly not desirable’ (Piattoni, 2001:29). The relationship 
between accepted forms of political particularism and clientelism might have been 
portrayed as that of an ideal and its corruption (c.f. Barnes and Sani, 1974; 
Zuckerman, 1977) and one that hinders the attainment of normative agendas (c.f. 
Littlewood, 1981; Schneider et. al. 1972) but, pragmatically, it can also be seen as 
‘a dialectical relationship between what is theoretically desirable and what is 
practically possible’ (Piattoni, 2001:18; c.f. Weingrod, 1968; Powell, 1970; 
Silverman, 1970; Lemarchand and Legg, 1971; Boissevain, 1966; Gay, 1998). In 
this view, clientelism is just one of the historical forms in which interests are 
represented and promoted, a practical (although in many ways undesirable) solution 
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to the problem of democratic representation. (Piattoni, 2001:3). Clientelism can be 
regarded as particular manifestation of particularistic politics which is fully 
compatible with democratic politics as a form of a dyadic relationship that is 
complementary to other institutional forms (c.f. Landé, 1983).  
This function of clientelism stands in sharp contrast to the coercive tactics of 
physical repression, intimidation and electoral restrictions that clearly render a 
dominant party system authoritarian by restricting political participation and pre-
empting accountability between the rulers and the governed. Unlike subtle 
manipulative tactics that skew preferences in a non-coercive way, these are real 
pervasive authoritarian controls that leave little choice for prospective political 
activists. Violence works through intimidation and fear of physical punishment, 
while clientelism involves incentives in the form of rewards and disincentives by 
means of exclusion and discrimination.  At first glance, the two sets of practices 
seem to differ substantially as to how they produce changes in behaviour.  
Unless something concrete is said about whether or in what circumstances 
clientelist exchange is not the product of free choice and the result of consensual 
agreement, clientelism can be duly regarded as a form of exchange in the political 
distribution of resources and a phenomenon derivative of competition for access to 
goods and services distributed by the government. More should be said about power 
relations and domination to allow a claim that clientelism, or at least a form of 
clientelism, contravenes basic properties of democracy as defined by a minimalist 
approach to democracy stripped off subjective and unrealistic visions of how its 
ideal form should be.  
An argument in that direction is that clientelism is an abuse of state power that 
distorts the playing field and by virtue of its scale generates an authoritarian regime 
(Levitsky, 2010; also Greene, 2010a and 2010b). The underlying idea is that the 
state with its centralised and all-pervasive authority becomes a partisan resource 
that interferes with the emergence of political competition from the social context 
by blocking the emergence of contesting political forces. With its unmatched 
human, intellectual and material resources, state power involved in political 
competition generates a degree of distortion large enough to limit contestation. The 
resulting asymmetry violates the organic link between social diversity and political 
pluralism described in chapters one and two. While the state is in itself the target of 
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competing political demands, clientelism reverses the direction of social influence 
as the tool that enables one group to impose political outcomes on society.   
This argument makes a general claim about the democratic credentials of state 
involvement in political competition by a single party on the basis that clientelism 
like any other form of state power is an instrument used in shaping preferences and 
behaviour and that like coercion it may have a similar impact on political 
competition – skewing the political expression and collective organisation of 
diverse social interest and reducing the level of the government’s exposure to 
contestation. This view can be associated with the normative standard of 
contestability discussed in chapter two. Clientelism can be seen as a corruption of 
state society relations, when government intervention in the economy is no longer a 
tool for debated, agreed upon and revisable political change but is snapped by 
political parties and misused to push the strategic behaviour of individuals to a 
desired direction. It thus alters fundamentally the pattern of social organisation and 
alters relative power between the party and social groups. The state becomes a 
partisan tool that actually pre-empts such a debate, producing a distorting impact 
on the pattern of political competition at times so intense that it becomes difficult to 
challenge, check, and debate particularistic politics and state power applications It 
distorts the very process through which the demos is expected to be able to exert 
some influence on the exercise of state power. Instead, state power captured by a 
few political parties and used as a partisan resource generates a top-down process of 
tampering with social diversity and political preference formation. It is in this 
context that clientelism as a form of exercise of state power over individuals for the 
purpose of achieving partisan gains should be seen as inherently incompatible with 
the ideal essence of democracy.  
The objection to this argument is that all forms of state intervention in social and 
economic life may be driven by the government party’s desire to attract supporters 
and recruit contributions. The claim, therefore, that clientelism is an abuse of state 
power is generic enough to include competitive multi-party systems where 
clientelism has an intense and widespread presence. Clientelism as a form of state 
power employed in the context of political competition has had an extensive 
presence in many competitive political systems: from the late 19th and early 20th 
century USA (Shefter, 1994), to Latin America (Geddes, 1994), and the 
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Mediterranean (Gellner and Waterbury, 1977 Lyrintzis, 1984). Licences, state 
employment, public contracts, privatisation are among the many forms of 
clientelistic exchange developed between politicians with state and private actors 
(c.f. Ades and di Tella, 1997). Other lawful forms of state policy, including 
distributive policies and general regulation, are commonly used by the incumbent 
party to secure re-election. While the practice of clientelism produces a highly 
distortive effect on the conditions of political competition, it is generally viewed as 
a by-product and a shortcoming of democratic competition. This very real property 
of modern democracies is epitomised in the notion of the ‘cartel party’, which uses 
the resources of the state to ensure their own survival (Katz and Mair 1995). 
By the same token, all forms of public spending can be criticised as spending by 
politicians directed to please voters. In short, many forms of lawful exercise of state 
power may give the incumbent an electoral advantage which minor parties outside 
the government clearly lack. What is more, particularism, office-seeking politics 
and incumbency advantages cannot be eradicated from democratic government, for 
it is precisely the purpose of democracy to allow contestation of particularistic 
allocations and to expose all uses of state power by the government to criticism and 
debate.  
An alternative argument is to maintain that elections are not meaningful when the 
costs imposed on opposition actors in the form of intimidation and physical 
repression and any other forms of authoritarian controls are pervasive and 
fundamentally important in altering participation decisions of prospective activists 
(Greene, 2010a:156 and 158). When clientelism is associated with dominant party 
systems, it is easy to understand why dominant parties derive extraordinary resource 
advantages and thereby increase their chances of winning elections but it is far from 
evident whether this should be considered as a form of authoritarian control. Many 
other manipulative uses of state power by the incumbent could raise the cost for 
other minor parties to be effective contestants. If we follow this maximalist stance 
on clientelism as an abuse of state power that raises the cost on the opposition, 
competitive party systems that involve cases of two or more clientelist parties may 
equally not qualify as democracies.  In this logic, the terms of party competition 
cannot be regarded as fair when the playing field is heavily skewed in favour of the 
clientelist parties. 
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Nevertheless, it is quite common that government parties make use of resources 
from the public budget to generate electoral advantages. In all these forms state 
power is widely used in many forms to skew voters’ preferences and generate 
incumbent’s advantage in electoral mobilisation in democratic systems too and can 
be seen at worst as a pathology of democratic politics. It is one thing to 
acknowledge that both clientelism and physical repression engage state power to 
bring changes to preferences and behaviour and it is quite another to claim that both 
practices are in effect coercive. As long as the political arena remains open to all 
political entries and elections are not tainted with fraud or widespread violence, an 
inclusive hegemony that relies on extensive practice of clientelism by the dominant 
party is an unusual outcome that can be still classified at worst as a flawed 
democracy. More should be said about what is meant by ‘the abuse of state power’ 
and by ‘fair competition’, given that state power is involved in party politics in the 
form of pork-barrel policies, patronage, electoral law restrictions and incentives, 
state funding for parliamentary parties, etc all generating advantages for the bigger 
parties. Regardless of the fact that clientelism raises the cost of the opposition 
activities in Greene’s sense, what should be shown is that the practice itself is 
incompatible with the basic political freedom to choose one’s path of political 
behaviour freely, as enshrined in democracy. 
The hypothesised association between clientelism and one-party dominance 
developed in chapter three and four provides some useful hints as to where to look 
if we are to support the opposite view. The next sections develop two arguments in 
support of the view that clientelism is a form of particularistic politics that runs 
counter to basic standards of democratic politics on the basis of the normative 
analysis in chapter two and the causal model presented in chapters four and five. 
The first argument looks to the kind of impact produced by clientelism on political 
behaviour and the way clientelism interferes with contestability to claim that 
clientelism should be equated with the more conventional means of violence and 
physical intimidation. Clientelism can be regarded as an essentially non-democratic 
practice because it violates the requirement that particularistic claims should be 
exposed to open contestation in public debate. Hence, clientelism has an inherently 
non-democratic nature shielding individualistic claims to government from 
exposure to criticism. The second argument seeks to establish that intimidation by 
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violence and particular forms of clientelism under certain circumstances work in 
similar ways to force changes in the behaviour of individuals. The analogy between 
clientelism associated with one-party dominance and the use of state coercion lies in 
the nature of the impact they both have on political behaviour by punishing ‘voice’ 
and excluding ‘exit’.  
6.3 Clientelism as an illegitimate form of particularistic politics 
The argument that clientelism produces a distorting impact on fair competition is 
too weak to distinguish it from other forms of particularistic politics in democracies 
that generate advantages for the incumbent, unless additional reasons are given as to 
why the clientelist exchange differs from all other forms of state involvement in the 
economy. The discussion therefore can be narrowed down to whether the use of 
state power to skew the recruitment of political resources undermines core 
properties of democracy.  
In that direction, Robert Putnam’s distinction between different forms of 
particularism, puts forward a useful idea. Policies were divided between 
‘clientelist’, where particular interests are promoted to the detriment of the general 
interest, and ‘civic’ polities, where preferences are expressed through broader 
categories of interest (Putnam, 1993). The former category is clearly portrayed as an 
anomaly in relation to particularistic politics. As noted earlier, the problem with this 
dichotomy is that there is no consensus on what kind of policy serves this ‘general 
interest’. The term ‘general interest’ may refer to numerous subjective and possibly 
contradictory perceptions. Particularistic demands can be masked behind a rhetoric 
that astutely makes references to the notions of general interest and common good 
to cover a highly distributional intention. We can retain, however, this distinction as 
a starting point for drawing a more robust line on the basis of the manner in which 
particularistic demands are articulated and, ultimately, supplied.  
If a clear boundary should be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate forms of 
particularistic politics, a promising claim is to assert that selective and even 
discriminatory allocations of goods and services by the state are legitimate political 
practices in conformity with basic democratic standards insofar as both the demands 
themselves and the process of selection are exposed to open debate in the formal 
structures for public participation and contestation put in place by democratic 
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institutions. Simply put, particularistic demands are required to be exposed to public 
scrutiny and particularistic demands selected through this process are legitimate 
only when they have been subjected to an open process of public deliberation and 
eventually to voters’ approval in elections. From a minimalist perspective on 
democratic theory, particularistic politics can be driven by rather ‘dark’ motives and 
employed for cynical reasons, as long as competing claims are openly challenged 
and debated in the formal processes of representation and decision-making. In that 
event, authoritative decisions on selection are legitimate even if they are driven by 
self-interested motives.   
This realistic criterion acknowledges that there are plural and often irreconcilable 
sources of demands and that it is the very essence of democratic competition to 
provide an open forum in which some of them are selected while others are not. 
Particularistic politics is an inevitable feature of policy-making and remains 
legitimate insofar as it meets the requirement of publicity, which serves as a check 
on the selection process itself, by providing others with some protection and 
defence against competing claims and exposing all claims and government 
decisions to public debate and criticism. An optimistic view of this position is that, 
in responding to competing demands that have been articulated in an open process 
of debate and deliberation, the government will tend to produce forms of policy 
delivery that are as compatible as possible with prevalent perceptions of ‘common 
interest’. A more pragmatic approach is to expect that ‘going public’ means that the 
government will have to show some concern to competing views and interests, and 
that an open selection process will provide a check on possible abuses of 
discretionary power.  
Clientelism clearly infringes the above requirement as it involves agreements that 
are kept away from public scrutiny. Patrons and clients bypass public scrutiny 
exactly when they deem that transparency and due consideration of other demands 
could be a cause for delay and a major hurdle. The clientelist way of allocating 
resources contravenes the basic requirement of publicity and the essential rule-of-
law requirements of transparency, due consideration of all cases and non-
discrimination in the application of a selection criterion in other identical cases. It 
thus runs counter to the command that selective allocations of goods and services 
by the government should take place in conditions of open debate so that all 
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affected parties could have the opportunity to be aware of them and challenge them. 
On this basis, clientelism is not merely a departure from the notion of legitimate 
particularistic politics but a practice that destroys the very basis on which 
particularistic politics is expected to take place in a democracy. 
The same requirement of publicity and exposure to debate distinguishes clientelism 
from pork-barrel politics narrowly defined as the selective allocation of a public 
resource to a given constituency or group by politicians in anticipation of public 
support. Although both clientelism and pork-barrel politics are forms of favouritism 
involving the use of state resources to influence political preferences, pork-barrel 
politics lacks an explicit agreement between the politician and the beneficiaries for 
the exchange of favours. The distinctive element in pork-barrel politics is that 
selective allocation takes place in the absence of a hidden exchange, without a clear 
and explicit agreement between the politician and the beneficiaries that would 
include a priori pledges from the beneficiaries to reciprocate. Like clientelism pork-
barrel politics is part of a strategy aiming at political mobilisation (c.f. 
Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002), however, benefits from pork-barrel politics are 
often diffused among a usually large group of beneficiaries. While pork-barrel 
politics remain a highly controversial tool for partisan motivation, insofar as the 
scale and nature of the practice is such that pork-barrel allocations can be identified 
and exposed to open debate, the practice conforms to the standard of what 
constitutes a legitimate political activity compatible with democracy.  
Clientelism is now understood to be incompatible with basic democratic properties 
not in terms of the impact it has on political competition (as explained in chapter 
four) but because of the incompatibility of the process it puts forward with basic 
democratic norms requiring open contestation. It is this particular feature of 
clientelism that instils a notion of unfairness in the conditions of political 
competition when its application is systemic and extensive. The practice of 
clientelism occurs in democracies too with less conspicuous effects on the degree of 
political competitiveness. In these political systems a degree of contestability 
survives thanks to the existence of more than one clientelist networks. 
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6.4 Clientelism, exit and voice 
The argument that clientelism is an essentially authoritarian practice and, 
consequently, an inclusive hegemony generated by its extensive application is an 
authoritarian regime can undergo a tougher test. A higher standard can be put in 
place according to which it should be shown that the impact generated by 
clientelism on one’s freedom to choose a course of behaviour has a similar nature to 
that of violent coercion. To consider clientelism as essentially authoritarian, the 
practice should not be assessed in terms of the form of its impact on political 
competition to be seen as an unlawful form of particularism, but it should be 
compared with the coercive forms of power employed by typical authoritarian 
regimes in terms of the effect each of them has on individual free choice of political 
behaviour. This criterion brings us back to the micro-level of clientelist exchange. 
While the use of state power in both practices constrains behaviour and distorts the 
political expression of diverse social interests, at first glance, each practice seems to 
affect behaviour quite differently. The impact of coercion on one’s cost and benefit 
calculations is particularly invasive, involving the exercise of physical violence and 
intimidation that compels the targeted actors to adapt their behaviour accordingly or 
face physical punishment. By threatening the personal freedom, physical integrity 
and possibly life of the targeted actors, coercive power deprives individuals of the 
basic freedom to choose a preferred course of action. By contrast, relationships 
between patrons and clients appear to entail consensual agreements based on 
concomitant wills by which both parties gain significant mutual advantages. Even 
when these relationships entail asymmetrical power, the terms of ‘agreement’ could 
be said to resemble the type of contract whose terms are decided by one party and 
the consumer is simply asked to ‘take it or leave it’. While clientelist exchange 
involves a highly asymmetrical power relation between the patron and the client, it 
still stands far away from the kind of insidious dilemmas coercion places on choice, 
forcing adaptations in behaviour against one’s will by threatening great harm.  
If coercive power is defined by its capacity to force changes in behaviour against 
one’s will, the coercive aspect of clientelism can be traced in measures of exclusion, 
discrimination and material retaliation employed by government to deter defection 
and support of the opposition; the negative side of clientelism, which incurs serious 
material costs. As argued in chapter four, the efficiency of punishment depends on 
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the availability of opportunities for exit. Actual cases of punishment imposed on 
opposition supporters show the probability that the same sanction will be imposed 
in the future on any individual who considers following a similar path of behaviour. 
They also serve as warning signals to existing clients about the cost attached to 
defection. These calculations of risk, though varying on individual basis on the 
basis of personal circumstances and degree of risk aversion, involve: 
 Assessing the severity of the cost in view of the social position in which one 
is situated (impact assessment). 
 Evaluating the probability of the cost. This looks at the rate of occurrence 
that can be traced in the severity and the frequency of relevant incidents by the 
government acts (signalling).  
 Evaluating the possibility of mitigation or compensation by looking at 
whether opportunities exist for exit to spheres of private economic activity relative 
autonomous from clientelist practices. 
Risk calculations take into account the size of the private sector autonomous from 
government discrimination where new economic activities outside the political 
sector of the economy can be found; the larger the size of the private sector 
autonomous from state action, the higher the chances to ‘exit’. By contrast, the 
larger the political sector of the economy is, the smaller the opportunities an 
economic actor has to ‘exit’ from the clientelist network to avoid or mitigate any 
cost suffered due to unapproved behaviour; and the smaller the scope for exit, the 
smaller the degree of freedom one has to choose a path of behaviour against the will 
of the patron. As a result, the extensive application of clientelism in inclusive 
hegemonies can raise the opportunity cost of political activity to levels comparable 
to the costs imposed on individual choice by coercion in authoritarian regimes and 
in any case could limit individual freedom in ways similar to coercion in an 
authoritarian regime. Under these circumstances, a clientelist exchange can no 
longer be seen as voluntary agreement insofar as the targeted individuals cannot opt 
out without suffering some form of serious and inescapable damage to their 
personal welfare.  
With limits to exit from its rewards and punishments, the party can direct political 
behaviour through clientelist exchange in a way that pre-empts the emergence of 
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competition and limits its exposure to other sources of political contestation. Under 
the circumstances described in the type of clientelism associated with inclusive 
hegemony, clientelism of the type associated with inclusive hegemony goes as far 
as to deny ‘voice’ by depriving exit. Moreover, by constraining free choice in ways 
similar to coercive power, clientelism generates and embeds relations of domination 
inside the client group. The absence of alternative clientelist networks in a large 
political sector of the economy increases the dependency of clients on the clientelist 
party, which generates forced integration into a structure of command and control. 
Far from a network of individuals freely pooling their resources to achieve a 
number of shared goals, the clientelist group is now a sphere of authority and 
domination, where blockages to ‘exit’ and the material punishment and sanctioning 
of ‘voice’ commands the clients’ subordination to the ruling elite.  
6.5 Final remarks 
The last chapter has presented a set of arguments in support of the view that 
inclusive hegemonies with low degrees of contestation produced by extensive 
application of clientelism are authoritarian regimes. Drawing on the literature’s 
standard to classify dominant party systems as democratic or authoritarian on the 
basis of whether the strategies, tools and practices generating this outcome 
contravene basic standards of democracy, the chapter has examined whether 
clientelism can be considered as an authoritarian exercise of state power.  
Two arguments are presented. The first argument on ‘the legitimacy of 
particularistic politics’ observes that clientelist allocations of benefits are hidden 
transfers kept away from public deliberation. It argues that clientelism contravenes 
the very essence of democracy that authoritative allocations of resources by state 
power are only legitimate if they are previously exposed to open debate and public 
scrutiny. The second argument about ‘the analogy between force and clientelist co-
optation’ examines the distinct way by which the particular type of clientelism 
associated with an inclusive hegemony impinges on preference formation, in search 
for direct analogies between clientelism and state coercion. A party’s monopoly 
control over the supply of clientelism in a large political sector of the economy 
gives the party the extraordinary capacity to punish defectors and opponents by 
positive material retaliation and exclusion from the clientelist network. Dissent 
inevitably receives punishment owing to lack of exit, and members of the client 
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group have to yield to pressures for behavioural change possibly against their will. 
This deprives individuals from free choice of behaviour. For any of the above 
reasons, dominant party systems generated by the particular type of monopoly 
clientelism can be duly classified as authoritarian regimes. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion: pluralism, dominance and political analysis 
 
7.1 Summary of the analysis 
The concluding chapter presents a summary of the arguments made in the previous 
chapters followed by a discussion about their broader implications for the wider 
literature in the field and, more broadly, the study of politics from a group-based 
perspective. The thesis has developed a twofold argument about inclusive 
hegemonies, an ideal-type dominant party system with contested democratic 
credentials. The starting point is Dahl’s prominent definition of democracy as 
contestation open to participation, which has raised the dimension of government 
contestability to a constitutive element of the definition of democracy next to an 
open structure of participation.   
The application of a Dahlian approach to dominant party systems suggests that 
dominant party systems facing low degrees of contestability should be classified as 
authoritarian by definition regardless of whether they offer an open structure of 
participation. That the pluralist position relies on a normative conception of 
democracy which remains highly debatable suggests that the notion of 
authoritarianism cannot be effortlessly extended to this type of party system without 
facing objections as to the very basis upon which this heavy judgment relies. To 
support a Dahlian approach requires the development of a more nuanced argument 
that takes into account the criterion set up by the established literature for 
classifying dominant party systems as democratic or authoritarian, according to 
which the processes and strategies used by the dominant party to establish and 
maintain its dominant position should run counter to core democratic principles. A 
more demanding formulation of this benchmark is to ascertain that a dominant party 
system is authoritarian if it meets two requirements: a) there is low government 
contestability in all three arenas of contestation (it is an inclusive hegemony) and b) 
the means employed to achieve this state of affairs are essentially non-democratic. 
Attempts to extend the conceptual boundaries of dominant authoritarian party 
systems by other approaches to dominant party systems and semi-authoritarianism 
have used the notions of meaningful elections and fair competition to argue that a 
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number of strategies involving the use of state power skew the playing field and 
increase the cost of the opposition to act as an effective political force. The thesis 
argues that these positions still remain questionable. It is still not clarified whether 
the practices should be seen as effective hindrances to competitive politics or 
merely as pathologies of politics, which to a smaller extent are observed in viable 
democracies. Although the literature has been nothing but parsimonious in listing 
tactics and strategies that allegedly enable a party to become dominant without the 
need to place significant limits to the formal structure of participation, it remains a 
theoretical challenge to explore whether and why any of these tactics and strategies 
potentially associated with the rise and consolidation of a dominant party are 
essentially non-democratic before passing a hefty judgment about the character of 
the regime associated with them.  
To define the character of inclusive hegemony, the thesis followed a number of 
analytical steps. It adopted a critical stance on Dahl’s definitional standard and 
sought to build a more robust defence of his claim that inter-party contestability 
should be taken as an inherent quality of democracy, by juxtaposing the pluralist 
definition of democracy with alternative meanings of democracy, namely the 
‘mandate approach’ and democracy’s basic etymological interpretation. The second 
chapter has provided a minimalist synthesis in defence of the view that 
contestability is an essential quality of democracy.  
The third chapter paid a visit to historical narratives of democratisation to add 
empirical strength to the claim that a dominant party characterised by a low degree 
of contestability is a particularly puzzling political phenomenon. The story of 
democratisation portrays a picture of politics in which inter-group political 
competition reflect inter-group relative power and shifting group alliances. Two 
patterns are discerned which can be read as a refinement to the pluralist framework; 
first, groups are formed on the basis of shared interests often consisting of 
individuals that belong to the same social categories such as class, ethnicity, 
religion, and gender; and second, relative power and political preferences are 
associated with social positions, changing socioeconomic conditions and shifting 
distributions of resources and power. Historical narratives of democratisation and 
regime change demonstrate that societies are constantly divided by long-standing 
social cleavages and emerging policy divisions, and that political communities 
119 
 
facing conflicts of interest will almost inevitably exhibit a considerable degree of 
political competition.  
What the narratives of political struggle and democratisation highlight is that social 
diversity generates a competing political arena, which, unless suppressed by violent 
means, tends to provide political forces with multiple opportunities to form 
collective action and compete in politics. The multiple memberships of individuals 
in social categories on the basis of income, class, employment, location, ethnic 
origin, and gender offer various grounds for collective action expected to be 
channelled into politics in the form of a multi-party system reflecting a wide range 
of political and ideological diversity. Consequently, chapter three argues, social 
diversity is a source of systemic volatility, which acts as a centrifugal force in 
politics and constantly undermines attempts by groups or group alliances to 
concentrate political power. Subsequently, in political systems open to participation, 
contestability is the inevitable outcome of the activities of autonomous and 
competing political forces, within-party factions and civil society organisations 
representing opposing and often irreconcilable interests. Hence, one-party 
dominance becomes a perplexing phenomenon due to the fact that long incumbency 
tends to generate new divisions and to accumulate more grievances among groups 
experiencing losses. This should be treated as an indication of anomalous conditions 
in political competition.  
In light of the above remarks, the opposition’s weakness to capitalise on policy 
divisions and attain some electoral gains in a dominant party system of open 
participation cannot be effortlessly attributed to the weakness of its party strategy or 
to its failure to learn from consecutive electoral defeats and identify flaws in 
previous political campaigns that would enable it to reassess its political messages, 
improve its organisational capacities and possibly change its leadership. The theory 
of democracy and regime change points to a different explanatory path. If 
authoritarianism is typically sustained by a monopoly in coercion suppressing the 
political expression of diverse social interests, inclusive hegemonies must involve 
the exercise of other forms of power equally effective as coercion in bringing about 
a similar political outcome. Explaining the consolidation of an inclusive hegemony 
requires an account of how other forms of power such as persuasion and incentives 
may lead to limited contestability against a context of social diversity that tends to 
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generate an uneven distribution of preferences and an uneven distribution of 
resources. Starting with the premise that the distribution of campaign-related 
resources largely delineates the relative capacity of each political party to mobilise 
broader electoral support in a political system open to participation, an explanation 
of the establishment and stability of dominant party systems should examine how 
disparities in the organisational capacities between the government and the 
opposition emerge and how this asymmetry results in an advantage for the dominant 
party in mobilising broader electoral support. Given the fact that the diversity of 
social interests would tend to generate a diversity of power resources too, the 
question is to identify which causal process makes possible the emergence of a 
hegemonic party out of an open multi-party system. 
Chapter four unfolds the association between clientelism as a tool of recruitment of 
campaign resources and electoral mobilisation. The chapter argues that, while social 
divisions and cleavages offer multiple sources of campaign resources for inter-
group competition (c.f. Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), the formation and organisation of 
a political party faces a collective action problem. Political organisation – a form of 
collective action vital for electoral mobilisation – does not automatically stem from 
shared perceptions of interests, common public causes and ideology. To address the 
problem of free-riding, parties need to set up selective incentives to incentivise 
active contributions to party organisation and activate political engagement. Just as 
the coercive power of the state gives the ruling group the capacity to suppress 
dissent and command compliance, an equally strong incentivising mechanism can 
be found in state involvement in the allocation of economic resources and 
opportunities. A solution to this problem is to make the distribution of resources 
conditional on a desirable pattern of behaviour by the recipients, the clients. Since 
the rewards offered in clientelist exchange tend to make a considerable impact on 
one’s utility curve, they may, therefore, act as a strong incentive for actors to 
engage in party activities and make sizeable material contributions. This take on 
clientelism in chapter four goes beyond the typical view of vote-buying to identify a 
process by which the party obtains an unmatched advantage in incentives for the 
recruitment of active supporters and, consequently, a lead in human and material 
resources employed in order to mobilise broader electoral support.  
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Having identified a causal variable, a dual process is presented linking clientelism 
with electoral mobilisation: on the first stage, clientelism induces contributions to 
party organisation in campaign resources and, on the second stage, the advantage 
gained in resources for campaign strengthen the party’s capacity for electoral 
mobilisation. At the same time, clientelism offers a mode of interest 
accommodation that re-organises social claims into hierarchically controlled 
networks of clients and thereby helps the party prevent centrifugal tendencies that 
could undermine its cohesion, such as defections and internal factionalism. 
The analysis in chapter five extends this causal model to explain the outcome of 
limited contestation, the defining characteristic of inclusive hegemony.  At issue 
here is to gain a theoretical grasp of how clientelism acts as successful substitute for 
coercion in constraining political behaviour to the extent that it produces a 
hegemonic one-party regime in a multi-party system open to the participation. 
Chapter five shows how under certain structural conditions clientelism can indeed 
produce limited contestability. The aggregate effect of clientelism on the overall 
pattern of political mobilisation depends on a number of structural and agential 
parameters: namely the range of clientelist incentives and the intensity of the 
practice. These parameters determine whether clients have some scope for exit. 
Limiting exit reduces the degree of one’s autonomy and increases the degree of 
one’s dependency on the clientelist party. Clients are clustered into large clientelist 
networks where behaviour is supervised and checked. Limited exit also reduces the 
scope for the opposition parties to recruit supporters among those indifferent to 
clientelist incentives.  
The aggregate effect of the widespread and systematic application of clientelist 
incentives in that type deters the development of autonomous forms of political 
organisations in all arenas of contestation. In addition, not only does clientelism 
affect party politics but it also reshapes power relations within the dominant party 
and between government and civil society, two alternative arenas for social actors 
to contest government policies. Under the type associated with political hegemony, 
clientelism serves as a ‘blocking factor’ hindering the development of open 
contestation as effectively as suppression in typical authoritarian regimes. This 
particular function gives a specific meaning to Duverger’s early definition of a 
dominant party as one whose influence exceeds all others for a generation or more 
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(Duverger, 1954:308) and draws a clear distinction between democratic and 
authoritarian regimes. 
In light of the previous analysis, chapter six addresses the question whether 
inclusive hegemonies should be seen as authoritarian regimes, following the 
standard of the literature on democracy that that the nature of the regime is defined 
by the factors associated with its emergence and consolidation. Although this 
categorisation is unproblematic in the case of typical authoritarian regimes that rely 
on the use of coercion, fraud and intimidation, a decision on the nature of one-party 
dominance that relies on extensive applications of clientelism to limit its exposure 
to contestation requires the development of a convincing argument about the nature 
of clientelism itself, which avoids idealised, unrealistic and disputable expectations 
of what democracy should be and rather refers to widely accepted distinctive 
properties of democracy.  
Two arguments are presented in support of the view that the practice of clientelism, 
under particular circumstances, contravenes essential democratic properties. First, 
unlike other uses of state power that give the incumbent an advantage in electoral 
mobilisation, the clientelist agreement fails to meet the requirement that demands in 
a democratic process should face public scrutiny, a requirement based on the basic 
conception of democracy developed in chapter one. Second, low contestability in 
this particular type of clientelism, albeit not the result of physical violence and 
intimidation, deprives exit and punishes voice thereby directing political behaviour 
in the same way as coercive power. Dissidents face a spectrum of exclusion and 
material retaliation if they choose to express dissent and exhibit undesired 
behaviour. The chapter concludes that both this type of clientelist incentives and 
coercion are applications of state power that share similar purposes and functions 
and, for that reason, a regime generated by their practice should be duly classified 
as authoritarian.  
The causal process linking resources and electoral mobilisation relies on rational 
choice assumptions to make causal arguments on the micro-level. The analysis here 
has used the less contested assumptions that political engagement is motivated by 
collective incentives and that voters make their decisions on the basis of the 
information available to them (bounded rationality). The theory here turns 
assumptions implicit in empirical works into analytical arguments and clarifies 
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causality as a sequence of causal processes between a) clientelism and party 
organisation (as a form of collective action by which campaign resources are 
gathered and employed) and b) party organisation and electoral mobilisation, 
brought into a model that takes into account the size of the political sector of the 
economy and the institutions in place. Based on the same assumptions of rational 
behaviour and bounded rationality, it is expected that the aggregate level the sum of 
individual risk assessments responding to the set of clientelist incentives and 
disincentives approximate the number of actors who are engaged in the political 
sector of the economy.  
Ideal-type constructions and abstract theorising help empirical research sort out 
various observations to might favour a purely descriptive approach citing a basket 
of factors and, instead, discern in-depth causal associations. Modelling the causal 
linkage between a regime-type and a set of explanatory variables is particularly 
useful for empirical studies as it allows empirical research to make claims of 
causality on the basis of observations of values of the explanatory variables. If a 
particular configuration of variables, namely clientelism and a large political sector 
of the economy, is found in an empirical case, this can be seen as a sufficient 
empirical evidence for a causal variable explaining the emergence of a dominant 
party system. Empirical research of a case study that has identified the presence of 
the model’s parameters in a particular dominant party system can then argue with a 
higher degree of certainty that clientelism is the main causal factor associated with 
the stability of one-party dominance.  
A final note is that the building of a logical sequence of arguments based on initial 
assumptions about human action has touched on a number of broader analytical 
questions: how does the distribution of power resources impinge on political 
competition? How do non-voluntary structural attachments trigger collective 
action? What is the input of structural-economic properties in the interactions 
between groups? If relative power matters, what is meant by power and in what 
ways do different forms of power relate to each other and to party competition? 
How can power resources be incorporated into an analytical framework on group 
formation and behaviour? In the following ‘opening-out’ section, the broader 
ontological implications of the previous analysis are discussed and made explicit as 
to how they may offer a refinement of the pluralist framework. 
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7.2 Broader theoretical and epistemological implications 
7.2.1 Structure and agency 
In seeking to explain the puzzle of one-party dominance, the dissertation has made 
adaptations to the pluralist approach to collective action. It has placed pluralism in a 
‘structure and agency’ framework that takes into account the role of power, 
structural properties and power relations in mobilising political action and 
triggering political behaviour. It has also revised the pluralist ontology, which 
places the group as the unit of analysis, to be consistent with methodological 
individualism and rational choice in acknowledging that collective action emerges 
as the result of selective incentives motivating individuals to pursue their goals by 
means of group action.  
The marriage of rational choice with pluralism here suggests that without specifying 
sets of collective incentives, collective action cannot be taken as given. Involuntary 
memberships in socioeconomic categories such as class, income, gender, ethnicity 
etc, do not automatically generate group action. A pure structuralist approach fails 
to give due consideration to the role of agency and selective incentives that, by 
punishing free-riding behaviour and by offering targeted benefits for a group of 
individuals that outweigh expected costs, make it worthwhile for rational 
individuals to pursue collective action. The ontological norm is that, for the purpose 
of empirical work we can talk of collective action when we see it happening and, 
alternatively, for the purpose of theory building in the thesis is that we may 
hypothesise a set of selective incentives triggering collective action. The 
assumption derived from neoclassical economics according to which individuals are 
utility maximisers adjusting their behaviour depending on the set of incentives has a 
central place in the thesis’ analysis, when, for instance, explaining the link between 
party organisation and clientelism as a tool that motivates contributions to the 
party’s campaign in return for access to government distribution of resources and by 
threats of exclusion and material retaliation. This rational-choice framework for the 
explanation of aggregate political patterns allows the thesis to support the claim that 
by incentivising political alignment with the party, a clientelist party gains an 
advantage in human and material resources which it uses to mobilise broader 
electoral support.  
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Equally, the thesis’ ontological approach gives due consideration to the input of 
structure in collective action. It acknowledges that the application of selective 
incentives to motivate collective action is confined by the presence of structural 
preconditions offering substantive grounds for collective action. Social divisions, 
grievances and ideological differences form the basis of collective action, which 
agency activates into concrete political engagements. A view of political action as a 
reflection of the social context takes into account the input of structural 
categorisations that create ‘communities of fate’ along divisions based on class, 
gender and ethnicity with shared social experience, patterns of behaviour and 
predispositions, and possibly perceptions of interest that might give rise to 
collective action. For the purpose of theory-building, the technical language of 
utility maximisation should not overshadow the input of these specific social 
parameters defining collective action.  As the reading of works in democratisation 
in chapter two illustrates, a ‘structure and agency’ approach can locate the 
formation of interests, political preferences and collective action in objective 
properties related to economic and social status upon which selective incentives 
may apply to trigger political action. Depending on how costs and incentives are 
configured by human agency, structural factors may shape shared perceptions of 
common interest and may be the main triggering factor for collective action. 
Structure is brought centre-stage in chapter five, where the range and effectiveness 
of clientelist incentives was said to be dependent on the size of the political sector 
of the economy governed by political incentives and on the position of economic 
actors therein. In the case of a dominant party, the political sector of the economy 
allows the practice of clientelism to act as a blocking factor for forms of political 
action, despite the presence of social and political divisions expected to act as 
centrifugal forces. Here, clientelism was presented in its interaction with other 
driving factors of political action such as ideology, social status, political 
grievances, social cleavages etc, which were are integrated factors in one’s rational 
calculation of expected benefits, costs and risks. This impact of structure on agency 
captured by the rational model of behaviour has explained how clientelism 
restructures collective action into hierarchical, command-and-control networks 
against other social conditions that push in the opposite direction. Broadly speaking, 
such a scheme allows the analysis to integrate and gauge comparatively the impact 
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each of these structural parameters has in a given case. At the same time, consistent 
with methodological individualism, the thesis allows for a wide scope for agency. 
Depending on the availability of structural opportunities, agency can shape the 
structural context in which incentives are set up to trigger collective action. As 
shown in chapter three, a political group that occupies power may use the state’s 
formidable power capacities to change key structural properties and relations which 
enable it to command support and punish defection.  
The broader suggestion is that any hypothesis that seeks to associate a phenomenon 
with a number of explanatory variables should identify the combined effect of 
structural relationships and particular sets of incentives for political action on 
political behaviour. By tracing the interplay between incentives and structure, 
political behaviour, though not determined by incentives, becomes more predictable 
and can be incorporated in theoretical generalisations. This also suggests that 
political change can be analysed with reference to changes in the incentive 
structures as either the intended effect of collective action or the unintended 
consequence of structural change. Structural shift such as economic and 
technological change, tend to destabilise existing sets of incentives, possibly 
triggering changes in political behaviour as a result. For instance, as explained in 
chapter four, exogenous shocks to a national economy can limit the effect of 
clientelism on politics, by limiting the clientelist resources available to the 
government party and by dictating economic reforms that limit the scope for 
clientelism.   
7.2.2 Balance of power  
The same framework adopted by the dissertation to avoid the pitfalls of structural 
determinism and the danger of overreliance on agency informs the concept of 
balance of power, which appears to be precariously dependent on both the 
distribution of resources in a given structure and group strategies and alliances.  
For classical pluralism, political domination by a single group is prevented in a 
system of mutual controls that establish a balance of power between competing 
groups; this is the crucial precondition for a viable democracy. For some, the 
problem, however, is that power resources are unequally distributed among 
individuals. Existing inequalities of power in contemporary societies seem to make 
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impossible the ideal of a ‘balance of power’ sustaining democracy (Gould, 1988, 
99). The pluralists’ take on this criticism places great reliance on group action and 
shifting alliances. The underlying premise is that the distribution of power resources 
in any given context is constantly reshuffled by the collective organisation of 
individuals. A ‘balance of power’ can then emerge from group alliances that 
produce re-alignments in the distribution of power resources. This increases the 
prospects for democracy in conditions of inequality. In the pluralist framework, 
most importantly, members of a weaker group can combine their resources, raising 
the cost of control, and thereby overcoming domination on certain matters 
important to them (Dahl, 1982, 33, and 35). A system of mutual controls may 
emerge from within a context of economic inequality among individuals. However, 
collective organisation may generate new power asymmetries. Even when the 
distribution of power among groups is somewhat symmetrical, it is still possible 
that a number of groups could collude to outweigh others.  
Chapter three brings new light to this debate by acknowledging the input of 
structure in explaining why the possibility of collusion by certain groups against 
others is a rare occasion. It is understood that, because social diversity generates 
conflicting and irreconcilable preferences, no group alliance will be able to fully 
accommodate preferences in the long run and sooner or later this will confront 
centrifugal tendencies, internal splits and factionalism. Nonetheless, it is shown that 
a sharp asymmetry of power can be achieved and sustained when an extraordinary 
source of power resources falls in the hands of one group. In authoritarian regimes 
state coercion is the typical form of power used by a single political group to 
suppress dissent, defection and opposition. Other forms of state power, however, 
can produce a similar impact on political behaviour and, on aggregate level, on 
political competition. Thus to understand dominance in the absence of coercion, the 
role of other power resources, economic resources and knowledge/intellectual 
resources, in politics should be carefully examined.  As chapter two explains, the 
balance of power is a delicate state of affairs contingent on both the relative 
distribution of power resources among competing groups and the reshuffling of 
power relations through group alliances. It is pointed out that, on the one hand, 
distributions of power resources are related to the economic structure while, on the 
other, the economic structure can be strategically manipulated by a political group 
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in control of the state with the purpose of skewing the distribution of resources. 
This view reflects a mixed ontology that incorporates in this analysis the interplay 
between agency and structure. 
The second analytical premise the thesis adopts is that groups are not simply 
aggregations of power pooled by their members but they also constitute spheres of 
authority in relation to their members. At first glance, the value added of this 
premise is that it adds the dimension of intra-group dynamics next to the pluralists’ 
emphasis on inter-group competition (c.f. emphasis on factionalism within the 
dominant party by Boucek, 2012). Since most groups are governed by a group 
leadership through a hierarchical structure that ensures a degree of co-ordination of 
collective action, it is intra-group power relations experienced by individual 
members of the group which, by constraining behaviour, may seriously obstruct the 
genuine expression of preferences and ultimately limit the degree of contestability 
within the group.  
On closer interpretation, intra-group and inter-group dynamics are co-dependent. 
The capacity of a group to constrain the behaviour of its members depends on the 
conditions of recruitment and the range of alternative options its members have. 
What mitigates the power of leadership to check or even dictate the behaviour of 
group members is whether members have some scope for exit from the group to 
either form or join alternative organisations. As the terms of entry to and exit from a 
group for individuals depend on the availability of alternative options for collective 
organisation, the range of options determine the power of the group on its members. 
The plurality of social organisations enables individuals to opt in and out of the 
group and choose among alternative spheres of authority. A plurality of groups 
offers alternative arenas of socialisation and competing sources of information and 
persuasion. By contrast, limited opportunities for entry and exit from one group 
increases the power of the group leadership over its members. Lack of exit, 
ultimately means that group membership in a no longer voluntary, the product of 
free will, when a decision to leave the group would inevitably incur a high cost. 
Lack of exit to other groups also means that dissenting voice within the group’s 
sphere of authority is highly costly. In the absence of different spheres of authority, 
no client is in a position to negotiate their terms of entry and to some extent or 
mitigate the losses by exiting the group later on. Under these conditions, 
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membership in a clientelist group organised and controlled hierarchically becomes 
essentially a relationship of dependency on, and subordination to the patron’s 
authority. This constrains how members of a group reveal their preferences and 
choose to behave to a degree that contravenes individual, freedom essentially 
defined as the freedom to choose among competing spheres of authority which ones 
to join and the freedom of exit from them.  
The ensuing question is what delineates the range of options for collective action. 
As chapter three has indicated, the number of associations tends to reflect the 
degree of social diversity in a given context, which offers multiple opportunities for 
the individual to enter or exit from group membership. Thus limits to the number of 
possible group affiliations are primarily structural, given that collective action is 
largely contingent on shared experience and common perception of interest 
referring to social, economic and cultural status. Because individual attachments to 
non-voluntary categories such as class, ethnicity, gender etc, do not easily change at 
will, they reduce the opportunities each individual has given his or her social status 
for engagement in collective action to a smaller subset of existing or potential 
groups. On aggregate level, structural attachments place limits to the number of 
associations each individual can choose from, and determine the relative size of 
collective associations. Thus entry to and exit from an association is not random. 
Both group formation and inter-group mobility are contingent on the existing 
pattern of attachments of individuals to social categories in a given socioeconomic 
structural context. Yet a wide range of choice still exists as most individuals 
simultaneously belong to more than one non-voluntary associations and can choose 
to take part in more than one group simultaneously. This at the same time increases 
their exposure to different sources of information.  
Limits to political pluralism can also be placed by agency. The structure and agency 
view of group formation presented above suggests that agency can apply a strategy 
that interferes in the way socioeconomic structure generates multiple and competing 
social and political organisations. A group aspiring to establish a dominant position 
in society and politics could employ a strategy that raises the cost of forming 
alternative political organisations by interfering with selective incentives on a large 
scale. Such extraordinary capacity can only be found in the power of the state with 
its resources for coercion unmatched by any other organisation, a huge incentivising 
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power by legislation and regulation, and the widest possible scope to redistribute 
economic resources and allocate economic opportunities. A deeper effect of state 
power is that the group in control of the state may shape incentives for political 
action in a desired direction by restructuring the social basis from which political 
organisation emerges. The outcome of widespread and systematic application of 
this form of manipulative power is the underdevelopment of autonomous 
organisations and restrictions to the avenues through which diverse social interests 
find political expression and accommodation. 
7.3 Epilogue: implications for normative democratic theory  
The analysis has unearthed a number of crucial and rather disquieting implications 
for democratic theory. Clientelism exposes the risks by government distribution of 
economic resources on political freedom. The analysis casts doubt on the views that 
in the absence of coercion exercised by one group, social diversity will inevitably 
generate a considerable degree of political competition, that one- group domination 
can be averted by the alliance of antagonistic groups in a system of mutual controls; 
that social diversity provides individuals and groups with the resources necessary to 
form groups and have a visible and vocal presence in politics; and that parties are 
merely organisations seeking to gain access to state power to represent bundles of 
preferences, the idealised vision of party politics in Western democracies. At the 
same time, the ubiquity of clientelist practices across a variety of political systems 
shows that rather than a pathology of competitive politics, the practise is inbuilt in 
the way politics interfere with the allocation of economic resources, and a potential 
danger for the viability of competitive politics. These two findings may undermine 
confidence in the resilience of representative democratic institutions, as the increase 
of state action in the economy can increase the range and intensity of clientelism. 
With the state’s distributive mechanism in the hands of one group there is a high 
risk that, under certain conditions, a hegemonic regime can be established by 
manipulating preferences and behaviour through clientelism applied in all arenas of 
contestation – party politics, civil society autonomy and within-party contestation. 
To paraphrase Nicholas R. Miller, (1983), clientelism will seriously block 
‘pluralism as dispersed preferences’ to evolve into ‘pluralism as dispersed power’ 
through group action.  
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Hence, the typical image of democratic politics that sees state power as the target of 
competing groups and declares that in a system open to participation the state’s 
overwhelming power can be tamed by the activities of competing groups could be 
criticised for presenting a limited view of the role of the state in politics, one that 
reduces it to an assembly of interacting agencies under a government elected by and 
accountable to the public. The same criticism applies to the view of political parties 
as the main channel of political representation, expressing the demands, 
expectations and complaints of the members and social groups they represent. 
Rather, chapter three and four indicate that the political party can evolve into a 
sphere of authority over its members and a major force shaping the very content and 
forms of expression of social demands. The party obtains such a capacity owing to 
the state’s unmatched capacity to skew the conditions in which political competition 
takes place, interfering in the way social demands and interests are articulated, 
defended and accommodated in politics, undermining individual autonomy and 
reshuffling relative power among social and political groups. Resilient 
constitutional checks on government power can be undermined through the same 
process, when citizens are asked to decide on constitutional amendments that would 
grant stronger powers to the government, while forming their preferences on the 
basis of information provided by the government party. The same process by which 
the normative prescription of democracy of citizens in control of power is supposed 
to be realised can allow the rise of an actual monopoly of power without recourse to 
violent coercion, by the decision of a majority in conformity with the formal 
institutions of representative democracy.  
This alarming and rather depressing analysis offers useful insights to the normative 
agenda of democratic theory that seeks to find institutional ways to tame the power 
of the state. First, it could be read as a challenge for the neorepublican’s conception 
of democracy, which gives primary importance in the capacity of people to contest 
‘whatever it is that government does’ (Pettit, 1997:ix) and which sees the 
relationship between state and the people ‘as one between the trustor and the 
trustee’ (Pettit, 1997:8). There are now serious reasons to be sceptical whether 
political institutions alone could guarantee that a representative-democratic state 
shall act as a trustee for non-domination, given that there is a strong incentive for 
the ruling group to use the state as the mechanism to obtain a dominant position. 
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Given that there are inbuilt incentives for a client-patron relationship and insofar as 
government interference in the distribution of economic resources can produce a 
distortive effect on behaviour and preference formation to the point that it can lead 
to actual monocracy reproduced through the democratic process, to envisage a 
state-society relationship as one between trustor and trustee is an overly optimistic 
position.  
Pluralistic politics is now understood to be a precarious state of affairs highly 
dependent on a social basis vulnerable to state action. This brings back the basic 
question posed by the very etymology of democracy as demos and kratos; how to 
control state power. The normative question how people can exercise control over 
the state remains unresolved. The arguments presented in the thesis question the 
feasibility of the ideal democratic imagery. They bring centre-stage the liberal 
preoccupation with the amount and intensity of government authority exercised on 
individuals, and the concern with dominance and oppression in the relation between 
state power and the ideal of political empowerment through democratic politics (c.f. 
Young, 1990:3).  Insofar as the elected government is seen as the legitimate actor at 
liberty to decide over the scale of distribution of resources, with few checks on the 
growth of the political sector of the economy that determines the range of 
clientelism, there is a danger that a hegemonic regime may be established through 
the very institutions of democracy. 
We may now contend with more certainty that effective checks on state power 
should be found beyond the sphere of formal political institutions. If the agenda for 
analytical and normative democratic theory is to suggest ways that thwart the 
possibility of domination through the exercise of all forms of state power, we hold 
the argument that political outcomes, including more fundamental cases of 
constitutional change, are intricately linked with relative power dynamics between 
competing groups. In state-society relations, decentralised power resources allow 
multiple and relatively autonomous groups to put in place a pattern of mutual 
controls that keeps all forms of state power at bay. While it is through collective 
action that checks on state power can be placed, the effectiveness of group action 
depends on their capacity to find and draw the necessary resources from a social 
and economic context relatively autonomous from the state. In short, political 
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pluralism rests upon a pluralist socioeconomic basis, and democracy precariously 
relies on the vibrancy of social and economic pluralism.  
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